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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Political Participation and Transformation in Urban China,  
1993 and 2002. (May 2008) 
Diqing Lou, B.A., Foreign Affairs College  
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Jon R. Bond 
 
 My dissertation examines political participation in non-democratic countries. 
Specifically, it looks into China’s urban political participation in the past decade and 
examines how Chinese urban citizens are mobilized to participate in politics when an 
authoritarian regime has been experiencing dramatic economic change. The theoretic 
question of this dissertation is the evolvement of state-society relations during the 
economic development and how the change of the state-society relationship is reflected 
in individual behavior. I found that while the social context such as the workplace served 
as fundamental grassroots institution to mobilize citizens’ political participation in the 
early 1990s, China’s urban political participation has shifted to lean more and more on 
individual resources. 
Political participation in non-democratic regimes is a unique and rapidly 
developing field in the studies of political behavior. Scholars studying citizens’ political 
participation in USSR and China have long noted that political participation in an 
authoritarian regime is mobilized and controlled by the state and citizens are organized 
 iv 
by the state to participate in politics to provide for regime legitimacy. In the dissertation 
I tested this paradigm within the context of China’s economic development. 
The data I employ are the 1993 China’s Social Mobility and Social Change 
Survey and the 2002 Asian Barometer Survey. Both data sets contain highly congruent 
batteries of questions on citizens’ political behavior and political attitudes that provide 
the basis of comparison across time. The data sets were collected across China in 1993 
and 2002 respectively representing the population of adult residents (excluding Tibet).  
The comparison of urban political participation in the past decade exhibited a 
general and measurable decline of citizens’ participation in the economic reform. I found 
Chinese citizens’ political participation has shifted largely from the pattern of 
“grassroots-state-mobilization” to “individual-voluntary-mobilization” during the 
economic reform. I argue that this is largely resulted from the change of state-society 
relations as individual citizens are granted with more autonomy in political liberalization 
and become less dependent on the state for economic sources. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 This dissertation is about political participation in the non-democracies and it 
aims to explore the determinants that motivate citizens’ participation in non-democratic 
settings. Specifically, the dissertation employs the case of China and attempts to identify 
the motivating factors for China’s urban political participation.  
 My main argument in the dissertation is that in non-democratic countries, social 
context can be at least as important as individual characteristics in determining political 
participation, if not even more significant. I argue that the single most important predictor 
to determine China’s urban political participation is the workplace that the individual is 
immersed within. At the end of the study, I shall discuss the likely significance that such 
findings may suggest about China’s democratic prospect in light of China’s current 
economic reforms. 
Study of Political Participation in Democracies and Non-Democracies 
 Political participation has been a central topic in political studies since the 
behavioral revolution that occurred in the 1960s. As political studies diverted their 
attention from traditional political theorizing toward human behavior, the question of 
individual citizens’ political participation has remained one of the most important topics 
in the study of politics.  
 
 
 
 
___________ 
This dissertation follows the style of American Political Science Review. 
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Indeed, citizens’ political participation occupies a critical place in modern 
political studies, especially in the study of democratic systems for good and almost  
apparent reasons. After all, an active and responsive citizenry is critical for the healthy 
and successful operation of democracy.  At a minimum, democracy is a form of 
government that governs with the consent of the governed, and gives citizens the 
opportunity to participate in making policy. Without the engagement of its citizenry, any 
democracy is subject to the danger of collapse or tyranny. Thus, to monitor and assess 
citizenry’s political participation can be an important and critical task of the political 
studies of modern democracy.  
As theory and methodological development enabled systematic research of human 
behavior, more and more scholarly attention has been devoted to the study of political 
participation, mostly in democratic systems. Scholars of political behavior have been 
trying to disentangle the puzzles such as what citizens do in order to attain their political 
goals in the current political system, and why some people opt to stay out of the political 
process while some others strive to engage in politics. In the last few decades, there has 
emerged a remarkable number of scholarly works that shed light upon these questions 
and upon political participation in general (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Almond and Verba 
1963; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Woflinger and Rosenstone 1980; 
Verba, Scholozman and Brady 1995; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Oilver 2001). These 
works have been concerned with various aspects of citizens’ political participation, and 
have greatly deepened our understanding of forms and quality of political participation 
within the current political system as well as the democracy itself. These studies 
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illuminate the disparities of political participation among the citizenry and have directed 
the social efforts to motivate and engage people with political life in a more equal fashion. 
 Although the study of political participation remains one of the most important 
and one of the most fruitful subfields in political science research, it has been mostly 
confined to the study of democracies. Indeed, for long it was generally accepted by the 
political science discipline that participation mainly existed in democratic countries. 
Although participation has been a heated and well-researched field, little political 
participation research had been done for the citizenry in non-democratic regimes. 
 Since the early 1970s, scholarly attention has increased in the political 
participation in the non-democratic regimes, such as the Soviet Union and People’s 
Republic of China. Political research has raised the general question in the study of 
political participation: can there be meaningful political participation in non-democratic 
regimes, and has there actually been political participation in non-democratic regimes?  
The answer to these questions has been a “yes”. During the last three decades, 
participation scholars have found that there indeed is meaningful and actual political 
participation in the non-democratic regimes (e.g. Friedgut 1979; Hahn 1987; Millar 1987; 
Bahry and Silver 1990; Shi 1997; Jennings 1998; Tong 2003). These political behavior 
scholars who dared to ask the question about the possible existence of political 
participation in non-democratic countries have found that citizens in non-democratic 
settings are indeed engaged with political affairs in an effective and comprehensive way. 
Townsend (1967) in his study of political participation found that popular political 
participation was well available in the newly established China. Little (1976) compared 
the political participation in the U.S. with the participation in the USSR, and noted the 
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widespread forms of participation in the Soviet politics1. In Friedgut’s (1979) study of 
political participation of USSR, the author examined citizens’ political participation in 
the Soviet Union and compared them with the U.S. participation.  
As the contemporary participation studies confirmed the existence of civil 
engagement in non-democratic societies, scholars started to further examine the 
motivational mechanisms through which citizens are engaged in politics.  
Bahry and Silver (1990) looked into political participation in the Soviet Union 
and reported that political participation was prevalent in Soviet Union before the 
democratization of the country. Bahry and Silver pointed out that not only were citizens 
able to participate in the non-democratic countries, but the battery of their participation is 
complex and far from being uni-dimensional. Partially inspired by Bahry and Silver’s 
work, Shi (1997) looked into political participation in Beijing on the eve of the 1989 
democratic movement and found there were various meaningful types of political 
participation in China. After conducting interviews with around one thousand Beijing 
residents, Shi concluded that citizenry of the non-democratic countries, such as China, 
were able to participate in politics meaningfully and to attain their sociopolitical goals 
through various means and channels.  
 Bahry and Silver’s research and Shi’s study are among a collection of important 
political behavior studies that are devoted to the question of the mechanisms of political 
                                                          
1
 Townsend defines political participation as follows: “political participation includes all those activities 
through which the individual consciously becomes involved in attempts to give a particular direction to the 
conduct of public affairs, excluding activities of an occupational or compulsory nature” (4). According to 
Little, mass political participation is the “involvement of individual citizens in collective political activities 
related to the functions performed by the formal institutions of the political system” (454). Both Townsend 
and Little argued that mobilized political participation should be counted toward meaningful political 
participation in non-democratic countries, and “both the American and Soviet political systems are 
participant systems” (Little, 455). This definition of political participation has raised drawn critiques in 
later studies of political participation in non-democracies, as whether or not mobilized political acts should 
be counted toward meaningful political participation remains controversial in some scholarly debates.  
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participation within non-democratic settings since the early 1990s (Jennings 1997; Shi 
1998; Chen and Yang 1999; Tong 2003; Chen 2004). Not only have these works further 
confirmed the existence of political participation in non-democratic settings, but they also 
have provided invaluable insights and knowledge that deepened our understanding of 
political participation in non-democratic nations. A majority of these works have tried to 
address various aspects of the following key question of political participation within 
non-democracies: if political participation in non-democracies is as real and meaningful 
as political participation in democracies, are the determinants of political participation in 
non-democracies the same as the determinants of political participation in democracies? 
That is, if political participation does exist in non-democracies, how are we to explain it? 
Two Approaches in Studying Political Participation 
Before we move on to explain political participation in non-democracies, let us 
briefly review the explanation and prediction of political participation in the current 
political studies in general.  
 So far the study of political participation has evolved along two fundamentally 
different theoretical lines. The first line is to reduce the political participation to the 
individual level, which attempts to explain the different levels of citizens’ participation 
with different individual characteristics, such as one’s income, education, gender and age. 
The other approach is to explain the difference in political participation from the 
sociopolitical context that goes beyond the individual level. The first school is generally 
regarded as methodological individualism, while the other is referred to as the social 
entity or social context school (Durkeim 1965; Watkins 1973; Kincaid 1986).  
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 Both schools of methodological individualism and social contexts are derived 
from the powerful intellectual roots of sociopolitical philosophy. The methodological 
individualism, as argued by Karl Popper (1962) and Friedrich Hayek (1952), insist that as 
most sociopolitical phenomena can ultimately be reduced at the individual level, most 
sociopolitical phenomena should be explained at the individual level, and the individual-
level social theory should suffice to explain social phenomena. The social entity school, 
supported by important figures such as Comte (1851) and Durkheim (1965), points out 
that there are independent social institutions and social forces that exist beyond the 
individual level, which are as capable and powerful to explain social phenomena as the 
individual traits.  
 Although the methodological individualism and social entities schools ignited 
heated debates in social science in late 1950s and early 1980s, both have contributed 
tremendously to the development of social science inquiry. This is certainly true for the 
field of political participation studies.   
 The current studies of political participation, especially the studies of political 
participation in democracies, which are relatively more advanced than the participation 
research of other systems, have greatly benefited from both of these two theoretical lines. 
One school of contemporary political participation study has focused heavily on the 
individual level. That is, scholars and their works on political behavior insist that political 
participation should and could be comprehensively disentangled by examining diverse 
characteristics at the individual level, such as individuals’ age, education, income, 
citizens’ partisanship and psychological engagement in politics. The other political 
participation research branch maintains that political behavior can hardly be fully 
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explained by individual differences, and political participation can be better explained 
from the perspective of social entities, such as social organizations and social forces. 
Following these lines of inquiries, there have been two major types of theoretical 
explanations for political participation, particularly for the political participation in 
democratic settings. One is to examine and explain citizens’ political participation at the 
individual level, and the difference of citizens’ political participation is attributed to 
citizens’ different income, education, life-stage, partisanship and citizens’ varied interest 
and psychological engagement in politics (Campbell et al. 1960; Almond and Verba 1963; 
Verba and Nie 1972; Barnes et al. 1979; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Clark and 
Clark 1986; Schlozman et al. 1995; Brady, Verba and Schlotzman 1995; Verba, Burns 
and Schlozman 1997). For example, classics of participation studies in democracies by 
Almond and Verba (1963), Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) and Brady, Verba and 
Schlotzman (1995) have all long noted the importance of individual socioeconomic status, 
such as education, income and individual civic engagement, in motivating citizens to 
participate in political affairs. Also, studies by Campbell et al. (1960), Verba and Nie 
(1970) and Verba, Burns and Schlozman (1997) also have pointed out the critical linkage 
between citizens’ political participation and individual partisanship, political interest, 
political knowledge and efficacy in politics. Other type of explanation asserts that the 
differences in the level of individual citizens’ political participation results from the 
social organizations and social institutions that citizens are immersed within every day. 
Such line of theory seeks to explain individual citizens’ political participation difference 
with the everyday surrounding context, such as the family background, the workplace, 
neighborhood and one’s socializing groups such as churches and civil organizations, etc. 
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The differences in these social contexts are believed to contribute to the different level of 
individuals’ acts of political participation (Huckfeldt 1979; Almond and Verba 1989; 
Kenny 1992; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Oliver 2001). Huckfeldt (1979) argued that 
social contexts are important connecting ties between individual social status and political 
participation. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) points out that mobilization plays a critical 
role in shaping people’s voting behavior and emphasizes the importance of social 
networks in engaging citizens into politics, as the organizational memberships provide 
critical networking opportunities to involve individuals into political affairs. Oliver (1999) 
argued that the socioeconomic characteristics of citizens’ immediate environment affect 
citizens’ political participation in various ways.  
Both types of political participation research, political individualism and social 
contexts have achieved remarkable fruits in studying political participation and have 
significantly contributed to the current understanding of political participation. It is found 
that political participation, especially political participation in democracies, can be 
explained both at the individual level, i.e. explained by individuals’ characteristics such 
as income, education, age and political interest, and by social contexts and environment 
that the individual is immersed within, such as the family background and the workplace. 
 The study of political participation in the non-democratic countries has made an 
important contribution by confirming and identifying various forms of citizens’ political 
participation in non-democracies.  Yet, compared to the contemporary study of political 
participation in democracies, there is still a gap remaining concerning the motivational 
mechanisms of citizens’ political participation in non-democracies, especially the 
influence of social context. That is, most of the current participation studies of non-
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democratic settings, such as P. R. China, have placed the major emphasis upon the 
explanation of political participation at the individual level instead of the contextual level. 
A large amount of current political participation studies in non-democracies have mainly 
attempted to analyze the participation differences by examining the individual differences, 
such as education, income, age, membership of the Communist Party and interest in 
political, etc. (Shi 1997; Jennings 1997; Jennings 1998; Tong 2003; Chen 2004). 
Although the influence of social context has been a major theoretical stream in explaining 
political participation in democracies, few political studies so far have done extensive 
research on the social contexts as major sources contributing to the participation 
disparities in non-democracies. 
The major goal of this dissertation is thus to explain political participation in non-
democracies from the social contextual perspective, which, hopefully, shall contribute to 
the general understanding of the mobilizing system and determinants of citizens’ political 
participation in non-democratic settings. Specifically, it employs the case of 
contemporary urban China and tries to identify the major factors that motivate citizens to 
engage in political affairs from the social contextual level.  
The Practical Dimension of This Dissertation 
 Besides the theoretical purpose that this dissertation aims to serve as providing the 
contextual understanding of political participation in non-democracies, there is also the 
practical goal that this study strives to attain. 
 One critical social contextual factor that we shall examine in this study is the 
workplace in China’s urban setting. Currently Chinese urban workplaces are going 
through significant structural changes under the new policies initiated in Chinese 
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economic reforms. So are the social contexts that urban Chinese citizens are experiencing 
every day. Before China’s economic reform in the late 1970s, most Chinese citizens 
worked for the government organizations and state-owned enterprises, and the national 
economy was mainly a state economy. Ever since China launched massive economic 
reforms in the early 1980s, more and more private and foreign enterprises had taken off 
in urban China. With favored economic policies, private and foreign enterprises are 
developing steadily and state enterprises have dropped from its dominant place to barely 
half in recent years.2 Given the rapidly changing scenario of China’s urban workplaces, if, 
as we hypothesize, social contexts such as the workplace, should have a significant effect 
upon China’s urban political participation, the structural changes of the workplaces may 
result in a deep impact on Chinese citizens’ political participation, China’s urban political 
development and China’s democratic prospect sequentially. 
 Thus, one of the major goals of this study is that through studying the case of 
China’s urban political participation under the influence of social context, especially the 
influence of the workplace, it attempts to analyze the changing trend of the political 
participation in China’s urban areas in the economic reforms. By studying the social 
contextual influence on China’s participation, we shall discuss the practical implication 
of our finding and we shall boldly discuss and predict the democratic prospect that China 
may be faced with. We shall argue that China’s accelerating economic reforms have been 
tearing down important social institutions that are critical to mobilize citizens’ political 
participation, and thus jeopardize the quality of China’s political participation at least in 
the urban areas. 
                                                          
2
 Source: 2001 National Statistic Yearbook of China. 
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 Another practical political concern that we have in this dissertation is in the 
changes of Chinese urban political participation in the past decade, and how the changes 
in citizens’ political participation are deeply rooted in and reflect the change of state-
society relations in urban China. From 1993 to 2002, China has been experiencing rapid 
economic development, which has brought important and fundamental sociopolitical 
changes to Chinese society. In this dissertation, we will be investigating what the 
similarities are between citizens’ political participation in 1993 and 2002, and what are 
the differences, and what these similarities and differences mean for Chinese urban 
political behavior, and how the continuities and changes reflect the possible changes in 
the state-society relationship that Chinese regime has been facing during the economic 
takeoff.  
Data Sets 
 There are two data sets that we shall be employing in this dissertation. One is the 
1993 Chinese Social Mobility and Social Change Survey and the other 2002 Asian 
Barometer. 
 The 1993 Survey of Chinese Social Mobility and Social Change data set was 
collected by the Social Survey Center of People’s University in Beijing across China in 
August 1993.  The data set is designed to be representative of the adult population over 
18 years old in China, residing in family households at the time, excluding those living in 
 12 
the Tibetan Autonomous region.3 A Stratification multistage area sampling procedure 
was employed to select the sample.4 
 This Chinese Social Mobility and Social Change survey is a comprehensive and 
well-suited data set that collected both the detailed political behavior information and a 
battery of demographic information of all the adult respondents. Also, the survey is 
conducted across all the provinces of China except for Tibet, and the population is 
sampled to well represent the country. The data set has both rural and urban information 
on file, and in this dissertation I shall focus upon the urban section of the data set. The 
total sample of the urban population is 1,070.  
The other data set that we shall use in this study is the Asian Barometer Survey, 
specifically the Mainland China section. Currently the data set is stored in the Asian 
Barometer Survey Project Office in the National Taiwan University and is available to 
the public for academic research upon individual request.5 
The Asian Barometer conducts an over 150-question survey across eight Asian 
regions, which are Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, Philippines, Japan, Mongolia, South 
Korea, and Mainland China. The survey is composed of series questions concerning both 
political attitudes and political behavior of the individual respondent. Compared to the 
1993 data set, the 2002 Asian Barometer is a cross-national survey data set emphasizing 
on the individuals’ political attitude and perception. However, the data set does include 
                                                          
3
 A large proportion of Tibetan do not speak Chinese. Also, at the time of the survey, the transportation in 
Tibet was difficult due to inefficient railroad and highway system. 
4
 The primary sampling units (PSUs) selected eighty-five cities, and the secondly sampling units were 
districts (qu) or streets (jiedao), and the third stage of sampling units were committees (juweihui). 
Households were used at the fourth stage of sampling.  
5
 The data set was collected by the East Asia Barometer Project (2000-2004), which was co-directed by 
Professors Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu and received funding support from Taiwan’s Ministry of Education, 
Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University. The Asian Barometer Project Office is solely 
responsible for the data distribution, and I appreciate the assistance in providing data by the institutes and 
individuals aforementioned. 
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questions of citizens’ political participation, and contains most of the interested 
independent variables in our study.  
The Mainland China Asian Barometer data come from the survey conducted in 
China between March 2002 and August 2002 in cooperation with the Institute of 
Sociology of Chinese Social Science Academy. The sample represents the adult 
population over eighteen years of age residing in family households at the time of the 
survey excluding those residing in the Tibetan Autonomous Region.6 A stratified 
multistage area sampling procedure with probabilities proportional to size measures (PPS) 
was employed to select the sample.7   
The 1993 Survey and 2002 Asian Barometer consisted of batteries of questions 
gauging citizens’ political behavior, social context and citizens’ individual characteristics, 
such as income, education, social status and political interest, which enabled us to 
compare citizens’ political participation and investigate the participation motivation 
across time.    
Organization 
 Before we set out the whole research, we would like to briefly map out the basic 
organization of this study for clarity and guiding purposes. 
 Chapter II shall be devoted to the existent literature of the political participation 
studies in both democratic and non-democratic settings. We shall look into the major 
theories and methods that have been employed to study political participation in all 
settings, and our emphasis shall be placed upon the current works of social contexts and 
                                                          
6
 The Tibet Autonomous region was excluded in the 2002 survey due to similar reasons as in the 1993 data. 
7 The Primary Sampling Units are sixty-seven cities in the urban area, and the secondary sampling units 
were districts and streets, and the third stage of selection was community or neighborhood committees. 
Households were used at the fourth stage of sampling. A total of 496 sampling units were selected. 
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its relationship upon political participation as well as current political participation study 
in non-democratic settings, especially in China.  
 Chapter III shall be the theory and proposition section of the study. Based upon 
the existent studies reviewed in Chapter II, we shall lay down our own theories and 
propositions concerning the relationship between political participation and social context. 
In this chapter we shall also discuss the definition of political participation as well as 
social context, and what relationships we expect to find between political participation 
and social context, especially the workplace. 
 Chapter IV is the first empirical section, in which we shall discuss the data set, 
dependent and independent variables and the measurements and methodologies that we 
shall employ in this study. We shall also set out the key participation forms of our interest. 
Preliminary statistical analysis is to be conducted in this chapter. 
 Chapter V is the major empirical chapter, in which we shall conduct all the 
empirical tests that are related to theories and propositions and analyze the statistical 
results. This chapter shall provide us with the major empirical evidence of the theories 
that are raised in Chapter III. 
 Chapter VI is a chapter dedicated to Chinese politics. As we acknowledged here, 
this dissertation exploring the social contextual influence on China’s political 
participation does not only have the theoretical importance, but also carries deep practical 
significance. In this chapter, we shall devote our discussion into the practical implication 
of this research and talk about how this dissertation may concern itself with China’s 
urban politics and China’s democratic prospect within the economic reforms. 
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 The last chapter, Chapter VII, is the concluding chapter, in which we shall review 
the major theories and empirical findings of this research and summarize what are learned 
concerning the contextual influence on political participation in non-democracies in 
general and the relationship between the workplace and China’s political participation in 
particular. In addition, we shall acknowledge the limitations and drawbacks of this study 
and point out the directions that future researches may like to explore.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 This chapter reviews the established theories and long-standing approaches in the 
study of political participation in democracies and non-democracies with the emphasis on 
the latter.  The major methods and research fruits in the research of political participation 
provide guidance and direction for the rest of the study. At the same time, we shall also 
identify theoretical gaps in existing political participation research, which would be the 
starting point of the theory building of this dissertation. 
The literature review is arranged along two theoretical lines, the methodological 
individualism and social contextual perspectives. We shall look into the political studies 
in democracies from both individual and contextual perspectives, and examine the 
individualistic study of political participation in non-democratic settings such as the 
former Soviet Union and contemporary China. The focus of the literature review is on 
how context such as the workplace affects political participation in democratic settings, to 
use as a theoretical basis for analyzing the social contextual influence on political 
participation in non-democracies. In this chapter we shall examine both the fruits and 
gaps in the current social contextual studies of political participation in non-democracies, 
especially Chinese urban political participation. Finally, we shall briefly preview the 
theoretical arguments to be raised in Chapter III as to advance understanding of how the 
social context affects participation in non-democracies.  
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Political Participation in Democracies 
 Political participation is one of the most important and widely researched fields in 
the study of political science. Research on political participation in democracies has a 
long history and has produced remarkable fruits at both theoretical and empirical levels.   
Political participation was an important topic in political philosophers’ concerns 
of the interactions between the state and the society. As early as Aristotle’s era, political 
scientists were arguing that an effective and genuinely democratic government depends 
on citizens’ participation in the decision making process of the state. In Social Contracts 
& Discourse Rousseau ([1762] 1950) argued that the government should be considered as 
the trustee from the public, and citizen’s participation into the public decision making is 
not only important but also necessary to sustain the normal functioning of the democracy. 
These thoughts have been emphasized in the modern political theory literature and it has 
been widely acknowledged that an active citizenry is critical to the survival and eventual 
success of a democracy (Dewey 1927; Dahl 1956, 1970; Pateman 1970; Thompson 1970).  
In the early writings, political participation has largely been a topic of abstract 
political thought. Since the behavioral revolution in the 1950s, political scientists have 
been looking closely into how citizens participate in politics and what explains their 
political behavior. The study of participation in democratic societies accelerated rapidly 
in the last few decades, and political scholars have explored widely the contents, 
variations, significance and motivational mechanisms of citizens’ political participation 
(Almond and Verba 1963; Verba, Sidney and Norman 1972; Sidney, Nie and Kim 1978; 
Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Brady, Verba and 
Schlotzman 1995; Oliver 2001). These works have explored a wide range of topics in 
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political participation, which have contributed greatly to our understanding political 
participation for both democratic and non-democratic settings. While a complete review 
of the studies of democratic political participation is beyond the scope of this dissertation, 
here I will closely examine what previous research has found about the motivational 
mechanisms of citizens’ political participation in democracies.  
The literature has advanced four models of citizens’ political participation in 
democracies–the socioeconomic model, the demographic model, the psychological 
engagement model, and the social-contextual model.  
 Socioeconomic factors have long been noted in the political participation research 
as important motivational factors in affecting citizens’ participation level (Almond and 
Verba 1963; Nie, Powell and Prewitt 1969; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Barnes and Kasse 
1979; Dalton 1988; Conway 1991). Back to Verba and Nie’s (1972) research of political 
participation in the United States, socioeconomic resources (i.e., education and income) 
have been found to affect citizens’ civic orientations, such as concern for politics, 
information and feelings of efficacy, which motivate citizens to participation in politics. 
In Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s (1980) seminal research of participation in the states, the 
authors pointed out how different socioeconomic status may affect citizens’ political 
interests and actual participation level, as citizens who are well-educated and well-to-do 
are more likely to participate into politics when holding other variables constant, and the 
education turns out to be particularly important. Wolfinger and Rosenstone argue that 
education increases the moral pressure to vote, and education helps “impart information 
about policies and cognate fields and about a variety of skills, some of which facilitate 
political learning” (18). Also, as an extension of the socioeconomic resource model, 
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Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) reported that socioeconomic factors are among the 
most important variables that motivate citizens to participate in politics, when 
socioeconomic factors such as income and education bestow individuals with more 
resources and civic skills to enable their political participation. In the research of political 
participation in democracies, socioeconomic resources are one of the most consistent 
findings across time and numerous studies of political participation in democratic setting 
have noted that socioeconomic resources are critical predictors of citizens’ political 
participation.  
Besides socioeconomic factors, general demographic factors such as gender, age 
and race are also found to be critical variables in influencing citizens’ participation level. 
There has been a vast amount of literature reporting that women generally participate less 
well-off than men (Campbell et. al.1964; Milbrath 1965; Verba and Nie 1972; Barnes and 
Kasse 1979; Baxter and Lansing 1983; Christy 1987; Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1994). 
Campbell et al.’s (1960) study of American political behavior in the 1950s found that 
women participate less than their male counterparts, and attributed the gender difference 
to the socialization process or “vestigial sex roles” (484). Verba and Nie (1972) further 
reported that the difference of political engagement between men and women are not 
limited to behavior, but also are reflected in other dimensions such as political interest, 
political knowledge, political efficacy as well as membership in social organizations. 
Scholzman, Burns and Verba (1994) and Verba et. al. (1995) explored the gaps between 
male and female political participation and attributed such differences toward the 
different levels of political resources distributed among men and women.8  
                                                          
8
 In the recent studies of participation, political scientists found the gap between different gender groups is 
becoming small as women are slightly less politically active than men. The gender gap is roughly similar in 
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Besides gender, age is also an important factor in explaining political participation. 
By employing the cross-national survey data, Nie, Verba and Kim (1974) have noted that 
political participation peaked in the middle age and remained at a relative low level for 
both young and old age groups.9 Also, after controlling for education, income and gender, 
following political researches have widely noted the prominent age influence in affecting 
political participation (Jennings 1979; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Jennings and 
Niemi 1981; Jennings and Markus 1988). The age influence is generally interpreted as 
the “life-cycle” experience, as the young adults tend to be more apathetic toward politics 
and the level of political interests increases among the middle-aged and then rapidly 
declines among the old and the physically infirm. While the “twilight years” decline 
occurs to women roughly in their fifties and sixties, men’s voting does not substantially 
decrease until the threshold of their seventies and eighties. Besides the “life-cycle” effect, 
generational effect is another dimension of the influence of age, which argues that birth 
cohorts share similar community of experiences in similar socioeconomic environment, 
which would give this generation, or birth cohort, distinctive experience and attitude 
toward politics and political participation (Nie, Verba and Kim 1974; Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005; Jennings and Zhang 2007).10  
It is also worth noting there is a wide range of political participation literature 
concerning the role of race and ethnicity in predicting the level of political participation. 
Races and ethnicities have been widely acknowledged in the participation research to 
have an indispensable and independent influence in affecting political participation 
                                                                                                                                                                             
magnitude to the difference in activity between Anglo-Whites and African-Americans, and it is 
considerably narrower than that separating the rich and poor (Verba et. al. 1995, 254).  
9
 Gender differences in participation levels across different sociopolitical settings were also acknowledged 
in this article. 
10
 In order to differentiate the life-cycle influence and generation influence, it demands times series data 
sets, which goes beyond the availability of the data sets employed in the dissertation.  
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(Verba and Nie 1972; Shingles 1981; Miller et al. 1981; Dawson, Brown and Allen 1990; 
Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Tate 1993; Hero and Campbell 1996; Leighly and Vedlitz 1999). 
One prominent characteristic of ethnic participation, participation of African-Americans 
particularly, is the development of “self-awareness”, and this group consciousness may 
substitute for higher social status and provides an alternative model to impel citizens into 
political participation (Marx 1967; Aberbach and Walker 1970; Verba and Nie 1972).  
Historically, ethnic minorities were documented to participate less than Anglo-Whites, 
such as voter turn out; however, participation in the past few decades found higher level 
of political participation in African-Americans after controlling of socioeconomic status 
(Olsen 1970; Bobo & Gilliam 1990; Verba et. al. 1995). This finding has been attributed 
to blacks’ sense of racial identity and generally greater community consciousness. For 
example, Bobo and Gilliam (1990) reported the black empowerment, as indicated by 
control of the mayor’s office, enhanced the political participation of the blacks by 
increasing their sense of political trust and efficacy. Although previous studies have not 
systemically traced the linkage between participation and ethnic minorities in Communist 
China, I would include ethnicity as a control variable in this study. 
           Besides the sociological and demographic factors in accounting for citizens’ 
political participation, participation studies also use psychological engagement model.  
Psychological engagement generally denotes citizens’ attention, perception and mental 
capabilities that may facilitate or obstruct them from participating into politics. 
Controlling for socioeconomic and demographic explanations, previous research finds 
that the level of citizens’ political participation is significantly affected by citizens’ 
attention devoted into politics, their abilities to process political information and their 
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perceptions about political systems and political process and their capabilities to engage 
with political affairs effectively (Almond and Verba 1963; Verba and Nie 1972; Barnes 
and Kaase 1979; Abramson and Aldrich 1982). Citizens’ psychological engagement with 
politics is generally assessed through a battery of questions pertaining to citizens’ general 
interest in politics, their knowledge about politics and current affairs as well as their 
perceptions about participating into politics (Milbrath and Goel 1977; Conway 1991; 
Dalton 1988). Among various psychological engagement factors included in the current 
research of political participation, citizens’ political interest and political efficacy have 
been found to be most consistently correlated with the participation level (Teixeira 1992).    
Although socioeconomic, demographic and psychological engagement models 
occupy important places in the political participation studies; they are far from exhausting 
the scholarly explanations of participation. During the last three decades, political 
scientists have been vexed by the paradox of American voter turnout that with the 
education and income levels increasing among American citizens, the overall voter 
turnout had remained low. One of the most important insights into this question is that the 
decline of the political participation level resulted from the decrease of the social 
mobilization, that is, the social contacts that are necessary to involve individuals into 
political affairs. Putnam (1995, 2000) has argued that the decline of American political 
participation in the last few decades is directly related to the decline of connection of 
individual citizens with their community and society.  
Indeed, because all politics are local and all political decisions are local decisions, 
the addition of social context theoretical models is a major advance in accounting for the 
motivational mechanisms of citizens’ political participation. This model posits that 
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participation is a response to the contextual cues and political opportunities structured by 
the social environment. As Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995, 3) argue: “Politics in a 
democracy revolves around the decision of individual citizens, but individual citizens 
make their choice at particular time and places, located in multiple environments 
operating at a variety of levels.” Individual citizens are innately part of the broad 
sociopolitical context. Besides their own socioeconomic resources and psychological 
engagement, individuals’ decisions and acts of civic participation nevertheless result in 
part from the motivation and opportunities that the environment provides within which 
they are immersed. 
In Who Votes? Woflinger and Rosenstone (1980) argue that the registration law 
and regulation makes an important impact on citizens’ voting and political participation. 
Powell (1986) in his examination of American voter turnout cross-nationally found that 
American party system and registration laws severely inhibits voter turnout, and he 
argued that party systems and electoral laws play a prominent role in determining the 
level of voter turnout. Through studying voter-turnout levels across 19 democracies, 
Jackman (1987) found that political institutions and electoral laws have the direct and 
significant effect on the voter turnout, and the presence of competitive electoral districts 
and unicameralism shall stimulate voter turnout. Mitchell and Wlezien (1995) in their 
study of the restrictive laws on registration and turnout in presidential and nonpresidential 
election years from 1972 and 1982 found that restrictive laws on registration had 
significant influence on voter registration and voting turnout. Campbell (2003) in her case 
study of the social welfare program and political participation of senior citizens, found 
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that while participatory inputs influence policy outputs, public policy would also be 
influencing participation in the political process.  
Some scholars also argue that intermediation of contextual influence provides 
important and distinctive perspective to the study on political participation, which argues 
media environment and interpersonal networks are critically important to affect citizens’ 
decisions of political participation.11 Lazarsfeld et. al. (1944) employed a panel study of 
presidential voting decisions and argued that personal influence was more pervasive and 
less in selective than the formal media in affecting citizens’ voting decision, and “politics 
gets through personal contacts than in any other way” (152). Berelson et. al. (1954) 
studied the formation of public opinion in a presidential campaign and found that social 
institutions and socioeconomic status had important intermediation influence on citizens’ 
opinion and decision in voting. Gunther et. al.’s (2007) studied citizens’ voting behavior 
comparatively and argued that politicization and information cleavage would influence 
citizens’ voting decisions through “a set of complex multistage processes characterized 
by intervening social, economic and cultural factors” (322).  
Studies of the institutions and participation were further broadened to economic 
and political contexts, and researchers found that socioeconomic institutions are 
important in determining the participation level (Powell and Whitten 1993; Pacek and 
Radcliff 1995; Cox et al. 1998).  
In his examination of neighborhood, Huckfeldt (1979) argued that social contexts 
are important connecting ties between individual social status and political participation. 
Kenny (1992) continued the contextual study and confirmed that both individually and 
                                                          
11
 The research design of the intermediation school usually employs panel study to capture the dynamics of 
citizens’ voting behavior, which is limited by the scope of this study due to data availability. 
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socially based participating acts are affected by citizens’ immediate social environment. 
In his often cited work, Putman (1995) argued that the decline of citizens’ political 
participation is directly related to the decrease of citizens’ involvement in the community 
and drop of the “networks of civil engagement”. Oliver (1999) also argued that the 
socioeconomic characteristics of citizens’ immediate environment affect citizens’ 
political participation, as “local politics are more contentious in economically diverse 
cities with more groups pursuing contradictory policy goals”, which stimulates citizens’ 
interest in politics and sequentially leads to higher political participation level (191). 
The social organization is another important contextual factor that may mediate 
citizens’ political participation. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) stressed the importance of 
social networks in engaging citizens into politics, as the organizational memberships 
provide important networking opportunities to involve individuals into political affairs—
“membership in organizations causes people to be targeted by political leaders for 
mobilization” (83). By examining the political participation by African Americans, Harris 
(1994) argues that the black church membership serves as the both organizational 
mobilization mechanism and the psychological motivational effect for African American 
citizens to participate into politics.  
Family background of individual citizens also provides important environmental 
cues that motivate or inhibit political participation. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) 
argue that parents’ education has a significant effect on children’s education achievement 
and income levels. In addition, parental education has a moderately strong direct effect on 
vocabulary skills and political interest and information. In his inspiring works of young 
people’s political participation, Plutzer (2002) argues that political behavior is deeply 
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rooted in one’s youth, and participation is a behavioral “habit” that citizens developed 
since they were young, as citizens’ family background, the political orientation and 
political behavior of one’s parents would significantly help to form individuals’ own 
participation habits. Parents’ education help promote offspring political knowledge; also, 
parental political involvement can provide both behavior to model and campaign relevant 
information that children rarely get from formal schooling (43).12 
Another important context is workplace. Workplaces are long theorized to exert a 
positive influence to stimulate individual citizens’ political participation. Previous studies 
found that workplaces provide important contextual cues to boost political participation, 
as citizens’ experiences at work have a strong direct effect on their attitudes and 
behaviors outside the workplace. (Elden 1981; Greenberg, Grumberg and Daniel 1996; 
Mutz and Mondak 2006).  
In their seminal study Who Votes?, Wolfinger and Rosenstone’ (1980) devote an 
entire chapter to the question of how workplaces and employment types might affect 
citizens’ political socialization process and their political participation. They found a 
higher rate of voter turnout among employees in the public sector than employees of 
other sectors after controlling income, education, gender and other demographic factors. 
They argue that the government employees are a particular social group who are more 
likely to perceive the relative immediacy to elections, and employment in the public 
sector is more likely to improve citizens’ political consciousness and political alertness 
and stimulates their political participation. Bennett and Orzechowski (1983) examined the 
                                                          
12
 Sociological literature has long documented the significant effect of the family background on the social 
stratification, psychological orientations and behavioral patterns the individuals (Wilson 1959; Kohn 1977; 
Belsky, Lerner and Spanier 1984; Riley, Foner and Waring 1987; Ballantine 1989), and family background 
has generally been held as an important link of individuals’ socialization process. 
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voting behavior of 1964 through 1978 general elections and found that voter participation 
rates for public employees are approximately 18 percent higher than the general public.  
In his study of the effect of workplace on citizens’ political participation, 
Greenberg (1986) confirmed the significant association between workplace participation 
and participation outside the workplaces.  Specifically, he found that employees who 
participate in workplace democracies are more likely to be involved in voting and various 
community and campaign works outside the workplace. Also, Johnson and Libecap (1991) 
examined the voting behavior of public employees in the 1984 and 1986 national 
elections, and found that when controlling socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics, government employees as a group are more likely to vote than private 
sector employees, and they attributed this higher voting rate to both the coercion from 
machine politics and low cost of being “politically alerted” (140). With the 1996 data of 
American National Election Studies, Corey and Garand (2002) found that government 
employees have more exposure to political information, and government employees have 
higher levels of political interest, political knowledge, support for the government and 
political efficacy. The vote turnout of government employees is significantly higher than 
other social groups. Thus, the authors concluded that the government employment has an 
independent and significant effect upon citizens’ political participation.   
From these studies of social contexts and citizens’ political participation, we may 
gain an understanding of the significance of social contexts in shaping and affecting 
citizens’ political participation, at least in democratic settings. Other than the 
socioeconomic resources, exogenous demographic factors and the psychological 
engagement, social contexts, such as the workplace and family background that surround 
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individuals in the everyday environment shall have an independent and indispensable 
influence on citizens’ overall participation. The philosophies, approaches, and fruits of 
the social contextual studies not only have remarkably increased our knowledge of 
political participation in democracies, but they also have shed important light upon the 
political participation studies in general, especially the participation studies in non-
democracies. 
Political Participation in Non-Democracies 
The topic of this dissertation is the mobilization mechanisms of political 
participation in non-democracies; specifically, I am interested in urban political 
participation in China and how the social contexts may be influencing the variety and 
intensity of Chinese urban political participation.  
Theories and research on the causes of political participation focus primarily on 
democracies. The study of citizens’ political participation in non-democratic systems is 
relatively recent. Not until late 1960s did political scientists start to devote their attention 
to political participation of non-democratic societies. The questions of whether political 
participation occurs outside democracies and, if so, what forms it takes have remained 
important puzzles for political scholars. Research on political participation in non-
democracies has proved to be a challenging yet worthy field of study. Since the 1970s, 
political scholars have made remarkable progress in discovering and analyzing political 
participation in non-democratic countries.  These researches shed light on the state-
society relationships of the non-democracies and on political behavior in general (Hough 
1976; Little 1976; Friedgut 1979; Bahry and Silver 1990; Shi 1997; Jennings 1997; 
O’Brien and Li 2001).  
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Inkeles and Bauer’s (1959) research on the political life of the Soviet citizens 
found that individuals in the Soviet Union were active in pursuing interests in the public 
arena, although their enthusiasm was more focused on one’s personal wellbeing rather 
than political ideals and principles. Townsend (1967) in his study of political 
participation also found evidence that popular political participation was available in the 
newly established China. Townsend observed various forms of Chinese citizens’ political 
participation at both the state and local levels. He argued that small group activities are 
important forms of citizenry participation, and there are close interactions between the 
local cadres and the mass public through citizens’ participation.  
Little (1976) compared the political participation in the U.S. with the participation 
in the USSR, and noted the widespread forms of participation in the Soviet politics. 
According to Little, Soviet citizens took part in various types of political participation, 
such as actively working for a party or candidates during elections, attending political 
meetings or rallies, and complaining to the local and state government officials. The 
author concluded the “mass political participation can exist in political systems [that are] 
of widely varied characteristics” (455). Friedgut’s (1979) also compared political 
participation in the Soviet Union and the U.S. He analyzed the ideological roots of the 
political system of the USSR, and examined closely the existent political institutions. 
Specifically, he looked into participation at the local level, such as the voting and 
participation in the unofficial political organizations and argued that the participation of 
the Soviet citizens at the local level was both meaningful and nuanced. Shi (1997) 
examined political participation of Chinese urban citizens and found that within the 
setting of Communist society, citizens do participate in politics and actively pursue their 
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interests. Actually, due to relatively scarce resources of the communist China, citizens are 
highly active in their participation. Shi differentiates Chinese urban political participation 
into more than a dozen forms, including voting, campaign activities, appeals, and 
boycotts, etc. Through interviews and surveys in rural China, O’Brien and Li (2006) 
examined the rightful resistance and policy based resistance engaged in the rural China, 
as peasants and farmers use the rhetoric and commitments of the central government to 
try to fight misconduct by local officials, open up clogged channels of participation and 
push back the frontiers of the permissible. These participatory activities with Chinese 
characteristics are examined in studies exemplified in O’Brian and Li’s earlier works.13          
With expanding research on political participation in non-democracies, not only 
have the political scholars confirmed the existence of meaningful participation in non-
democratic systems, but they also started to explore the motivational mechanisms of non-
democratic political participation. If there are real and significant levels of political 
participation in non-democratic systems, how is the participation distributed among the 
citizenry of non-democratic states. In other word, given the forms of political 
participation in non-democratic systems that we are aware of, who are the citizens that 
participate more and who are the ones that participate less, what factors determine the 
different levels of participation among the citizenry, and what are the general 
motivational mechanisms in non-democratic societies. 
The studies of political participation in non-democracies have focused mainly on 
the individual socioeconomic resources and psychological engagement. Systemic study 
                                                          
13
 O’Brien and Li (1995) reported that lodging complaints is a common and potentially effective way for 
Chinese villagers to defy grassroots leaders; O’Brien (1996) argues that rightful resistance employs rhetoric 
and commitments of the powerful to curb political or economic powerful, and it hinges on locating and 
exploiting divisions among the powerful; with interview and survey analysis, O’Brien and Li (1996) 
examined policy based resistance in rural China and argued that policy-based resisters were well informed, 
regarding cadres to be equals and assert political and legal claims. 
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of the social contextual perspective has been rare. In the following part of the review, I 
shall look into the current research on the mechanism of political participation in non-
democracies, identifying both the fruits and discrepancies in the literature. I will begin 
with a review of the major studies focusing on the individualistic characteristics in 
accounting for the non-democratic participation, such as the socioeconomic resources and 
psychological engagements.  Next I will look at the currently available participation 
studies from the social contextual perspective. 
In examining participation in Chinese local industrial firms, Tang (1993) found 
that socioeconomic development has an important and mixed impact on citizens’ political 
participation, as male workers and workers with lower income are less likely to demand 
instrumental participation and managerial participation. In Political Participation in 
Beijing, Shi (1997) clarifies various types of political participation, and seeks to discover 
the motivational mechanism of Chinese participation.  He found that socioeconomic 
resources and demographic factors, such as the education, economic status and being 
middle-aged, all significantly contribute to urban political participation. Shi (1998) also 
examined the variable “age” (generation) in accounting for the differences in both 
resources to participate into politics (education) and actual political behavior. Based on 
1990 survey data of mainland Chinese adult residents, Shi found that the generational 
factor, that is the age, plays an important role in explaining the differences into both the 
elements of citizens’ political participation and actual political behavior. Shi found that 
citizens’ participation level rise along the age and decline with infirmity. In Jennings’s 
(1997) study of citizens’ political participation in Chinese countryside, the author 
explored the determinants of citizens’ political participation in the countryside. Jennings 
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(1998) analysis of data from four-county survey conducted in 1990 found conventional 
resources that significantly enhance participation include the year of schooling and 
having a second vocation (for both status significance and material benefits) and 
engagement factors, including party membership and political efficacy, also have a 
significant positive effect. Jennings (1998) especially investigated the gender differences 
in political participation in rural China, and reported a persistent and strong gender gap in 
political participation in the rural areas. Jennings emphasized that women profit 
enormously from having a second occupation and considerably more so than do men, 
which “clearly moves her out of a traditional role” (964). In Tong’s (2003) study of 
citizens’ political participation in contemporary China, the author is particularly 
interested in the role of gender in Chinese participation. By employing the survey data of 
1994, Tong found that the gender difference is persistently and negatively correlated with 
citizens’ political participation and psychological political engagement. At the same time, 
Tong also found socioeconomic resources, measured by occupational prestige and 
education achievement, are positively correlated with citizens’ political participation. 
In Bahry and Silver’s (1990) work to explain the Soviet political participation on 
the eve of the Gorbachev’s era, the authors introduce a “more complex” model to account 
for citizens’ political participation by incorporating individual attitudes into the model. 
Controlling personal resources and demographic variables, such as education, earnings, 
age, gender, the major influence on citizens’ participation was psychological engagement, 
such as citizens’ interests in politics, efficacy to participate into politics, citizens’ faith in 
other people (which is measured to account for the possibility that individuals citizens 
trust and expect other citizens to co-participate in politics), and citizens’ satisfaction of 
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the political regime. Analysis of interview data with more than two thousand Soviet 
emigrants indicates that citizens’ attitudes are significantly correlated with diverse types 
of citizens’ participation.  
In McAllister and White (1994) study of citizens’ political participation in the 
post-communist Russia (which was right after Soviet’s transition to the market economy), 
the authors tried to explain different levels of participation. The authors found that the 
political engagement—citizens’ interest in politics, efficacy, and support for the political 
regime—are the most significant predictors of citizens’ political participation. At the 
same time, McAllister and White reported that citizens’ resources such as employment 
status and economic well-being contributed to the political participation level as well. 
While emphasizing on citizens’ psychological engagement, Chen (2004) in his study of 
Popular Political Support in Urban China explored the relationship between citizens’ 
political participation level and the psychological political engagement. Employing the 
longitudinal survey data of China, Chen reported that beyond individual resources, such 
as income, education and age, Chinese urban citizens’ psychological engagement—i.e., 
political interest and support for the political regime—plays an important role in 
predicting citizens’ political participation. 
As the literature above indicated, in the current study of political participation in 
non-democratic settings, influential works accounting for the motivational mechanisms of 
citizens’ political engagement have focused largely on the factors at the individual level, 
such as the individual socioeconomic resources and psychological engagement. Indeed, 
as these studies have rightly noted, both personal resources and psychological 
engagement are important predictors in accounting for participation in non-democracies. 
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Through studying the influence of individual characteristics in citizens’ participation in 
non-democracies, we have gained important insights concerning how citizens engage in 
political affairs and connect with states in non-democratic societies. 
Although the emphasis on individualistic characteristics to explain participation in 
non-democracies has contributed a great deal to our understanding, few studies have paid 
attention to how the social context may contribute to explain political participation in 
non-democracies. Yet, social context was an important variable in the early theories and 
writings of political participation in non-democracies. 
In studying and theorizing the state-society relationship in non-democracies, 
political scholars have long been noting the existence of the strong state control and the 
totalitarian type of mobilization of citizens’ political participation in non-democracies 
(Arendt 1951; Friedrich and Brzezinski 1966).  In these studies, citizens were portrayed 
as being manipulated or coerced into excessive support of the policies of the self-
appointed leaders who are impervious to public opinion (Friedrich and Brzezinski, 161). 
In his study of the Soviet politics, Allardt (1961) noted the “totalitarian populist” nature 
of the Soviet society and political participation, as on the one hand, the communist Soviet 
Union had strict state control and all-inclusive ideologies to guide local institutions and 
forms of political participation, and on the other hand, these local institutions tended to 
mobilize the local residents to a large extent. Allardt argued that with all the state 
mobilization of the Soviet citizens’ activities, the citizens remained in the local social 
frameworks and were organized and supervised by the regime.  
In the later studies of the political participation in non-democracies, such as the 
Soviet Union and P. R. China, political scholars further confirmed the importance of the 
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institutions and bureaucracies in accounting for citizens’ political participation 
(Townsend 1967; Hough 1977; Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). In his study of the 
Soviet Union Society and citizens’ political behavior, Hough (1977) noted the 
“institutional pluralism” political structure in the communist USSR. That is, instead of 
going through any interest groups, citizens’ interests were articulated through the 
formalized institutional channels, and citizens needed to contact the leader or the trade 
union in the unit, or go to the higher authorities in order to pursue their interest. 
Indeed, in studying the nature of political participation and the state-society 
relations in non-democracies, political scientists have not totally ignored the possible 
influence of the sociopolitical institutions in affecting and mobilizing citizens’ political 
participation. In this study of the Chinese urban political participation and the social 
contexts, we should also gain more understanding of the important sociopolitical context 
in the contemporary China. Among all the diverse accounts of the contemporary Chinese 
urban politics, the workplace has been widely regarded as the most prominent institution 
in the current urban China.  
As the most important and widespread formal sociopolitical institution in the 
contemporary urban China, previous studies have acknowledged the significance of the 
workplace in China’s urban life. In Whyte and Parish’s (1984) early study of the urban 
life in contemporary China, the authors noted the widespread functions that the 
workplaces served. These not only include economic benefits and interests, such as 
housing and health-insurance, or social welfares such as clinics and nurseries, but also 
significant political powers, such as convening employees for hear public decrees and 
herding citizens to attend political studies. Walder’s (1986) influential book, Work and 
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Authority in Chinese Industry, also noted the key role of the workplace in Chinese 
political systems. He asserted that the workplace is the most important sociopolitical 
cornerstone in the Communist China, and workplaces, especially state institutions and 
enterprises, have a strong control over the sociopolitical life of Chinese citizens.  State 
institutions and enterprises exercise this control by holding regular political studies, 
keeping records of employees’ political performance, and transforming citizens’ political 
performance into economic gains. Shi’s (1997) study of political participation in Beijing 
also noted the importance of political institutions especially the workplace context in 
Chinese urban politics.  He noted that Chinese government policies are controlled within 
the workplaces and workplaces are in charge of distributing both material and non-
material resources to individual citizens. Suggesting that working units are the 
“fundamental link” between the Communist state and the society, Lieberthal (2004) 
pointed out that work units are important sociopolitical organizations of Chinese society, 
which are “engaged in purely political tasks” (184). When economic reforms 
significantly altered the work unit system by encouraging the development of collective, 
joint-venture and privately owned enterprises, the author lamented the economic reforms 
are “eroding the fundamental link the Maoist system created to handle the relationship 
between the state and society” (185). Saich (2004) also noted that the work unit is the 
“defining system for urban organization” and “a system to ensure social and political 
control” (Saich 2004).  
We may see from the above studies and from my own over-twenty-year 
experiences living in the P.R. China, workplaces indeed occupied the central focus in 
citizens’ life in the contemporary urban China. Despite the critical significance that 
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workplaces carry in Chinese urban political life, few studies of political participation 
have systemically analyzed how the workplace might be affecting Chinese urban political 
participation. The main research question of this dissertation is to study the relationships 
between workplace and political participation in urban China.  This analysis should shed 
light on our understanding of the social contexts and the political participation in non-
democracies in general.   
Besides the theoretical significance of pursuing this research question, there is 
also important practical value in studying the influence of workplaces on Chinese urban 
political participation. Through the study of the role of workplace in mobilizing citizens’ 
political participation in urban China, we may hopefully gain a better understanding of 
political participation and state-society relationship in contemporary China within the 
context of current economic reform and development.  
Although of critical importance in Chinese urban life, the configuration of 
Chinese workplaces has been changing rapidly during the recent two decades. Before 
China’s economic reform in late 1970s, most Chinese citizens worked for the government 
organizations or state-owned enterprises, and the national economy was mainly a state 
economy. Ever since China initiated massive economic reforms in the early 1980s, more 
and more private and foreign enterprises have taken off in urban China, and the emphasis 
of the national economy has shifted from retaining the homogeneity of state economy to 
achieving effective and rapid economic development. With favorable economic policies, 
private and foreign enterprises are developing steadily in urban China, and these non-
state enterprises have begun to provide considerable employment opportunities to 
Chinese citizens. With a rejuvenated economy and more liberal economic policies, 
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collective enterprises that once constituted a relatively small percentage in the national 
economy have gained tremendous momentum and now account for a much larger part of 
the national economy. At the same time, state enterprises, which used to be the major 
component of the national economy now have dropped to about 50%, and the 
employment scale of the state enterprises and state economy has also diminished 
significantly.14 This dramatic change of the composition of work unit types would have a 
profound impact on Chinese urban political participation, if this study were to find 
different work units should have different mobilization effects on citizens’ participation. 
It would have implications on the changed political participation, how individual citizens 
connect with the state and how the democratization is going to fare that some scholars 
have found to be fugitively burgeoning in China now.15   
 
                                                          
14
 Source: 2001 National Statistic Yearbook of China. 
15
 In recent studies of Chinese politics, scholars such as Bruce J. Dickson (2003), John Kennedy (2002), 
Kevin O’Brien and Li Lijiang (2001), Jie Chen and Yang Zhong (1999) have found the bourgeoning of 
grassroots democracy in China at both urban and rural settings. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
THEORY AND PROPOSITION 
 
This chapter presents the theories and propositions of how social contexts, 
specifically the workplace that individual citizens belong to are able to affect the intensity 
and variety of citizens’ political participation. First I will examine the fundamental 
concepts of the theory, which are political participation, social contexts and the 
workplace. Second, I will elaborate on the proposed theory as why social contexts may 
affect the modes and intensity of China’s urban political participation, and the possible 
theoretical challenge that the theory may encounter. Finally, the chapter concludes with 
the discussion of the independent variables. 
Definition of Key Concepts 
Political Participation 
 Citizens’ political participation channeled in the existent political institutions has 
been one of the most researched fields in political studies (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 
1980; Bennett and Orzechowski 1983; Powell and Whitten 1993; Verba, Schlozman and 
Brady 1995; Pacek and Radcliff 1995; Hill and Leighley 1999; Corey and Garand 2002). 
Political participation denotes the “activities by private citizens that are more or less 
directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or actions they 
take” (Nie and Vera 1975). Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) pointed out that political 
participation is the “activity that has the intent or effect of influencing the government 
action” (38). Political participation encompasses several types of behavior, including 
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voting, official contact, campaign work, or protest (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and 
Kim 1978; Shi 1997).  
Political action that is consistent with established rules and norms of the existent 
political system traditionally is called conventional political participation or compliant 
political participation. In this dissertation, conventional political participation in urban 
China includes congressional voting, voting in the workplace, campaigning, contacting 
one’s leader directly, etc.  
Political participation is not one-dimensional. “The citizenry is not simply divided 
into more or less active citizens; rather there are “different types of activists engaging in 
different acts, with different motives, and different consequences” (Verba and Nie 1972).   
Verba and Nie (1972) argued that participation is not a uni-dimensional phenomenon, and 
there are four dimensions in political participation, which are the type of influence, the 
scope of the outcome, the amount of conflict and amount of initiative. According to these 
four dimensions, American political participation is explicated into the following modes: 
voting, campaigning activity, cooperative activity and contacting. Kaase and Marsh (1979) 
argued that when the normal communication channels become blocked, citizens with 
particular demands will choose to organize themselves outside established political 
institution and engage in unconventional political actions to articulate their interest, the 
“behavior that does not correspond to the norms of law and customs that regulate political 
participation under a particular regime” (41). Kasse and Marsh suggest that political 
nonconformity entails the willingness to risk official retribution and public sanction that 
sets the participants from those who are active in conventional activities and passive 
conformists. Although both conventional and unconventional political participation 
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include several types of activity with varying costs, in general, conventional participation 
is a less costly way for citizens to influence government action. 
Also, in another well-known study of political participation in the former Soviet 
Union, Bahry and Silver (1990) found that citizens’ political participation includes 
unconventional and compliant political activities.  They find that unconventional political 
behavior is related to people’s social background and political orientations, such as being 
less satisfied with their material life and being highly interested in politics. They found 
compliant political behavior is related to individuals’ attitude and values, such as stronger 
sense of personal influence, greater interest in politics16 and support for more civil 
liberties. At the same time, Shi’s (1997) study of political participation in China found 
that citizens may engage in “unconventional” political participation, such as carrying 
work slowdowns, taking part in strikes, etc. In Verba, Schlozman and Brady’s (1995) 
study of civic political engagement in American politics, the authors also included 
unconventional political acts, such as the protest, along with vote, campaign work and 
being affiliated with political organizations, as one type of the “activity that has the intent 
or effect of influencing the government action” (38). 
 This dissertation analyzes conventional political participation and unconventional 
political participation, both of which involve a variety of activities.  
 In this dissertation, I analyze unconventional political participation, such as 
political behavior strictly outside the established political systems (i.e. writing to the 
newspaper), or political behavior that seeks to circumvent established political systems 
(i.e., asking help from officials’ friends). In Chapter IV I report the results of factor 
                                                          
16
 Bahry and Silver (1990) argued that individuals’ interest in politics is likely to motivate individuals’ 
participation in both cooperative and unconventional participation by increasing citizens’ psychological 
engagement with politics (827). The proposition was supported in the empirical analysis.  
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analyses to group different types of political participation and map out the distribution of 
each political participation type. 
Social Context 
          One central concept in this dissertation is the social context, through which citizens 
are mobilized or obstructed to participate into political affairs. The word “context” has a 
number of connotations. In this study the concept “context” to is defined as the 
sociopolitical environment that individual citizens are surrounded with and within which 
they are engaged in the politics with actual behaviors. Here the sociopolitical 
environment not only includes broad sociopolitical institutions such as the regime types 
and electoral systems, but it also denotes everyday sociopolitical settings that individual 
citizens that are immersed within such as the neighborhood, social organizations, 
workplaces and the family background. In this dissertation the social contexts of primary 
interest are the workplace that the individual belongs to and family background.  
Workplace 
Previous studies (Bennett and Orzechowski 1983; Johnson and Libecap 1991; 
Corey and Garand 2002), measured work place as a dichotomous variable, i.e. the public 
sector verses the private sector. Workplace types in urban China are very different and 
much more complex than the workplace of interest in the above studies. Shi’s study of 
Political Participation in Beijing categorizes Chinese workplaces into four distinctive 
categories: state organizations, state enterprises, collective enterprises and 
private/collective enterprises. In his research of citizens’ congressional voting behavior 
and types of workplaces that the citizens belong to, this categorization of workplace 
contributes significantly toward the empirical analysis. In this study, I categorize different 
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types of the workplaces according to their connection with the state, as whether the state 
policies are to be effectively applied to the workplace and to what extent the workplaces 
is subject to the state control.  
I identify five fundamentally different types of workplaces in urban China: (1) 
government organizations, (2) state institutes, (3) state enterprises, (4) collective 
enterprises, and (5) private/foreign enterprises. There are two major criteria to 
differentiate the urban work units. The first is the payment and salaries—where the 
employees get their salaries and welfare. The employees may be paid by the government, 
by the domestic enterprises they serve, or by foreign enterprises. The second is how 
closely the work unit is connected with the state. We examine whether the work unit is 
the state itself, or work units function to support the major causes espoused by the state, 
such as technology, environment and education, or they are financially tied to the state 
and constitutes the state economy. Unlike Shi’s categorization, this dissertation 
differentiates the government organizations and the state institutes as two distinctive 
workplace types. The reason for the differentiation of the government organizations and 
state institutions is that the government organizations mostly serve as party organs and 
local governments, which represents the government itself; the state institutes are 
institutes set up by the state to improve social affairs, which do not represent the state 
directly.  I define work places in urban China as follows: 
1. Government Organizations (Dang Zheng Ji Guan) 
Citizens who work for government organizations generally work for the 
Communist party or the city government itself. These government organizations 
are limbers in formulating, implementing governmental policies and realizing 
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CCP’s rule over the state. The government organizations are financially 
dependent upon the state. Examples of the government organizations include the 
State Council, Youth League of the Chinese Communist Party, People’s Congress, 
city governments, CCP Committees in cities, the courts, Securities, etc. Basically, 
government organizations function as the party organs or the local city 
governments itself under the CCP’s leadership.  
2. State Institutions (Shi Ye Dan Wei) 
State institutions are state bureaus and agencies in charge of specific state affairs, 
such as the education, cultural affairs, public hygiene, scientific research, etc., 
which belong to the state but do not represent the government.  State institutions 
are responsible for a certain aspect of state’s work within the realm of the nation 
or cities, and they are set up by the state and financially depend upon the state. 
Examples of the work units that belong to state institutions include: national/city 
education committees, national/city sports affairs agencies, national/city 
agriculture and forestry committees, national/city libraries, national/city cultural 
agencies, national/city publication agencies, etc. State institutions are funded by 
the state, in charge of a specific aspect of the state affairs and aiming at improving 
a particular aspect of societal services. They are not as closely related to the ruling 
party as the governmental organizations.  
3. State Enterprises (Guo Ying Qi Ye) 
The state enterprise is one of the most important work unit types, which constitute 
the biggest proportion of all work units in urban China. State enterprises used to 
constitute over 90% of the national economy in the1950s and 1960s, and now its 
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proportion is still around over 50% of China’s GDP after the economic reform.17 
In other words, state enterprises were and still remain as pillars of Chinese 
national economy. Although the scale of state enterprises can be either large or 
small, a large percentage of state enterprise has an employment over thousands. 
State policies are well applied to state enterprises, and state enterprises are subject 
to state economic control and regulations, especially before the economic reform. 
Examples of state enterprises include: Beijing Steel Company, Tianjin First 
Contexture Production Unit, National Petroleum and Chemical Cooperation, 
Dalian Fishing Cooperation, China Telecom, China Overseas Transportation, etc. 
4. Collective Enterprises (Ji Ti Qi Ye) 
Collective enterprises are defined as an important component of the national 
economy in China’s Constitution. They belong to the public namely and they are 
responsible for their own economic well-being. Collective enterprises are not 
dependent upon the state financially, neither are they subject to state economic 
control and regulation. A considerable amount of collective enterprises were fruits 
of the socialist reforms in the 1950s, which transformed the privately owned or 
foreign enterprises to the publicly owned enterprises. Some collective enterprises 
have developed into large-scale and well-known enterprises in China nowadays, 
such as the Haier Electronics. State economy policies are applied to collective 
enterprises and employees in collective enterprises usually expect similar 
economic and social treatments as compared to the employees in state enterprises. 
Examples of collective enterprises include: Haier Electronics, Three-Deer Milk, 
                                                          
17
 Sources: 2003 National Statistical Yearbook of China. 
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small-scale electronic producers, diary producers, small-scale chemical products 
producers, mechanical products producers, etc.  
5. Private and Foreign Enterprise (Si Ying Qi Ye & Wai Zi Yi Ye) 
Private and foreign enterprises were rooted in China after the economic reforms 
starting in the1980s. As the emphasis of China’s economy shifted from guarding 
its communist purity to achieving economic development, more and more private 
and foreign enterprises were established in China. The socioeconomic connection 
between the state and private/foreign enterprises is limited. Private and foreign 
enterprises are financially on their own, and their performance and operating 
mechanism are not subject to the state control. State laws still apply to private and 
foreign enterprises for sure, while state policies’ influence on the private and 
foreign enterprise is constrained. It is not unusual that the private/foreign 
enterprises and state enterprises share different tax rates in the same province. 
Also the economic treatments of the private/foreign enterprises employees may 
vary remarkably from one to another according to the economic well-being and 
policies of each individual company. Examples of private and foreign enterprises 
include: Nokia Mobile Company, City Bank, Siemens Electronics, private 
chemical, mechanical enterprises in the coastal areas of China. 
Propositions 
 This section presents a theory to explain why social contexts, such as the 
workplace and family’ influence the variety and intensity of citizens’ political 
participation in urban China. The central argument of this dissertation is that Chinese 
workplaces have an independent and distinctive contextual influence on the modes and 
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intensity of China’s urban political participation. This argument mainly consists of two 
tenets: (1) the workplace provides important and distinctive environment to motivate 
citizens to participate in politics. As the workplace distances or draws nearer to the state, 
the participation behavior changes accordingly. This is a direct effect. (2) how closely the 
workplace is connected to the state provide important context that may shape different 
relationships between participation and other mobilization factors, such as the resources, 
psychological engagement and political organizational. This is an interactive effect. 
Workplace Type & Citizens’ Political Participation 
 As Shue (1988) argued, leaning about the society and politics is not a study of a 
mere mechanism or system, but rather a process (italics by author). “The establishment of 
certain kinds of institutions in a social environment with certain prevailing attitudes may 
promote the development of certain new forms of organization, which in turn may 
undercut some formerly held beliefs and encourage de facto work routines...” (26). 
According to Shue, intricate social intertexture forms political life, and to study the state 
and politics, it demands close examination of the content and fabrics of social intertexture 
and context. In this proposition, I theorize that different types of the workplace should 
exert a direct influence upon the modes and intensity of citizens’ participation in urban 
China. Specifically, I hypothesize that the more closely the workplace is connected to the 
state, the more likely the employees are going to be engaged in participation encouraged 
by the state and less likely in participation discouraged by the state.  
 This proposition is based upon two arguments. First, Chinese urban workplaces 
provide important socioeconomic control over individual citizens, and citizens rely 
heavily upon the workplace for both economic and sociopolitical resources.  Thus, 
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individual citizens who belong to the workplaces that are closely connected with the state 
are more likely to develop the political attitude and political behavior in accordance with 
the state’s requirements than citizens in workplaces that are not so closely connected to 
government.   
 As the literature review indicated, the workplace is one of the most important 
environments in determining citizens’ sociopolitical life in urban China. Not only are 
citizens economically dependent on the workplaces for income, pension, medical 
insurance, they are also subject to various sociopolitical restrictions and privileges in 
connection with the workplace, such as the admission to the Communist Party or Youth 
League as an access to upgraded economic and political status, keeping a permanent 
profile of one’s previous working and political performance, obtaining permits to change 
jobs, get married or have one than one child. In sum, workplaces provide most important 
economic and sociopolitical resources to individual citizens and apply critical restrictions 
on them as well, which may significantly affect citizens’ attitudes and political behavior. 
As Crowley (1994) and Fish (1995) argue in their studies of Russian political 
participation, workers’ heavy dependency upon the workplaces may dampen their open 
opposition to the polity and keep them docile in the everyday political life. Similarly, for 
the employees who belong to a workplace that is more closely connected with the state 
and more likely to be subject to the state control, citizens are more likely to develop an 
attitude and political behavioral pattern that are in accordance with the state’s 
requirement and command, given the strong dependency that the individual citizens 
experience in the workplace context. That is, individuals who are working for institutions 
that are closely connected with the state are hypothesized to be likely to develop attitudes 
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inclined toward the state, and more likely to engage in political behaviors encouraged by 
the state and less likely in behavior that is discouraged by the state.  
Second, the workplaces that are closely connected to the state are more likely to 
provide a sociopolitical environment that resembles the sociopolitical environment 
outside the workplace—the state power structure, and citizens belonging to the type of 
the workplace that are closely connected to the state are more likely to engage in the 
political behavior encouraged by the state.  
 As the above workplace concept prescribes, the more closely the workplace is 
attached with the state, the more likely the state policies are to be applied to the 
workplaces, and the more likely the workplace is going to be subject to state control and 
consequentially resembles the power structure of the state politics. As Greenberg (1986) 
argued, employees in the enterprises that resemble the sociopolitical structure outside the 
workplaces are more likely to be engaged with conventional political participation 
encouraged by the state, such as voting, campaigning and community work. In this study, 
I also hypothesize that the workplaces that are more closely related the state and resemble 
the power structure of the state politics are more likely to provide a sociopolitical 
environment that is conducive to the pro-government political behavior, especially 
regarding the political participation that is prevalent both inside and outside the 
workplaces context, such as voting.  
Political Organization inside the Workplace and Political Participation 
Besides the influence of different workplace types, I argue that the political 
organization inside the workplace also exerts important influence on the variety and 
intensity of citizens’ political participation outside the workplace. Specifically, the more 
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rigorous the political organizational structure is inside the workplace, the more likely 
employees are going to engage in the conventional political participation—especially the 
participation acts that are channeled through the political organizations, and less likely to 
engage in the participation discouraged by the state and workplace.  
            As the most important grassroots sociopolitical organizations in urban China, 
workplaces shoulder the responsibilities to see citizens behave in a politically correct or 
at least political acceptable way. The political organization inside the workplace provides 
the organizational structure for the employees to get in contact with the political authority 
and exerts pressure on the employees to comply with the political code set by the state. 
One important task engaged by the political organization is to hold the political study 
inside the workplace on a regular basis, and the availability of the political study in the 
workplace directly reflects the rigor of the political organization (Walder 1986, 1991).  
The political study is a compulsory meeting imposed on the employees of the 
workplace that aims at infusing the employees with political information and knowledge 
that is compliant with CCP’s ideology and current political campaign. In political study 
sessions, employees are made to know the party’s stand on contemporary salient 
domestic and international issues and what the party aims to achieve in the next stage, 
which usually requires the compliance and cooperation from the citizens. Exemplars of 
these political study topics include the campaign raised by the CCP across the nation 
against Fa Lun Gong or corruption among high-ranking government officials, and the 
Party’s stand in the highly salient domestic and foreign policy related issues, such as the 
Tiananmen Square demonstration or heated territory disputes with neighbor countries.  
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 The availability of the political study reflects the rigor of the political organization 
inside the workplace. Although political study sessions are compulsory for the employees 
to attend and employees are required to be present in order to being viewed as “good” 
citizens, not every workplace holds the political study session regularly. The tighter the 
political organization inside the workplace, the more regular is the political study going 
to be held within the workplaces, and in this study I propose that whether or not the 
political study is held regularly in the workplace reflects the strength and resilience of the 
organization inside the workplace.  
 Specifically, I argue that the tighter the political organization inside the workplace, 
that is, as the political study is held in the workplace on a more regular basis, the more 
likely the individual citizens are going to participate into political acts that are in 
compliance with the state’s requirements and the individual citizens are less likely to 
engage in the political acts that are inhibited by the state.  
 For the relationship between the workplace’s connection with the state and the 
political organization, I found that the more closely the workplace is connected with the 
state, the more rigorous the political organization is going to be inside the workplace. The 
following table, Tale 1, illustrates the frequency of political study sessions held within 
different types of the workplaces regarding their connection with the state. 
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Table 1. Political Study by Workplace Type 
Political Study according to Workplace Type Percentage of Regular Political Study  
Government Organizations .9375 
hState Institutions .8343 
State Enterprises .5512 
Collective Enterprises .3636 
Private/Foreign Enterprises .2244 
(Data Source: 1993 Survey of Chinese Social Mobility and Social Change) 
 
Different Workplace Context & Political Participation 
 In this proposition, I argue that different types of the workplaces provide different 
sociopolitical contexts for the individual citizens to participate in politics. Besides the 
direct influence of the workplace type and the political organization pressure inside the 
workplace on citizens’ political behavior, I hypothesize that the relationship of between 
the psychological engagement, socioeconomic resources and political organizational 
pressure and individual citizens’ political behavior vary from one type of the workplace 
to another due to the different contexts provided by different workplaces.   
 Specifically, I expect that in the workplaces that are closely connected with the 
state, the influence of psychological engagement and socioeconomic resources on 
individual citizens’ participation will be weaker than in workplaces that are more 
remotely connected with the state. Because the power structure of workplaces most 
closely connected with the state resembles the state power structure, citizens who work in 
this context are likely to have the knowledge and resources necessary to participate 
regardless of their psychological engagement and socioeconomic resources. That is, the 
close connection between the workplace and the state will overcome the effects of 
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citizens’ personal characteristics.  In workplaces that are not closely connected with the 
state, psychological engagement and socioeconomic resources will have a stronger effect 
on participation because citizens’ that score high on these variables are more likely to 
have the knowledge and resources required for participation than are citizens that score 
lower on such resources. In other word, participation of citizens who work in the context 
of workplaces that are only distantly connected to the state is more likely to be based on 
the volunteerism out of one’s own personal resources instead of the structural political 
mobilization.  
In order the test this hypothesis, instead of maintaining the five categories of the 
work units, I shall differentiate the work units into two fundamental types—the state 
organizations and non-state organizations. The state work units includes the 
governmental organizations, state institutions and state owned enterprises, while the non-
state organizations consists of the rest of work units types.  
Possible Challenge & Empirical Check 
 Above I elaborated on the major theories and propositions regarding the 
relationship between the workplace and citizens’ political participation in urban China. 
Before I move on to the discussion of the influence of family background on individual 
citizens’ political participation, I shall briefly examine the theoretical challenge that may 
be raised regarding the proposed relationship.   
 Besides the major theoretical models in participation studies regarding citizens’ 
socioeconomic resources, psychological engagement and the social contextual influence, 
in the last decade political scholars have been addressing the possible influence of 
individual resources—time, money and civic skills—in motivating citizens to participate 
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in politics. Following this individual resources perspective, the hypothesis regarding the 
relationship between workplaces and citizens’ political participation may experience the 
theoretical challenge that the workplace’s influence on individual citizens’ political 
participation is not merely “contextual”, but rather it is through influencing the resources 
of individual citizens, such as time, money and required civic skills that the workplace is 
able to affect citizens’ political participation. Before I respond to this theoretical 
challenge, I may need to briefly review the original resources model.  
  The resource model first proposed by Verba, Schlozman and Brady in the mid-
1990s was intended to bridge the causal linkage between socioeconomic factors and 
citizens’ political participation. Brady, Schlozman and Verba (1995) argue that the major 
components of the resource model are money, time and civic skills that are the direct 
determinants of political participation of individual citizens. The emphasis of the 
individual resources model is civic skills, and the authors argue that through the 
stratification of social status (income and education) and the mediation of non-political 
organizations, civic skills and resources are distributed unevenly among individuals, 
which sequentially leads to uneven political participation. It is worth noting that although 
the resource model serves as an important missing link between socioeconomic factors 
and political participation, after all it is closely concerned with the socioeconomic and 
demographic model and intends to bridge this particular aspect of the participation study. 
Indeed, as Brady, Schlozman and Verba (1995) acknowledged when introducing the 
resource model, there are three fundamental components in determining citizens’ political 
participation: the individual resources, psychological engagement and mobilization 
networks.  
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 Nevertheless, the resources model raises important challenges to the theory 
regarding the contextual mobilization influence of citizens’ political participation, which 
should be seriously considered.  
 As Brady, Schlozman and Verba (1995) noted, citizens must be equipped with 
concrete resources (in contrast to the abstract resources such as the social status) such as 
time, money and civic skills in order to be able to participate into politics. In order to 
differentiate the influence of the workplace as being the social contextual effect or the 
influence on the individual resources factors, I shall conduct a correlation analysis 
between the workplace and individual resources, especially regarding the money and 
civic skills.18 
 The empirical analysis is to be conducted in the following chapter. If the 
empirical result indicates a high correlation between citizens’ workplace environment and 
participation resources, it may be contended that the workplace exerts influence most at 
the individual level rather than at the contextual level; if the correlation is weak or even 
does not exist, the contextual influence argument would be maintained.  
Independent Variables 
Socioeconomic Resources 
1. Position in the workplace 
I theorize that the positions held by citizens in the workplace may have a considerable 
impact on citizens’ political participation. For a high position holder, one is more likely 
to shoulder responsibilities inside the workplace, and thus more likely to be well 
                                                          
18
 As the original data set did not collect information of individual citizens’ political skills such as the 
ability to make speeches or write letters effectively, in this study I shall mainly use the educational level as 
the surrogate variable to measure citizens’ civic skills.  
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connected at various levels inside the workplace and more politically informed. Thus, I 
speculate the higher position holders are more likely to participate in conventional 
political acts because of political empowerment and political security. On the other hand, 
high position holders tend to hold higher stake within the current political system and 
they are less likely to act against it by engaging with unconventional political behavior.  
2. Socioeconomic status (Income and education) 
As previous studies upon political participation indicate, socioeconomic status has a 
resilient influence upon both citizens’ resources and capabilities to participate in politics 
(Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Hill & 
Leighley 1999; Oliver 2001). While the income disparity in urban China during Mao’s 
reign was minor, it becomes increasingly substantial since the economic reform. In this 
study I add income and education variables as independent variables, and I speculate a 
positive relationship between social status and conventional political behavior due to the 
advantaged social position and more resources that income and education provide, and a 
negative relationship with unconventional political behavior due to the increased stake.  
3. Self-perceived socioeconomic status  
Besides the objective measurement of the effect of citizens’ education and income in 
motivating citizens to participate in politics, I also include the citizens’ self- perceived 
socioeconomic status. I expect that the perception of one’s socioeconomic status, or 
comparative socioeconomic status, can be as important if not more important than the 
actual socioeconomic status (education and income) that a citizen is equipped with. A 
positive self-regard with one’s socioeconomic wellbeing may help the citizen feel more 
competent in participating in politics and gives one a perceived or real larger economic 
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stake in the current political system. I speculate that the positive self-regard of 
socioeconomic status may motivate one to participate more in the conventional political 
acts while refraining them from participating in unconventional acts.  
4. Gender 
Literature of political participation studies has long noted the difference of gender in 
motivating citizens to participate in politics due to the culture and resource factors 
(Almond and Verba 1963; Verba et. al. 1995; Jennings 1997; Tong 2003). It is found that 
females tend to participate less in various forms of political participation. In Shi’s (1997) 
study of citizens’ political participation in Beijing, the author also notes a less prominent 
role of women. In this study, I shall include gender as the control variable and speculate 
women tend to participate in politics less regardless of the participation types. 
5. Age 
Life cycle effect is theorized and empirically found as an important factor for citizens’ 
political thoughts and behavior. Young adults tend to be the most apathetic of politics and 
the level of political interests increases among the middle-aged and then rapidly declines 
within the old or retired (Converse and Niemi, 1971; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Bennet 
1986; Jennings 1997).  In this dissertation, I hypothesize that middle-aged people are 
more attentive to politics and public affairs than younger and older people, and the 
middle-aged more likely to participate in politics of both kinds. 
6. Marital status 
Marital status is theorized and empirically found to have an important effect upon 
citizens’ political participation level (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Johnson and 
Libecap 1991; Shi 1997). In this study I shall control for marital status and I speculate 
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that being married increases the likelihood of people to participate in conventional 
politics by associating citizens into adult roles, and being married may discourage 
citizens to engage in unconventional politics by increasing the actual or perceived cost for 
citizens to participate unconventionally.  
7. Ethnic background 
Existent studies of political participation have long noted that ethnicity is one of the most 
important factors in determining citizens’ political participation (Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Corey and Garand 2002). Also, 
scholars in comparative politics acknowledged that to effectively manage ethnic relations 
is a leading and salient issue in the non-democratic countries (Kuper and Smith 1969; 
Rothchild 1986; Byman 2002). Research by sinologists describing national minorities 
argues that ethnic minorities are given differential treatment in the social realms and 
economic realms and are marginalized on the geographic and social horizons of power in 
China (Gladney 1991; 2004). “Whereas most minority regions and districts have minority 
leaders, the real source of power is in the Communist Party, reflecting China’s active 
watch over the so-called autonomous areas” (Gladney 2004, 19). As the ethnic minority 
groups are likely to be a marginalize group in the society, I hypothesize that belonging to 
the majority Han will boost the likelihood of citizens to participate in politics 
disregarding the type, as the Han enjoys the dominant ethnic status in Chinese society. 
8. Family background 
The influence of family background is well acknowledged in the participation studies as 
critical context that may help shape citizens’ political behavioral pattern by brooding 
political interest, supplying political information and forming early participatory habit 
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(Verba, Scholozman and Brady 1995; Plutzer 2002). Also, previous sociological 
literature, especially the works exploring family relations in the democratic societies, 
indicates the most accurate measurement of the socioeconomic status of one’s family is 
the socioeconomic status of the father. I shall also employ father’s socioeconomic status 
to explore the social contextual influence of one’s family background, specifically, 
father’s education level and membership in the Communist Party. 
Psychological Engagement  
1. Party membership 
The Chinese Communist Party membership is found to have a significant influence on 
citizens’ political participation in China, due to the political status, information and 
protection that party membership offers (Walder 1996; Shi 1997, 1998). In this 
dissertation, the party membership variable is included in the analysis. I expect it will 
positively affect state-encouraged political participation and negatively affect state-
discouraged acts. 
2. Political interest, political knowledge and political efficacy 
In the current participation studies within different regime types, one’s psychological 
engagement into politics, such as political interests, political knowledge and political 
efficacy have widely been acknowledged as important factors to motivate participation 
(Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Finkel 1985; Bahry and Silver 1990; 
Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Shi 1997, 1998; Corey and Garand 2002).   
  Previous participation literature indicates there are two basic types of political 
efficacy: the internal political efficacy and external political efficacy. Internal efficacy 
refers to the perception on one’s competence to understand and participate into politics, 
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and external efficacy denotes one’s belief about the responsiveness of governmental 
authorities to demands made by citizens (Finkel 1985; Craig et. al. 1990; Niemi et. al. 
1991). In this dissertation, I expect that political interests, knowledge and efficacy will 
have a positive effect on citizens’ virtual political participation of both kinds in urban 
China except for the external political efficacy on unconventional political participation. 
3. Government attitude 
By political attitude, I mean how much people identify with the traditional value and 
regular functioning of the government, and I propose that the more citizens identify with 
the fundamental values and regular functioning of the government, the more likely they 
are going to support the government, take part in acts called upon by the government, and 
the less likely going to act against the government. 
4. Faith in people 
Based upon previous participation studies (Almond and Verba 1963; Bahary and Silver 
1990), individuals who have more faith in other people are more likely to be engaged 
more in cooperative political activities, as they are more likely to be able to cooperate and 
count on others’ support. Interpersonal trust may also motivate individuals to engage into 
unconventional political acts, since the ability to trust others reduces the perceived cost of 
being unconventional (Bahry and Silver 1987). 
               In the following table, Table 2, I proposed the hypothetical relationships 
between different types of political participation and independent variables.  
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Table 2. Proposed Relationship between Participation and Independent Variables 
 
Independent Variables 
Conventional  
Political 
Participation 
Unconventional  
Political 
Participation 
Position in the Workplace + - 
Socioeconomic status  
(income and education) + - 
Self-perceived socioeconomic status  + - 
Gender (female) - - 
Age parabolic parabolic 
Marital status + - 
Ethnicity background (Han) + + 
Family background 
(father’s education and CCP membership) + - 
Party membership + - 
Political Interest + + 
Political Knowledge + + 
Internal Political Efficacy  + + 
External Political Efficacy + - 
Government attitude + - 
Faith in people + + 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS I 
 
  
 Chapter IV introduces the two data sets used in the analysis, the 1993 Chinese 
Social Mobility and Social Change Survey and the 2002 Asian Barometer Survey.19 After 
presenting the measurements of the dependent and independent variables, I discuss the 
models and methodologies that I employ in the study, and the hypotheses to be tested and 
the methodologies. 
1993 Data Set  
 The 1993 Survey of Chinese Social Mobility and Social Change was collected in 
August 1993 by the Social Survey Center at People’s University in Beijing across China. 
The data set is designed to be representative of the adult population over 18 years old in 
China, residing in family households at the time, excluding those living in the Tibetan 
Autonomous region.20   
A stratified multistage area sampling procedure was employed to select the 
sample. The primary sampling units (PSUs) were selected eighty-five cities, and the 
secondly sampling units were districts (qu) or streets (jiedao), and the third stages were 
                                                          
19
 While the data collected in the 1993 and 2002 data sets contain information on both urban and rural 
China, the data employed in the empirical analysis focus on the urban section. There is a division along the 
rural and urban Chinese studies for long, which probably originates from the vastly different 
socioeconomic conditions existent in rural and urban China, such as residents’ employment type, village 
linage, migration and residents’ way of living. These differences are real and substantial, which is regarded 
as one of the main reasons that lead to the general division between the rural and urban Chinese studies 
theoretically and empirically. Even in the 2000s, the majority of Chinese population still resides in rural 
areas, who makes everyday living as peasants as the major occupation, and in urban China, to be employed 
by a certain type of workplace, or a certain type of work unit, is how most urban residents make a living. 
Acknowledging the above differences, this study aims to discover on how social context, specifically the 
work units, would influence citizens’ political participation in urban China, and the empirical data analysis 
of this study focuses on the urban part of China along with the discussion of implications. 
20
 A large proportion of Tibetans do not speak Chinese. Also, at the time of survey, transportation in Tibet 
was difficult due to inefficient railroad and highway system. 
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committees (juweihui). Households were used at the fourth stage of sampling. This one-
and-a-half-hour survey recorded Chinese citizens’ political participation, political 
attitudes and beliefs along with the demographic information such as residence, region, 
education, income, work and family background. Although the data set has both rural and 
urban information on file, I focus on the urban section of the data set, as the work unit as 
a social structure is the major grassroots socioeconomic institution in urban China, and is 
mainly restricted to the urban part of China as well. The total sample of the urban 
population is 1,070. 
Dependent Variables 
As elaborated in the theory section, I intend to differentiate political participation 
into two categories: conventional and unconventional political participation. Before I 
delve into solving the puzzle of grouping different type of political participation into 
conventional and unconventional groups, I conducted a factor analysis and principal 
component analysis to analyze the statistical components of dependent variables.21 
The analysis of the structure of participation starts with the initial Factor Matrix of 
the sixteen participatory acts in the 1993 data set. Table 3 presents the result of the factor 
analysis of the dependent variables and reports the extracted first four factors. The 
numbers of each column are the factor loadings of each participation variable on that 
component. 
 
 
                                                          
21
 The missing values in the data sets are treated as missing in the factor analysis above. I also imputed the 
missing value with the Amelia program and conducted factor analysis on the Amelia data sets. The results 
of the Amelia analysis are reported in the Appendix B, and the results are congruent with results of the 
factor analysis above.  
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Table 3. Initial Factor Analysis Matrix (Un-rotated) of the Participatory Acts in 
1993 
 
 Factor Loadings 
Participation Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
1.  Voting in the 1992 PC Election 0.19 -0.34 0.41 0.18 0.17 
2.  Voting in the work unit 0.2 -0.34 0.41 0.16 0.04 
3.  Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v. 0.5 -0.34 0.32 -0.05 -0.02 
4.  Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v. 0.61 -0.17 -0.17 -0.23 0.31 
5.  Recommend candidates when asked in c.v. 0.58 -0.19 -0.21 -0.23 0.22 
6.  Attend meetings that brief candidates in w.v. 0.46 -0.39 0.26 0.02 -0.24 
7.  Nominate candidates in work units in w.v. 0.62 -0.2 -0.19 -0.12 -0.21 
8.  Recommend candidates when asked in w.v. 0.56 -0.19 -0.2 -0.14 -0.3 
9.  Express to the leaders directly 0.38 0.33 -0.05 0.24 -0.1 
10.  Ask other leaders to intervene 0.32 0.55 0.01 0.1 -0.13 
11. Complain through hierarchy 0.51 0.28 -0.14 0.32 0.11 
12. Complain through workers' union 0.44 0.07 -0.14 0.32 0.15 
13. Ask others to persuade the leader 0.3 0.52 0.18 0.05 -0.12 
14. Wrote to government offices 0.3 0.22 -0.03 0.22 0.09 
15. Help from official's friends 0.25 0.59 0.27 -0.32 0.04 
16. Gifts and dinner 0.17 0.52 0.3 -0.29 0.1 
Variance Proportion 0.46 0.33 0.14 0.11 0.07 
Eigenvalue  2.93 2.09 0.89 0.71 0.46 
 
The first factor represents the single best summary of the linear relationships 
exhibited in the data, and every dependent variable exhibits a positive and measurable 
association with this composite variable. I interpret that this first factor represents the 
prime “activeness” component as a common dimension among the dependent variables 
(Verba and Nie 1987; Shi 1997). Verba and Nie argued that political participation can be 
considered simultaneously as both a multidimensional and a unidimensional phenomenon, 
and it is unidimensional because there is a common component—the “propensity of 
political activity” across all participatory acts in a society. The factor analysis indicates 
that the activity dimension explains 17 to 62 percent of the variance in each of the acts 
and accounts for almost half (46 percent) of the total variance among the sixteen 
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variables, which represents the single most important component in the 1993 dependent 
variables.  
The second factor reveals the multidimensionality among the dependent variables, 
as the latent variable differentiates the voting and campaigning and participation inside 
the work unit. For voting and campaigning, this latent factor explains 17 to 39 of the 
variance in each act, and 22 to 59 of the rest participation mode except for complaining 
through the trade union.  Be noted these first two components have explained almost 80 
percent of all the participation modes documented in the 1993 data set.  
Along the second latent variable, the four types of acts score particularly high, 
which are (1) ask other leaders to intervene (2) ask others to persuade the leader (3) help 
from officials’ friends (4) gifts and dinner. We group these acts as “official contacting”.  
Among the electoral participation, the analysis further reveals the distinctive type of 
voting behavior as revealed in the analysis.  
The third and fourth components with lesser eigenvalues (.89 and .71) are not as 
clear and heavy-weighted as the first two dimensions. The third factor appears to separate 
the voting behavior with the rest of the campaigning and non-electoral participation acts. 
Also, we group the attending briefing meetings in congressional elections and work units 
elections together, as the participation is closely related to the voting behavior. The fourth 
factor different has a lesser eigenvalue of .71 that distinguishes the participation acts that 
involves considerable risk. According to the fourth latent factor, we group the 
complaining through hierarchy and complaining through workers’ union as the 
complaining behavior. Finally, along latent factor 4, we group “express to the leaders” 
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and “wrote to the government” together with official contacting.22 The grouping of the 
initial factor analysis is reported in the following Table 4.  
Table 4. Grouping of the Initial Factor Analysis Matrix 
    
Naming the Factor  
 
    
Factor 2: Electoral Participation V. Work Unit Participation  Loading23 
1 Voting in the 1992 PC Election -0.34 
2 Voting in the work unit -0.34 
3 Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v. -0.34 
4 Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v. -0.17 
5 Recommend candidates when asked in c.v. -0.19 
6 Attend meetings that brief candidates in w.v. -0.39 
7 Nominate candidates in work units in w.v. -0.2 
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8 Recommend candidates when asked in w.v. -0.19 
9 Express to the leaders directly 0.33 
10 Ask other leaders to intervene 0.55 
11 Complain through hierarchy 0.28 
12 Complain through workers' union 0.07 
13 Ask others to persuade the leader 0.52 
14 Wrote to government offices 0.22 
15 Help from official's friends 0.59 Pa
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16 Gifts and dinner 0.52 
    
Factor 3: Voting Loading 
1 Voting in the 1992 PC Election 0.41 
2 Voting in the work unit 0.41 
3 Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v. 0.32 
4 Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v. -0.17 
5 Recommend candidates when asked in c.v. -0.21 
6 Attend meetings that brief candidates in w.v. 0.26 
7 Nominate candidates in work units in w.v. -0.19 El
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8 Recommend candidates when asked in w.v. -0.2 
                                                          
22
 This finding of the five modes of political participation is largely congruent with the finding in Verba, 
Nie and Kim’s study. Corresponding to their four major modes of participation—voting, campaigning, 
communal activity (contact government for general social outcome) and particularized contact (contact 
government for one’s particular interest), the participation modes found in urban China in this study are 
voting, campaigning and candidate recruitment, complaining, official contact respectively. As Verba, Nie 
and Kim acknowledged in their 1987 study, there has been “similar (participation) structure across 
heterogeneous set of nations” (54). This important finding of the existence of similar structure of political 
participation across different nations provides this study with an empirical ground to construct comparable 
models to analyze the political acts.    
23
 Although some of the extracted engenvalues are less than 1, they are still employed to support 
differentiating different modes of political participation. The employment of the eigenvalues that are less 
than 1 are cited in previous study of the analysis of political participation (Participation in America by 
Verba and Nie (1972)). 
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Table 4. Continued 
 
    
Factor 4: Complaining Loading 
9 Express to the leaders directly 0.47 
10 Ask other leaders to intervene 0.38 
11 Complain through hierarchy 0.65 
12 Complain through workers' union 0.52 
13 Ask others to persuade the leader 0.28 
14 Wrote to government offices 0.42 
15 Help from official's friends 0.06 P
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16 Gifts and dinner 0.04 
 
While setting out to frame the participation modes in conventional and 
unconventional types, the empirical factors analysis exposes the more subtle and less 
fixed dimensions among the participation acts in urban China in the early 1990s. The 
foremost finding of the factor analysis is that the commonality or unidimensionality 
underscores various participation modes. The first activeness component accounts for 
almost half of all the variable variances, and the second major division among 
participation acts is electoral and non-electoral participation. At the same time, we see 
from the analysis that voting is highlighted when compared with the rest electoral 
participation, with the latter requiring more personal initiatives from the participants. 
In short, different from grouping China’s urban political participation into 
conventional and unconventional categories, the empirical analysis reveals that first of all 
the political participation in urban China share the unidimensionality as active political 
acts in the non-democratic regime. Secondly, the most important delineation among the 
political acts is the difference between electoral and non-electoral activities, especially 
the voting. Finally, official contacting and complaining turn out to be important types of 
political participation as well. 
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To further explore the variable structure in the initiative factor analysis, I rotated 
the initial factors. The result is reported in the Table 5. 
Table 5. Rotated Matrix for the Participatory Acts in 1993 
 
 Rotated Factor Loadings 
Participation Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
Voting in the 1992 PC Election 0.08 -0.08 0.62 0.00 0.02 
Voting in the work unit 0.01 -0.06 0.62 -0.02 -0.11 
Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v. 0.25 0.02 0.16 0.04 -0.07 
Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v. 0.69 0.06 0.04 0.13 -0.21 
Recommend candidates when asked in c.v. 0.66 0.01 0.03 0.08 -0.27 
Attend meetings that brief candidates in w.v. 0.07 -0.07 0.14 0.04 -0.25 
Nominate candidates in work units in w.v. 0.30 0.00 0.06 0.13 -0.64 
Recommend candidates when asked in w.v. 0.24 -0.01 0.02 0.07 -0.67 
Express to the leaders directly 0.01 0.20 -0.04 0.47 -0.15 
Ask other leaders to intervene -0.04 0.43 -0.10 0.38 -0.13 
Complain through hierarchy 0.17 0.14 -0.03 0.65 -0.10 
Complain through workers' union 0.22 -0.03 0.07 0.52 -0.09 
Ask others to persuade the leader -0.06 0.49 0.00 0.28 -0.06 
Wrote to government offices 0.05 0.14 0.04 0.42 -0.06 
Help from official's friends 0.06 0.76 -0.06 0.06 -0.01 
Gifts and dinner 0.03 0.70 -0.02 0.04 0.06 
 
The first loaded component of rotated factor analysis confirms the distinctiveness 
of campaign behavior, especially for the candidates recruitment in the electoral 
participation. The second factor highlights the official contacting. Along the third 
component, voting once again stood out as a specific genre of political participation, and 
the complaining behaviors score the highest along the factor four. In the confirmatory 
rotated component analysis, the result complements to the initial factor analysis, and it 
confirms the voting behavior as the specific type of participation. The rotated factor 
analysis also sets aside the acts of official contacting. 
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Table 6. Principal Component Analysis of the Participatory Acts in 1993 
 
 Eigenvector    
Participation Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
Voting in the 1992 PC Election 0.11 -0.26 0.62 0.25 0.20 
Voting in the work unit 0.12 -0.26 0.62 0.22 0.02 
Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v. 0.28 -0.25 0.27 -0.08 -0.06 
Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v. 0.34 -0.14 -0.16 -0.24 0.42 
Recommend candidates when asked in c.v. 0.33 -0.15 -0.20 -0.26 0.30 
Attend meetings that brief candidates in w.v. 0.26 -0.28 0.22 -0.03 -0.34 
Nominate candidates in work units in w.v. 0.35 -0.15 -0.18 -0.17 -0.22 
Recommend candidates when asked in w.v. 0.32 -0.15 -0.20 -0.21 -0.36 
Express to the leaders directly 0.25 0.23 -0.06 0.26 -0.29 
Ask other leaders to intervene 0.21 0.38 0.03 0.05 -0.24 
Complain through hierarchy 0.31 0.18 -0.16 0.34 0.15 
Complain through workers' union 0.28 0.03 -0.17 0.40 0.22 
Ask others to persuade the leader 0.19 0.35 0.22 0.01 -0.23 
Wrote to government offices 0.20 0.16 -0.03 0.33 0.23 
Help from official's friends 0.15 0.38 0.29 -0.35 0.13 
Gifts and dinner 0.11 0.35 0.33 -0.33 0.24 
Variance Proportion 0.22 0.17 0.09 0.08 0.06 
Engenvalue 3.50 2.68 1.48 1.34 1.03 
 
Finally, I conducted the principal component analysis with the participation acts 
in order to obtain further information of the structure of dependent variables. The result is 
reported in Table 6. 
The analysis result once again confirms that the most important component that 
associated with the dependent variables is the common activeness component. Secondly, 
the principal component score underlines a clear distinction between electoral and non-
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electoral participation acts, and voting behavior is once again set aside as a specific form 
of participation.24   
According to the empirical testing of the dependent variables, I revised our initial 
categorization of participation acts as conventional and unconventional types and found 
that the unidimensionality across the political acts is the most important underlining 
characteristic of the array of participation in urban China in 1993. Secondly, the major 
difference among the participation acts is between electoral and non-electoral 
participation, while the voting is certainly a special participation form that requires lower 
level of cost. Finally, official contacting and complaining are distinguished as special 
type political acts. 
According to the analysis above, I differentiate citizens’ political participation in 
the 1993 data set into the following groups, and the distribution of political participation 
is reported in Table 7 and Figure 1.  
1. Voting 
a. Voting in the 1992 PC Election 
b. Voting in the work unit 
2. Campaigning  
a. Attended campaign meeting for the candidate in the 1992 PC election 
b. Attended campaign meeting for the candidate in the work unit 
3. Candidate Recruitment 
a. Nominated a candidate on your own initiative in the 1992 PC election 
                                                          
24
 I performed the factor analysis on the individual imputed data sets generated by the Amelia program as 
well. The results of the Amelia generated data sets also confirmed the results of the analyses above.  
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b. Recommended a candidate when solicited opinions in the 1992 PC 
election 
c. Nominated someone as a candidate on your own initiative in the work unit 
d. Recommended as a candidate when solicited opinions in the work unit 
4. Complaining through Political Organizations 
a. Complained to the higher authorities through the bureaucratic hierarchy 
b. Complained through the trade union 
5. Official Contacting 
a. Sought help from the official's friends 
b. Sent gifts or invited leader to dinner 
c. Asked other leader in the same unit to intervene 
d. Sought help from those who could persuade the leader 
e. Expressed opinions directly to the leader  
f. Wrote letter to appropriate government office 
Figure 1. Distribution of the Dependent Variables in Urban China in 1993 
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Distribution of Political Participation in Urban China in 1993
Often/Yes
Sometimes
Occasionally
Never/No
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Table 7. Distribution of the Dependent Variables in Urban China 199325 
 
Political Participation Types Never/No Occasionally Sometimes Often/Yes 
Voting in the 1992 PC Election 18.17   81.83 
Voting in the work unit 10.07   89.93 
        
Attending meetings that brief candidates 48.26 15.57 25.87 10.3 
Nominating the candidate oneself 88.62 4.31 5.75 1.32 
Recommend candidates when asked 89.22 4.07 5.51 1.2 
        
Attend election meetings 36.59 14.67 33.9 14.84 
Nominate candidates in work units 68.13 10.96 17.2 3.71 
Recommend candidates when asked 71.75 10.62 15.01 2.87 
        
Express to the leaders directly 37.75 20.67 31.54 10.04 
Ask other leaders to intervene 74.67 10.27 13.38 1.67 
        
Complained through hierarchy 78.02 8 12.07 1.91 
Complained through workers' union 89.73 4.54 4.9 0.84 
        
ask others to persuade the leader 79.09 8.48 11.47 0.96 
Wrote to government offices 91.88 3.58 4.06 0.48 
        
Help from official's friends 91.64 4.78 3.46 0.12 
Gifts and dinner 92.95 4.18 2.87 0 
 
Independent Variables 
The independent variables include the following: (1) social contexts—workplace 
type and political organization; (2) socioeconomic resources—position in the workplace, 
socioeconomic status, self-perceived socioeconomic status, gender, age, marital status, 
ethnicity and father’s educational level and father’s party membership; (3) psychological 
engagement— party membership, political interest, political knowledge, political efficacy 
                                                          
25
 Please note that the political participations types with variations less than 5% are not included in the 
actual empirical analysis due to the small amount of variations. These small-variance participation types 
include demonstration/sit in with 0.36% of variation, suing in court 1.79%, harassing leaders 1.77%, etc. 
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(internal political efficacy & external political efficacy), one’s attitude toward the 
government and faith in other people.  
Social Contexts 
1. Workplace type 
The workplace type is the key independent variable in this dissertation. As I elaborated in 
Chapter III there are five types of the workplaces in urban China in accordance with their 
connection with the state. I measured the workplace variable both as the ordinal variable 
from 1 to 5 in their connection with the state, and the binary variable for each specific 
type of the work unit. Also, in order to measure the different contextual influence the 
workplaces, I combined government organizations, state institutions and state enterprises 
as the state workplace and the rest of the work units as the non-state workplace. 
2. Political organization inside the workplace  
The variable of political organization is measured by the availability of the political study 
inside the workplace.  
Socioeconomic Resources 
1. Position in the workplace 
V126: What is your profession? 
I coded this variable according to the given answer (please refer to Appendix A). 
Specifically, the position variable are coded in the following scheme: senior professionals 
and private enterprises’ owners hold the highest position 4, professionals and managers in 
the work units hold the secondary position 3, white-collar workers and staff hold the 
lower position 2, Manual workers hold the lowest 1, and unemployed and housewives are 
0. 
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2. Socioeconomic status  
1) Income 
Previous research indicates that the household income level is a better indicator of one’s 
overall socioeconomic status than the individual income level (Bahry and Silver 1990; 
McAllister and White 1994). In this dissertation, I shall use the reported household 
income level as the socioeconomic status indicator, which is measured by the actual 
number of dollars of the respondents’ total household earns. 
V164: [For urban residents] what was your family's total income last month?  (Including 
salaries, bonuses, various subsidies, allowances, retirement pensions, living expense 
grants, alimony, second jobs, and from other income sources?) 
2) Education 
The education variable is measured as an ordinal variable, with 6 being the highest degree 
level and 1 being the lowest. 1 is the elementary school graduate, 2 lower middle school 
graduate, 3 upper middle school, vocational school, or technical school graduate, 4 
evening college TV college, correspondence college graduate, 5 fulltime college or 
technical college graduate, 6 graduate school degree. 
3. Self-perceived socioeconomic status 
V27: Compared to other families, which category do you feel your family's economic 
situation fits in? —Lower, lower middle, middle, upper-middle, upper  
V28: What do you feel is your family's social position now? —Lower, lower middle, 
middle, upper-middle, upper. 
4. Gender: dichotomous variable, and the male is coded as 1 and female as 0. 
5. Age 
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I theorize that participation will be highest during middle-age, as political participation is 
usually weak in one’s early age and declines with the infirmities of old age. In order to 
capture the parabolic effect of age, I will include two age variables in the model. One is 
the respondent’s natural age, and the other is the age squared. If the natural age is 
positively correlated with the dependent variable with significance while the age square is 
negative correlated with the dependent variable with significance, the curvilinear age 
effect should be supported.  
6. Marital status  
Dichotomous variable. Marital status is theorized and empirically found to have an 
important effect upon citizens’ political participation level (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 
1980; Johnson and Libecap 1991; Shi 1997).  Being married while without being 
divorced, separated or widowed is coded as 1 and the rest 0.  
7. Ethnic background 
Dichotomous variable. The Han ethnic group is coded as 1 and the rest 0.  
8. Family background 
In this study I shall employ the measurement of father’s education level and membership 
in the Communist Party to measure family background. Fathers’ education is measured as 
the same as the variable education. 
Psychological Engagement 
1. Party membership  
Party membership is a dichotomous variable. The communist party member is coded as 
“1” and the rest “0”. 
2. Political interest  
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Political interest is measured by the frequency of citizens gathering information in daily 
life via TV and newspaper, the two most prevailing media of political information in 
China’s urban setting. 
V10: Did you have a chance to watch TV news last week? —no, once or twice, a few 
times, nearly every day 
V11: Did you read the news in a newspaper last week? —no, once or twice, a few times, 
nearly every day 
3. Political knowledge 
Political knowledge is measured by the political information that citizens possess. In the 
data set, political knowledge is measured by the following question. 
V19: do you know who the chairman of the People’s Congress is? 
4. Political efficacy 
As I argued in Chapter III, political efficacy is differentiated into the internal political 
efficacy and external political efficacy.  
(1) Political efficacy toward the work unit 
A. Internal political efficacy 
V61n: I have excellent relations above and below, so I know exactly what's going on in 
my locality/unit—strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree. 
B. External political efficacy 
V61p: People in our work unit have many effective ways to influence the leaders' 
decisions—strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree. 
(2) Political efficacy toward the government 
A. Internal political efficacy 
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V81o: I consider myself very capable in participating in politics—strongly disagree, 
disagree, agree, strongly agree. 
B. External political efficacy 
V81i: In our country, people have many ways effectively to influence the government's 
decisions—strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree. 
5. Government attitude 
With government attitude, I intend to gauge how much the respondents identify with the 
traditional value and daily functioning of the government. 
V43d: Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree 
with the following statements: I should trust and obey the government, for in the last 
analysis it serves our interests—strongly disagree, disagree, agree, strongly agree. 
6. Faith in people 
By faith in people, I denote the presumed level of trust of citizens into others (Bahry and 
Silver 1987). It is measured with a dichotomous variable. 
V59: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't 
be too careful in dealing with people? —most people can be trusted or can't be too careful 
in dealing with people. 
Hypotheses 
After refining our understanding of the dependent and independent variables in 
this study, I test the following hypotheses regarding the influence of socioeconomic 
context especially the workplace on the variety and intensity of citizens’ political 
participation. 
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H1: The closer the workplace is attached to the state, the more likely the citizens 
who belong to this workplace are going to engage in voting, campaigning, candidate 
recruitment and official contacting. 
H2: The closer the workplace is attached to the state, the less likely the citizens 
who belong to this workplace are going to engage in complaining. 
H3: The more intense the political organization is in the workplace, the more 
likely the citizens who belong to this workplace are going to engage in voting, 
campaigning and candidate recruitment and official contacting. 
H4: The more intense the political organization is in the workplace, the less likely 
the citizens who belong to this workplace are going to engage in campaigning. 
H5: The closer the workplace is attached to the state, the more likely the citizens 
will participate in politics through the mobilization of political organizations, and the less 
likely to participate out of personal socioeconomic resources; on the other hand, the more 
distant the workplace is attached to the state, the more likely citizens participate into 
politic out of their own resources instead of through the political organization. 
H6: The contextual mobilization effect of the workplace that are close to the state 
is going to be stronger as compared to the influence of workplace that are distant to the 
state.  
H7: One’s father’s CCP membership and education achievement are likely to 
facilitate individual citizens to participate in politics.  
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2002 Data Set 
The other data set that I use in this study is the Asian Barometer Survey, 
specifically the Mainland China section. Currently the data set is stored in the Asian 
Barometer Survey Project Office in the National Taiwan University and is available to 
the public for academic research upon individual request.26 For more information about 
the data set, please refer to the website of www.asiaborameter.com. 
The Asian Barometer conducts an over 150-question survey across eight Asian 
regions, which are Hong Kong, Taiwan, Thailand, Philippines, Japan, Mongolia, South 
Korea, and Mainland China. The survey is composed of series questions concerning both 
political attitudes and political behavior of the individual respondent. Compared to the 
1993 data set, the 2002 Asian Barometer is a cross-national survey data set emphasizing 
on the individuals’ political attitude and perception. However, the data set does include 
batteries of citizens’ political participation questions, and contains most of the interested 
independent variables in our study.  
The Mainland China Asian Barometer data come from the survey conducted in 
China between March 2002 and August 2002 in cooperation with the Institute of 
Sociology of Chinese Social Science Academy. The sample represents the adult 
population over eighteen years of age residing in family households at the time of the 
survey excluding those residing in the Tibetan Autonomous Region.27 A stratified 
                                                          
26
 The data set was collected by the East Asia Barometer Project (2000-2004), which was co-directed by 
Professors Fu Hu and Yun-han Chu and received funding support from Taiwan’s Ministry of Education, 
Academia Sinica and National Taiwan University. The Asian Barometer Project Office is solely 
responsible for the data distribution, and I appreciate the assistance in providing data by the institutes and 
individuals aforementioned. 
27
 The Tibet Autonomous region was excluded in the survey the following reasons: first, many Tibetans do 
not speak Chinese; second, transportation in Tibet is extremely difficult since there is no railroad and the 
highway system is not well developed, and thirdly, it is difficult to find qualified interviewers who can 
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multistage area sampling procedure with probabilities proportional to size measures (PPS) 
was employed to select the sample.28 
Dependent Variables  
Following the analysis for the dependent variables in the 1993 analysis, I am 
going to conduct the empirical testing for the participation variables29 as reported in 
Table 8 and Table 9. 
Table 8. Initial Factor Analysis Matrix (Unrotated) of the Participatory Acts in 2002 
 
 Factor Loadings    
Participation Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Uniqueness 
Voting in the PC Election 0.32 0.24 0.32 0.04 0.74 
Voting in the work unit 0.23 0.36 0.28 0.00 0.73 
Attend meetings that brief candidates 0.41 0.33 0.09 0.03 0.71 
Nominate candidates in work units  0.46 0.29 -0.33 0.03 0.60 
Recommend candidates when asked 0.48 0.32 -0.29 -0.05 0.58 
Express to the leaders directly 0.55 -0.20 0.12 -0.09 0.63 
Ask other leaders to intervene 0.43 -0.18 0.05 -0.26 0.71 
Complain through hierarchy 0.54 -0.31 0.05 0.12 0.60 
Complained through workers' union 0.43 -0.17 0.00 0.15 0.77 
Ask others to persuade the leader 0.33 -0.25 -0.05 -0.15 0.81 
Wrote to government offices  0.32 -0.22 -0.05 0.23 0.80 
Variance Proportion 0.83 0.34 0.17 0.08  
Eigenvalue 1.93 0.80 0.41 0.19  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
work there effectively. It should be noted that the Tibet Autonomous Region was excluded in the 1993 
Social Mobility and Social Change data set due to similar reasons. 
28 The Primary Sampling Units are sixty-seven cities in the urban area, and the secondary sampling units 
were districts and streets, and the third stage of selection was community or neighborhood committees. 
Households were used at the fourth stage of sampling. A total of 496 sampling units were selected. 
29
 I also conducted the factor analysis on the data sets produced by Amelia and reported the result in the 
Appendix B. 
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Table 9. Grouping of the Initial Factor Analysis Matrix 
  
Naming the Factor  
 
    
Factor 2: Electoral Participation V. Work Unit Participation  Loading 
1 Voting in the 1992 PC Election 0.24 
2 Voting in the work unit 0.36 
3 Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v. 0.33 
4 Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v. 0.29 E
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5 Recommend candidates when asked in c.v. 0.32 
6 Express to the leaders directly -0.20 
7 Ask other leaders to intervene -0.18 
8 Complain through hierarchy -0.31 
9 Complain through workers' union -0.17 
10 Ask others to persuade the leader -0.25 
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11 Wrote to government offices -0.22 
    
Factor 3: Voting Loading 
1 Voting in the 1992 PC Election 0.32 
2 Voting in the work unit 0.28 
3 Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v. 0.09 
4 Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v. -0.33 E
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5 Recommend candidates when asked in c.v. -0.29 
 
The result of the initial factor analysis of the 2002 dependent variable is largely 
congruent with the 1993 dependent variable analysis. The first loaded factor represents 
the activeness of the political participation in urban China, and the dependent variable are 
all positively and measurably associated with the composite variable. The factor analysis 
indicates that the activity dimension explains 23 to 55 percent of the variance in each act 
and accounts for a significant 83 percent of the total variance. The second latent factor 
distinguished the electoral participation from the non-electoral participation, and the third 
latent variable highlights the voting behavior.  
To further explore the variable structure in the initiative factor analysis, I conduct 
the rotated analysis of the initial factors. The result is reported in Table 10 and Table 11. 
 82 
Table 10. Rotated Matrix for the Participatory Acts in 2002 
 
 
Rotated Factor Loadings 
Participation Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Uniqueness 
Voting in the PC Election 0.13 0.10 0.49 0.02 0.74 
Voting in the work unit -0.02 0.14 0.49 0.02 0.73 
Attend meetings that brief candidates 0.11 0.35 0.39 0.02 0.71 
Nominate candidates in work units  0.12 0.62 0.07 -0.01 0.60 
Recommend candidates when asked 0.10 0.62 0.12 0.08 0.58 
Express to the leaders directly 0.51 0.14 0.15 0.25 0.63 
Ask other leaders to intervene 0.36 0.12 0.06 0.38 0.71 
Complain through hierarchy 0.62 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.60 
Complained through workers' union 0.46 0.15 0.05 -0.02 0.77 
Ask others to persuade the leader 0.34 0.09 -0.08 0.25 0.81 
Wrote to government offices  0.42 0.10 -0.04 -0.12 0.80 
Variance Proportion 0.57 0.43 0.30 0.13 
 
 
Table 11. Grouping of the Initial Factor Analysis Matrix 
 
    
Rotated Factor 1: Official Contacting Loading 
1 Voting in the 1992 PC Election 0.13 
2 Voting in the work unit -0.02 
3 Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v. 0.11 
4 Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v. 0.12 E
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5 Recommend candidates when asked in c.v. 0.10 
6 Express to the leaders directly 0.51 
7 Ask other leaders to intervene 0.36 
8 Complain through hierarchy 0.62 
9 Complain through workers' union 0.46 
10 Ask others to persuade the leader 0.34 
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11 Wrote to government offices 0.42 
    
Rotated Factor 2: Campaigning & Candidate Recruitment  Loading 
1 Voting in the 1992 PC Election 0.10 
2 Voting in the work unit 0.14 
3 Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v. 0.35 
4 Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v. 0.62 E
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5 Recommend candidates when asked in c.v. 0.62 
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The rotated factor analysis again confirms the distinction between the electoral 
and non-electoral participation acts, with the first rotated factor strongly pertaining to the 
non-electoral political participation. The second and third rotated factor highlights the 
specific type of electoral participation acts. So far the empirical testing of the 2002 
dependent variables has largely loaded on similar if not identical factors as in the 1993 
empirical analysis. The foremost characteristic of the dependent variables is the 
activeness across the array of participation acts, and the most noticeable distinction 
among the dependent variables is between the electoral and non-electoral participation. 
Voting is set apart as a special form of electoral behavior as compared to campaigning 
and candidate recruitment, which requires considerable participants’ initiatives. Finally, 
official contacting stands out as an important mode of participation. 
Table 12. Principal Component Analysis of the Participatory Acts in 2002 
 
 
Eigenvector 
Participation Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 
Voting in the PC Election 0.24 0.32 0.49 0.10 
Voting in the work unit 0.17 0.46 0.39 -0.01 
Attend meetings that brief candidates 0.30 0.39 0.04 0.04 
Nominate candidates in work units  0.32 0.27 -0.55 0.04 
Recommend candidates when asked 0.33 0.29 -0.48 -0.11 
Express to the leaders directly 0.39 -0.19 0.19 -0.13 
Ask other leaders to intervene 0.32 -0.19 0.11 -0.55 
Complain through hierarchy 0.38 -0.31 0.11 0.20 
Complained through workers' union 0.32 -0.19 0.03 0.31 
Ask others to persuade the leader 0.25 -0.31 -0.04 -0.41 
Wrote to government offices  0.24 -0.26 -0.06 0.59 
Variance Proportion 0.25 0.14 0.11 0.09 
Eigenvalue 2.70 1.58 1.17 1.02 
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Finally, I conducted the principal component analysis of the dependent variables 
in 2002 as reported in Table 12, and the PCA analysis confirms our tentative conclusions 
above. 
 The first loaded component is the activeness among the dependent variables with 
the eigenvalue of 2.70. The analysis result shows that the activity dimension explains 
about 17 to 39 percentage of variance of each participation act, which overall explains 
about 25 percentage of the total variance among the dependent variables. 
 The second loaded component sets electoral and non-electoral participation apart, 
and the component explains about 14 percentage of the total variance across the variables. 
The third component distinguished the voting behavior with other campaign acts, 
including nominating candidates and recommending candidates. 
 Like the 1993 political participation, the political acts in urban China in 2002 still 
exhibit strong unidimensionality and the major distinction of the political acts is between 
electoral and non-electoral activities. According to the factor analysis result above I have 
differentiated the participation of 2002 in the following categories.  
 The distribution of the 2002 participation is reported in Table 13 and Figure 2. 
1. Voting 
a. Voting in the PC Election 
b. Voting in the work unit 
2. Campaigning  
a. Attended campaign meeting or briefing meeting for the candidate 
3. Candidate Recruitment  
a. Nominated someone as a candidate on your own initiative 
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b. Recommended someone as a candidate when the leaders solicited opinions 
4. Complaining through Political Organizations 
a. Expressed opinions directly to the leader  
b. Complained to the higher authorities through the bureaucratic hierarchy 
c. Complaining through the workers’ union 
5. Official Contacting 
a. Asked other leader in the same unit to intervene  
b. Sought help from those who could persuade the leader 
c. Wrote to government offices 
Table 13. Distribution of the Dependent Variables in Urban China in 2002 
 
Political Participation Types Never/No Occasionally Sometimes Often/Yes 
Voting in the 2002 PC Election 47.85   52.15 
Voting in the work unit 19.03   80.97 
Attending meetings that brief candidates 41.51 14.62 27.73 16.13 
Nominating the candidate oneself 79.5 6.89 11.93 1.68 
Recommend candidates when asked 77.07 8.77 11.97 2.19 
Express to the leaders directly 64.09 13.8 16.39 5.72 
Ask other leaders to intervene 88.72 5.49 4.84 0.95 
Complained through hierarchy 88.03 5.01 5.66 1.3 
Complained through workers' union 94.33 2.36 2.78 0.53 
Ask others to persuade the leader 88.6 6.32 4.25 0.83 
Wrote to the Government Offices 95.36 2.23 1.7 0.71 
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Figure 2. Distribution of the Dependent Variables in Urban China in 200230 
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Table 14. Comparison of Political Acts Distribution in Urban China of 1993 to 2002 
Political Participation Types   Never/No Occasionally Sometimes Often/Yes Chi2 
‘93 18.17   81.83  Voting in the PC Election 
‘02 47.85     52.15 .000 
‘93 10.07   89.93  Voting in the work unit 
‘02 19.03     80.97 .000 
‘93 36.59 14.67 33.9 14.84  Attend election meetings 
‘02 41.51 14.62 27.73 16.13 .120 
‘93 68.13 10.96 17.2 3.71  Nominate candidates in work units 
‘02 79.5 6.89 11.93 1.68 .000 
‘93 71.50 10.62 15.01 2.87  Recommend candidates 
‘02 77.07 8.77 11.97 2.19 .180 
‘93 37.75 20.67 31.54 10.04  Express to the leaders directly 
‘02 64.09 13.8 16.39 5.72 .000 
‘93 74.67 10.27 13.38 1.67  Ask other leaders to intervene 
‘02 88.72 5.49 4.84 0.95 .000 
‘93 78.02 8 12.07 1.91  Complained through hierarchy 
‘02 88.03 5.01 5.66 1.3 .000 
‘93 89.73 4.54 4.9 0.84  Complained through workers' union 
‘02 94.33 2.36 2.78 0.53 .000 
‘93 79.09 8.48 11.47 0.96  Ask others to persuade the leader 
‘02 88.6 6.32 4.25 0.83 .000 
‘93 91.88 3.58 4.06 0.48  Wrote to government offices 
‘02 95.36 2.23 1.7 0.71 .001 
‘93 91.64 4.78 3.46 0.12  Help from official's friends 
‘02 96.17 2.77 0.82 0.24 .000 
                                                          
30
 Please be noted that the political participations types with variations less than 5% are not included in the 
actual empirical analysis due to the small amount of variations. These small-variance participation include 
writing to the newspaper with variation less than 1.25%, or demonstration/strike/sit in less than .07%, etc. 
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Comparison of Political Participation in 1993 and 2002 
Table 14 provides the comparison of the participation level of urban residents 
between the 1993 data and 2002 data. I found that compared to the year 1993, the 2002 
data reveal a general decline of the level of political participation over the past decade: 
except for recommending candidates in the unit election, participation is lower in all 
modes (difference significant at the .01 level).  
The table indicates that Chinese citizens are measurably less engaged with politics 
in most political acts in the urban setting. The decline in voting behavior in congressional 
elections is especially notable.  
The decrease of overall political participation in the 2002 data is not a completely 
accidental phenomenon, and I speculate this change of the political participation level is 
closely related to the alteration of sociopolitical structure of Chinese society brought by 
the economic development that China has been experiencing in the last two decades. The 
change of sociopolitical structure changed the engagement between the state and society, 
which sequentially altered the pattern of individual citizens’ political behavior. 
As China started its economic reform in the early 1980s, the government initiated 
the reform to shift the national economy from “the state economy” to “market economy”, 
and at the same time the role of the authoritarian government has gradually transferred 
from the major distributor of the economy toward the market regulator. Although this 
transition to the market economy and the shift of the government role has by no means 
completed, the process and fruits of the reform in the last two decades have nevertheless 
produced profound changes to Chinese economy, its sociopolitical structure and the state-
society relationship. 
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Before the economic reforms, the Chinese government had acted as the major 
distributor of the economic necessities to the public, and except for very special cases 
most Chinese urban residents were heavily dependent upon the state for their monthly 
salary, housing, health benefits, pension, etc. The primary institution that controlled and 
distributed economic goods on behalf of the state was the work units that urban residents 
belonged, especially state organizations and state-owned enterprises. At the preliminary 
stage of the economic reform, Walder (1986) in his classic observation of the function 
and labor relationship in Chinese termed the economic dependence of the workers on the 
workplace as the reward of the authoritarian government to citizens who were loyal to the 
regimes. In practice, the regime’s control over citizens extended far beyond the economic 
realm. Most state workplaces, such as government organizations and state-owned 
enterprises would hold weekly sessions of “political studies” to educate the workers on 
government policies and governmental stand on current issues. Workers were required to 
attend political study sessions as part of the evaluation of “performance” in the workplace, 
and it is not unusual that workers were asked to comment on the political issues and 
policies of the state and avow their allegiance to the party government. Political study 
provided a potent tool for the state to supervise and control urban citizens psychologically. 
Such political study sessions peaked in the Cultural Revolution as many state enterprises 
had four-hour political studies in the afternoon virtually every day, while the studies 
started to diminish in the workplace setting since the economic reform. Statistical 
analysis confirms that attending political study sessions is positively correlated with 
citizens’ trust in the regime, and workers are required to attend the political studies the 
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causal relationship between political study and citizens’ regime trust is likely to run from 
the former to latter.  
       In short, before the market economic and reform development, Chinese urban 
citizens depended heavily on the state while the state maintained a strong control over the 
public. The major institution that carries out this mission is the workplaces, through 
which citizens were to obtain their living material from the state and respond to the 
requests of the state. This scenario has been changing gradually since the market reform.  
As the Chinese government renounced its role of major direct distributor in the 
economy, the market itself has slowly become the dispenser of economic resources to the 
public. Now citizens do not have to rely on the state as their sole resource of economic 
wellbeing and only economic opportunity. Unlike in the 1980s when most people would 
work for the same work unit from graduation till retirement, nowadays citizens can seek 
and get employment opportunities with one’s own skills and experiences on the market. 
Moreover, the government slowly ceases to be the sole provider of many other essential 
economic goods. Through the reform, urban citizens’ residential housing has completely 
been commercialized in the late 1990s, and before then the only way for most urban 
citizens to get housing for one’s family is to wait for the workplace to allocate the 
housing. They would need to wait for the available house resources and to talk to the 
workplace leaders of their need and seniority to entitle for the apartment, although the 
housing was rarely guaranteed for every worker. Since the reform, the source of housing 
has turned from the workplace to the market and citizens only need to purchase the 
apartment on the market. In addition to housing, the health insurance and pension systems 
have also been reformed thoroughly, and the government established individual account 
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for every urban citizen to provide for their medical care and pension allowance. Chinese 
urban citizens would no longer expect the workplaces to provide this essential social care 
for them.  
As the market replaces the government as the major distributor of economic 
resources, citizens’ dependence on the state is reduced significantly and they are provided 
with more autonomy and liberty at the societal level. At the same time, the control of the 
government on individual citizens is also much weakened. Citizens depend less on the 
states for everyday living material and their bargaining and interactions with the state for 
socioeconomic resources decline sequentially as well. Instead of participating to compete 
for the low-end interests for oneself in the work unit, Chinese urban citizens are not 
compelled to participate in politics to guard one’s interests anymore. Thus, Chinese urban 
citizens participate less in the workplace context in order to vie for low-end sociopolitical 
interests while they have gained more individual autonomy in the society. 
 From the analysis above we see that with the deepening of the economic reform in 
contemporary China, the economic reform itself has reached other areas of the Chinese 
society and changed the relationship between the state and society. Workplaces are no 
longer the vital economic and political grassroots institution in Chinese urban life and 
Chinese citizens are measurably less compelled to participate in politics in the 
workplaces.  
Independent Variables 
The independent variables included in the 2002 Asian Barometer Survey are the 
following: (1) social contexts—workplace type; (2) socioeconomic resources—position 
in the workplace, socioeconomic status, self-perceived socioeconomic status, gender, age, 
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marital status, ethnicity and family background; (3) psychological engagement—party 
membership, political interest, political knowledge, political efficacy (internal political 
efficacy & external political efficacy), one’s attitude toward the government and faith in 
other people.  
1.  Workplaces types 
The workplace the individual respondent reports to belong to: 5 representing 
government organizations, 4 for state institutions, 3 for state enterprises, 2 for collective 
enterprises and 1 for foreign/individual/private enterprises.  
Please be noted that within this cross-national survey, the existence of the political study 
is not recoded.  
Socioeconomic Resources 
1. Position in the work unit 
What is your position in the labor force?—Administration/management, clerical, farmer, 
manual worker, professional, sale, service or no work? 
Consistent with the 1993 data set coding, administration/management is coded as 4, 
professional as 3, service/clerical/sale (office workers) as 2, manual worker and farmer 
(laborers) as 1, and no work and housewife as 0.  
2. Socioeconomic resources 
Socioeconomic resources are measured by education and income. 
1) The income variable is measured by the actual monthly income by household.  
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“We would like to know your household on average is, counting all wages, salaries, 
pensions, dividends and other income that come in before taxes and other deductions.” 
2) Education is measured by the highest level of education achieved by the respondent, 
which is recorded in a ten-scale category: 0 no formal education, 1 incomplete 
primary/elementary, 2 complete primary/elementary, 3 incomplete secondary school, 4 
complete secondary school, 5 incomplete high school, 6 complete high school, 7 some 
university or college, 8 with university or college degree, 9 post-graduate degree.  
3. Self-perceived socioeconomic status 
V23: As for your own family, how do you rate your economic situation today? Is it very 
good, good, so so, bad, very bad? 
V24: People sometimes think of the social status of their families in terms of upper class, 
middle class or lower class. Where would you place your family on the following scale? 
—Upper class, upper middle class, middle class, lower-middle class, lower class. 
4. Gender: the male is coded as 1 and female as 0. 
5. Age: measured by the actual age of the respondent and the age squared.  
6. Marital status: dichotomous variable, and being married is coded as 1. 
7. Ethnic background 
 “Do you consider yourself as …?” The Han ethnic group is coded as 1, and the rest 0. 
8. Family background 
The family background in the 2002 data is measured by Father’s education.  
Psychological Engagement 
1. Party membership: CCP membership is coded as 1, otherwise 0. 
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2. Political interest:  
V14: “How interested would you say you are in politics”? —Very interested, somewhat 
interested, not very interested, not at all interested. 
3. Political knowledge 
Political knowledge is measured by the political information that citizens possess. In the 
data set, political knowledge is measured by the following question. 
V13C: do you know who the chairman of the People’s Congress is?  
4.      Political efficacy 
1) Internal political efficacy 
V58H: I think I have the ability to participate in politics—strongly agree, somewhat agree, 
somewhat disagree, strongly disagree. 
V74U: In the work unit I belong, I am able to influence the leaders’ decision 
effectively—strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree. 
2) External political efficacy 
V58E: In our country, people have many ways to influence the governmental decision 
effectively— strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree. 
V74G: In the work unit I belong, people have many ways to influence the leaders’ 
decision effectively—strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly 
disagree. 
5. Government attitude 
With government attitude, I intend to gauge how much the respondents identify with the 
traditional value and daily functioning of the government. 
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V49J: The leaders of the government are like the leaders of one’s family and I people 
should comply with the decision that they have reached— strongly agree, somewhat 
agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree. 
6.  Faith in people 
V26C: Generally speaking, would you say that “most people can be trusted” or “you can't 
be too careful in dealing with people”?  
Hypotheses 
As I shall further examine empirically in Chapter VI, the functioning and status of 
China’s work units have undergone profound changes during the last decade within the 
context of the ever-deepening economic reforms.  
With the reduced role of workplace in China’s socioeconomic as well as the 
political life, the control and dependence that Chinese urban citizens have been 
experiencing in the workplace setting have also been significantly reduced. The strong 
socioeconomic and political ties that used to exist between the urban residents and 
workplaces are also on the wane, and I propose that that the influence of workplace on 
China’s urban political participation has sequentially been remarkably diminished. 
 Thus, I hypothesize that compared to 1993 the influence of the workplace on the 
variety and intensity of Chinese urban political participation in 2002 has declined.   
 Specifically, I hypothesize that the different types of the workplace should not 
provide discriminatory contexts to facilitate or discourage Chinese urban citizens to 
participate in politics. At the same time, while individual citizens are granted more 
autonomy at the societal level, I expect that individual factors, such as individual 
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socioeconomic resources and psychological engagement play an increasingly important 
role in facilitating citizens to participate in politics.  
I shall first examine the retreating role of the workplace in China’s urban 
sociopolitical life in the empirical analysis in Chapter V, and I will analyze the reducing 
role of the workplace in China’s urban life in the case study of Chapter XI.  
Model & Method 
 After previewing the data sets, variables and hypotheses to be tested, in this 
section I review the statistical model and methods I use to conduct the empirical analysis. 
I begin with a discussion of the mathematical models. Then I proceed to the statistical 
methods I use to conduct the analysis: the principal component analysis, the ordered 
Probit analysis, the missing survey data and the Amelia statistical program and the 
CLARIFY statistic program.  
Models 
Let X denotes the vector of all the independent variables except for the workplace 
type,31 and the following are the three models that I estimate: 
1. Workplace as the ordinal variable 
εβββ +++= XworkplaceionParticipat 210  
 Where X = the 5 category workplace variable 
2. Binary measurement of each type of the workplace 
εββββββ ++++++= XentcollectivestateentstateinstgovorgionParticipat 543210  
                                                          
31
 That is, X = [Political organization, father’s party membership, father’s education, individual’s party 
membership, position, income, education, self-regarded economic status, self-regarded social status, gender, 
age, age-squared, marital status, ethnic background, political interest, political knowledge, internal political 
efficacy, external political efficacy, government attitude, faith in others]. 
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3. Contextual influence of the workplace  
εβββ +++= XnonstwXstwionParticipat ** 210  
(Here STW for state-workplaces is a binary variable with 1 for government organizations, 
state institutions and state enterprises and NONSTW for non-state-workplaces is also a 
binary variable with 1 for collective enterprises and private enterprises). 
Principal Component Analysis 
One important methodological tool that I shall employ in the dissertation is the 
principal component analysis, with which I categorize different types of the political 
participation and create indexes for the participation categorization.  The principal 
component analysis (PCA) is the statistical method that aims to reducing the 
dimensionality of the data that consists of a large number of interrelated variables while 
retaining as much as possible of the variation in the data (Jolliffe 2002). The produced 
first principal components illustrate the unified and significant dimensions that the 
variables have measured while attaining the maximal variation. At the same time, this 
method is used to produce indexes for the dimension-reduced variables represented by 
the principal components.  
Principal component analysis has often been dealt with as a special case of factor 
analysis, as both of which aim to reduce the dimensionality of the measured variables 
(Girschick 1936; Jackson 1981). Although PCA has indeed been used extensively as part 
of the factor analysis, these two approaches are inherently different regarding their 
techniques to reduce of the dimensionality of the data. Factor analysis attempts to achieve 
a reduction of dimension by postulating a model relating the observed variables to a 
smaller number of hypothetical variables, while there is no such explicit model 
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underlying PCA that achieves the dimension reduction by transforming the observed 
variables into a new set of variables, the principal components, whilst retaining most of 
the variation of the variation in all of the original variables (Jolliffe 1986, 2002).  
The principal component analysis can be applied to continuous, ordinal and 
dichotomous variables. In this study, I employ the PCA method to construct the indexes 
for the dependent participation types, which are either discrete or binary variables. “The 
basic objective of PCA to summarize most of the ‘variation’ that is present in the original 
set of variables, using a small number of derived variables, can be achieved regardless of 
the nature of the original variables” (Jolliffe 2002: 339).  
As the principal component analysis can be applied for both discrete and binary 
variables, the produced principal components are no longer discrete or binary but rather 
continuous variables. Thus, in order to conduct statistical analysis on the produced 
principal components as the dependent variables, I can employ statistical tools designed 
for continuous variables, for example, the Ordinary Least Square regression model.  
In this dissertation, I employ the principal component analysis to categorize 
different types of political participation and further produce the principal components as 
the indexes to represent the underlying concept that the original participation measured. 
The above table 1 and table 4 illustrate the result of the first-stage principal component 
analysis of different groups of the political participation. 
Ordinary Least Squares & Ordered Probit Model  
While the dependent variables in the regression analysis would be factor score of 
different modes of political participation, I used ordinary linear square regression (OLS) 
in the empirical analysis in Chapter V. The individual political participation would be 
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either binary variable such as voting or discreet variable such as writing to the 
government office. For voting, the individual political participation is coded as 0 or 1, 
and for participatory act such as writing to the government, the participation is recorded 
as never (no participation), occasionally, sometimes and often, and coded as 0, 1, 2 and 3 
accordingly. The missing values from individual participation are treated as missing and 
not deleted from the model. Instead, in the empirical analysis in Chapter V, I used the 
Amelia statistical package to impute the missing data in order to control the missing 
value issue as discussed as followed, and the dependent variables in the empirical 
analysis in the analysis in Chapter V again are the factor score of different modes of 
political participation.  
For analyzing a specific type of political participation, as included in Appendix C 
of the study, the OLS is not appropriate since major dependent variables in this study are 
either discrete or binary variables,. Therefore, I use Probit and ordered Probit regression 
model, which explores the correlation between dependent and independent variables, and 
I also use the CLARIFY statistical package to interpret the results of the ordered Probit 
Model that I shall discuss later on.  
Ordered Probit model is a methodological model that is widely used to analyze 
discrete and scaled dependent variables. Compared to the multinomial probit model, the 
ordered Probit model takes into account of the extra information implicit in the ordinal 
nature of the dependent variables, as the coding of the dependent variable in these cases, 
usually as 1, 2, 3, etc., reflects only a ranking, and the difference between a 1 and 2 
should not be treated equivalent to the difference between a 2 and 3. Ordinary Least 
Square regression will err in an opposite direction, as most of the dependent variables in 
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this study are not continuous, which violate the basic assumptions of the OLS model. 
However, if I employ the ordered Probit model to regress dependent variables, potential 
statistical biases shall be alleviated, as the ordered Probit statistical model is especially 
designed to analyze the relationship between binary or discrete dependent variables and 
explanatory variables (Veall and Zimmermannn 1996: Kennedy 1998; Greene 2001). 
Please note for the ordered Probit model, the goodness-of-fit measure (pseudo-R 2 ) 
is different from the OLS model, which usually carries less significance (Veall and 
Zimmermannn 1996: Kennedy 1998; Greene 2001). In order to verify the validity of the 
statistical results, I shall provide the results of the likelihood ratio test, which is designed 
to test the significance of blocks of coefficients.  
Missing Values & the Amelia Statistical Program 
 Survey data analysis begins with a preliminary exploration to determine whether 
the data are suitable for meaningful statistical analysis. In the preliminary analysis, which 
is not reported in order to save space, I found that missing values is a problem. About 
one-third of the cases are lost in statistical analysis programs that employ the listwise 
deletion, which deletes both nonresponses and cases associated with nonresponses (King 
et. al. 2001), and this corresponds with our experiences of preliminary exploration with 
the 1993 data set. The number of observations for dependent variables is around six to 
eight hundred or so, but the total observations decline to four to five hundred in the 
listwise deletion analysis, which is about one third of the cases in average in the 
regression. The drop of the cases is not caused by any particular independent variable, but 
rather by the small amount of missing values in each single predictor.  
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Although the number of observations is sufficient for meaningful statistical 
analysis, I still consider that it is necessary to take a close look at the problem of missing 
value. In order to correct this problem, I employ the Amelia statistical program to 
generate the missing values in the current data sets with consideration of the variance or 
error terms. Amelia, developed by Gary King and his colleagues in 2001, is a way to 
impute missing values. The Amelia program is based upon previous rigorous missing 
data imputation algorithms and it does not require exceptional expertise on computational 
algorithms and can be run on with the assistance of commercial software, such as the 
Stata.  
I first discuss the theoretical foundation of the algorithm of Amelia. There are 
three fundamental types of theorems regarding the nature of the missing data. First, the 
missing values are completely at random (MCAR) that cannot be predicted with the 
observed information. Second, the missing data may be missing at random (MAR) and 
the probability that a cell value is missing may depend on observed values of other 
variables. Third, the probability of the missing value is dependent on the unobserved 
value of the missing responses, and the missing is nonignorable (NI). The Amelia 
program is based on the second assumption that that observed data can be used to predict 
the missing data.  
By assuming the data are MAR, I first form the observed data likelihood as the 
marginal densities of the observed data are normal, and then I create an imputed value of 
the missing data the way I would usually simulate from a regression.32 The computation 
                                                          
32
 For example, Let jkD denoted a simulated value for observation j and variable k, and let kjD −, denote 
the vector of values of all observed variables in row j. The coefficients β from a regression of on the 
variable in kD can be directly calculated from elements of the vector mean µ and the off-diagonal elements. 
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algorithms is further assisted by the IP and EMis programs by allowing to take random 
draws from the generated imputation, as IP enables to draw random simulations from the 
multivariate normal observed data and EMis enhances small sample variances with a 
round of importance sampling. 
The procedures of the Amelia program are the following. I input the data vector 
with both dependent and independent variables into the program, and Amelia will create 
m values for each missing cell in the data matrix and create m imputed data sets, across 
which the observed values are the same but the missing values are filled with different 
imputation to reflect the uncertainty of the missing data. Then I may apply standard 
statistical methods to the generated data sets. Finally with the Clarify package or the MI 
procedure that is developed along with Amelia, I am able to combine the statistical results 
of the imputed data sets automatically.33 
Normally the Amelia will generate five imputed data sets with five sets of 
generated values. I choose to double the imputed data sets from five to ten in order to 
increase the accuracy level of the variance across different data sets. 
Although Amelia is a user friendly and statistically advanced program in 
recovering the missing data, we should be aware of its limitations. The algorithm of 
Amelia is based on the assumption that the variables in the matrix are jointly multivariate 
normal, which is approximation at best, as few survey data sets have variables that are all 
continuous and unbounded, much less multivariate normal, such as the categorical data. 
In order to retain the precision for the imputed Amelia data sets, in the statistical analysis 
                                                          
33
 The multiple imputation estimate of the parameter (“combined parameter”) is the average of the m 
separate estimates, and the variance of the point estimates is the average of the estimated variances from 
within each completed data sets plus the sample variance in the point estimates. 
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I have calculated the predictors in the imputed data sets as the continuous variable rather 
than discrete variables.34 
First Difference & the CLARIFY Statistical Program 
Finally, I will address the CLARIFY statistical method to improve the 
interpretation and presentation of our statistical results. The regression coefficients in the 
ordered Probit models are similar to the regression coefficients in the OLS models 
conceptually, however, the estimated coefficients in the Probit regression represent the 
change of log odds, instead of the change in lineal regressions, for one unit change in the 
independent variables. In order to compensate for this difference and to provide an 
intuitive understanding of the correlation between the dependent and independent 
variables, I employ the CLARIFY software to interpret the statistical results.   
The CLARIFY software was developed by Gary King and his graduate student 
that aims to interpret and present statistical results by simulating the expected parameters 
with computer-intensive techniques (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 200). It is argued that 
simulation can take full advantage of the parameter estimates, convey statistical findings 
in a reader-friendly manner, and is able to achieve any desired degree of precision by 
increasing the number of simulations (Fair 1980; Tanner 1996; Stern 1997).  
The CLARIFY program uses the logic of survey sampling to approximate 
complicated mathematical calculations, as simulation enables researchers to approximate 
the true expected value as estimating a feature of the population with a drawn sample. 
Specifically, I am able to approximate the statistical effect of the unit change of a 
particular independent variable in the ordered Probit model with the CLARIFY program 
by simulating the expected values of the dependent variables in accordance with the 
                                                          
34
 We still impute the dependent variables as ordinal variables in order to preserve the statistical model. 
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change of this independent variable, holding all other predictors at fixed values. For 
instance, the ordered Probit regression shows that the binary variable gender is 
statistically significant correlated with the participation type A at the .05 level with an 
estimated coefficient .3. In CLARIFY I can hold all other predictors at their mean values 
and simulate the expected value of the dependent variable A when the gender takes the 
value of 0 and 1. By doing so say 1000 times I am able to approximate the difference of 
the dependent variable A when the gender takes one unit of change, since a one unit 
change of the predictor cannot be directly shown with the estimated coefficient in the 
ordered Probit model. In the empirical analysis, I shall use the first difference to interpret 
the result generated by the ordered Probit regression model. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS II: THE ROLE OF WORKPLACE ON CHINESE POLITICAL 
PARTICIPATION 
 
 
 This chapter reports the findings of the analysis of the role of the workplaces on 
citizens’ participation in 1993 and 2002. In addition to measuring the direct effects of the 
work unit with individual variables of the work unit types and political organization, I 
also measure the work units as different contexts to gauge how the contexts affect the 
relations between the independent variables and political participation. As the previous 
discussion suggests, I expect less influence of the work unit on the daily political 
participation of Chinese urban citizens in 2002 than was the case in 1993.  
As China’s economic reform continues to deepen and develop, the state’s role in 
the national economy and in the society both start to transform. In the national economy, 
the state is no longer the sole distributor of goods and services, but has assumed the role 
of market regulator. Among the important changes during this process is the decrease of 
the state-owned enterprises and the sprouting and rapid growth of the foreign, private and 
individual enterprises in Chinese economy.  
Through economic reform, the state gradually relinquishes control over the 
national economy and the state is no longer the sole distributor of economic interests to 
Chinese urban citizens. Although state owned enterprises constituted nearly seventy 
percent of the national economy in early 1990s, its share in the economy dropped to less 
than 50% and its employment scale also diminished significantly by 2000.35  
                                                          
35
 Source: 2001 National Statistic Yearbook of China. 
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While the percentage of state work units dropped considerably over the past 
decade, critical socioeconomic interests that were once distributed via the work units 
were no longer channeled through the work units. Important resources such as housing, 
pension, medical insurance are no longer available to the urban citizens via the setting of 
the work unit. Instead these important resources in citizens’ daily life are now either 
distributed by the market, or through the state’s social network established in the 
economic reform. In the early 1990s, it was still important for urban citizens to engage in 
political participation in the workplace to compete for these interests, but since the early 
2000s, it has become less imperative for urban citizens to engage in various political acts 
through the workplace.  
With the change of the status and function of the work unit, I expect the influence 
of work units will decrease substantially in predicting urban political participation. As 
elaborated in the previous theory chapter, I expect while the work unit plays a crucial role 
in motivating citizens’ participation in the early 1990s, the influence of the work unit is 
going to decrease, if not entirely disappear in 2002. At the same time, I expect in 2002, 
instead of being motivated by the context of work units, China’s urban participation is 
going to be increasingly motivated by individual resources and citizens’ psychological 
engagement in politics along with the decreasing control from workplaces.  
The following sections report results of the analysis of the different modes of 
political participation – voting, campaigning, candidate recruitment, complaining and 
official contacting in 1993 and 2002.36 The dependent variables are the factor scores of 
                                                          
36
 Besides voting measured by 0 (no action) and 1 (vote), the original individual participatory act ranges 
from 0 (no action), 1 (occasionally participate), 2 (sometimes participate) and 3 (often participate). 
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participatory modes, and the missing values are imputed with the Amelia program. 
Analyses of the original data are reported in the Appendix C. 
I expect to find a decreased influence of workplaces in motivating citizens’ 
participation from 1993 to 2002, and increased importance of individual resources, such 
as education and income in China’s urban political participation.  
Voting  
The first mode of participation that I will examine is voting.  Table 15 shows the 
direct effects of workplace on voting in 1993 and 2002.  
In this analysis workplace is measured as an ordinal variable that indicates how 
close or distant a workplace is from the state.  Party organizations are essentially part of 
government and are closest to the state. Other types of workplace, such as state owned 
enterprises and collective enterprises are progressively more distant, while private and 
foreign enterprises are the most distant and independent of the state.  
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In addition, the “political organization” variable indicates whether the respondent 
participated in political studies held within the workplace.  We see that both indicators of 
workplace played an important role in mobilizing citizens to vote in 1993. Citizens in 
workplaces closer to the state were significantly more likely to vote than those in 
workplaces more distant.  Furthermore, political studies in the work unit increased voting 
behavior by a significant extent.37 By 2002, workplace had no significant affect on voting, 
and political organization studies had disappeared from the workplace setting.38 The 
workplace factor and resources variables such as marital status and being middle-aged 
were shown to be correlated with voting in 1993, while the psychological variables such 
as the party membership and internal political efficacy were correlated with the voting in 
2002. As the theory expected, while the workplace is no longer significant in predicting 
citizens’ voting behavior, psychological engagement became increasingly salient in 
predicting voting behavior in 2002. Although the findings are not especially strong, they 
are consistent with my theoretical prediction.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37
 In the original analysis, the ordered-probit regression analysis unambiguously revealed that political 
organization is the most important variable that predicted voting in congressional elections and elections in 
work units. The original analyses are reported in the Appendix C. 
38
 To compare the influence of different types of work units and how they may affect the voting behavior of 
Chinese urban citizens, I entered a dummy variable for each type of workplace, and recorded the result of 
the analysis in the Appendix D (private and foreign enterprises as the omitted category).  
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Table 15. Analysis of the Mode of Voting 
Table 15. Voting  
 
  
  
  
Independent Variables 
Voting 
(1993) Substantive  Effect Voting (2002) 
Substantive  
Effect 
Workplace  .09* (.05) 0.08 .07 (.04)   
Political Organization .38*** (.09) 0.19 /   
Socioeconomic Resources        
Position in the Workplace -.01 (.05)   .04 (.05)   
Income×10(-4) -.07 (.06)   .03 (.02)   
Education -.05 (.05)   .03 (.03)   
Self-regarded Economic Status .002 (.05)   -.004 (.05)   
Self-regarded Social Status -.02 (.06)   .06 (.05)   
Male -.05 (.08)   -.02 (.07)   
Age .04** (.02) 0.62 .06*** (.01) 0.88 
Age-squared×10(-4) -4.4** (1.8) -0.66 -.06*** (.01) -.86 
Marital Status .23** (.10) 0.09 .09 (.16)  
Ethnic Background (Han) .22 (.21)   -.14 (.16)  
Father's Education -.04 (.03)   -.0003 (.007)  
Father's Party Membership -.06 (.10)   /  
Psychological Engagement       
Party Membership .001 (.11)   .19** (.09) 0.07 
Political Interest .09** (.04) 0.12 .06 (.05)  
Political Knowledge -.004 (.09)   .07 (.08)  
Internal Political Efficacy .04 (.09)   .12** (.06) 0.06 
External Political Efficacy -.02 (.08)   .09 (.06)   
Government Attitude .03 (.10)   -.008 (.07)   
Faith in People .06 (.09)   .04 (.07)   
constant -1.7 (.61)   -2.63*** (.42)   
Number of observations 1070   1754   
Note: substantive effect is the effect of the change of one standard deviation of an independent variable on participation. 
* P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01     
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In the 1993 analysis, I found different types of workplaces exert distinctive 
influence on urban voting behavior. Although working in government organizations—the 
workplace closest to the state—had no significant effect on voting, citizens who worked 
in state institutions, state enterprises, and collective enterprises were significantly more 
likely to engage in voting than those employed in foreign and private enterprises. The 
effects of each workplace are similar.  Political organizations also have a similar effect on 
voting.  Besides the party organization, the result supports the hypothesis that the context 
of workplace is going to affect how citizens engage in political participation in urban 
China. In 2002, none of the workplace variables are statistically significant in predicting 
voting as predicted by the theory.  Party membership and internal political efficacy had 
no effect in 1993, but these variables are strong predictors of voting in 2002.  Among 
socioeconomic resources, only age affects voting, with similar effects in 1993 and 2002.  
After testing for the distinctive influence of different types of work units and 
influence of political organization inside the workplace, I further set out to test for the 
interactive influence of the work unit type and political organization inside the work unit 
as reported in Table 16. With the analysis, I intend to test and gauge how political 
organizations would have different effects in different types of the work units. I expect 
within different types of the work units, political organizations should exercise different 
political influence on citizens’ political participation. Instead of still including different 
types of work units for controlling purposes, I include interactive variables of the political 
organization and the five different work units to illustrate different effect of political 
organization on citizens’ voting behavior in different types of the work unit.  
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Table 16. Analysis of the Mode of Voting for Interactive Influence in Work Units 
Table 16. Voting (1993)     
  
    
Independent  Variables Voting (1993) 
Substantive  
Effect 
Interactive Party Organization  
(political organization * party organization) .35 (.23)   
Interactive State institutions 
(political organization * state institutions) .43*** (.14) 0.15 
Interactive State Enterprises 
(political organization * state enterprises) .47*** (.11) 0.21 
Interactive Collective Enterprises 
(political organization * collective enterprises) .46* (.19) 0.11 
Interactive Private Enterprises 
(political organization * private enterprises) .08 (.29)  
Socioeconomic Resources    
Position in the Workplace -.02 (.05)  
Income×10(-4) -0.11* (0.06) -.08 
Education -.01 (.04)  
Self-regarded Economic Status .003 (.06)  
Self-regarded Social Status -.02 (.06)  
Male -.06 (.09)  
Age .05** (.02) 0.78 
Age-squared×10(-4) -4.75** (1.9) -0.71 
Marital Status .25** (.11) 0.1 
Ethnic Background (Han) .22 (.22)  
Father's Party Membership -.08 (.10)  
Father's Education -.04 (.03)  
Psychological Engagement    
Party Membership .04 (.13)  
Political Interest .07 (.04)  
Political Knowledge .001 (.10)  
Internal Political Efficacy .05 (.11)  
External Political Efficacy -.02 (.09)  
Government Attitude .04 (.10)  
Faith in People .09 (.08)  
constant -1.71** (.70)   
Number of observations 1070   
Note: ∆ effect is the effect of the change of dichotomous variable or one standard deviation of other 
independent variable on participation.  
† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01  
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The analysis of the interactive influence of work unit and political study inside the 
work unit confirms the analysis result of the influence of different types of the work units 
on citizens’ voting behavior. While political organizations inside government 
organizations—the workplace closest to the state—had no significant effect on voting, 
political organization in state institutions, state enterprises, and collective enterprises was 
significantly more likely to motivate citizens’ voting than those in foreign and private 
enterprises. The interactive effects of political organization in each workplace type are 
similar.  The result of the interactive influence model shows that in different types of the 
work units, the political organization would exert different influence on citizens’ voting.39 
Campaigning 
The second mode of participation is campaigning. The results reported in table 3 
show that in 1993, while workplace does not affect campaigning activity, political 
organization is positively correlated with citizens’ campaigning behavior. However, the 
influence of political organization disappeared in the 2002 analysis.  
In the 1993 analysis, several socioeconomic resources influence campaigning 
behavior. Citizens’ position held in the workplace such as being the supervisor or in 
management within the workplace is a strong positive predictor of campaigning behavior, 
and self-regarded economic status is positively correlated with campaigning behavior. 
These effects of socioeconomic variables are not significant in 2002. Psychological 
engagement factors, however, influence campaigning behavior in both 1993 and 2002.   
 
                                                          
39
 I also conducted the analyses of interactive effects of the rest modes of political participation and the 
results have not been significant. The findings of the interactive model are confirmatory to the influence of 
the work unit types.  
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Table 17. Analysis of the Mode of Campaigning 
 Table 17. Campaigning 
        
  
  
  
  
  
Independent Variables 
Campaigning 
(1993) 
Substantive  
Effect 
Campaigning 
(2002) 
Substantive  
Effect 
Workplace  .01 (.06)  .07 (.05)   
Political Organization .29*** (.09) 0.15 /  
Socioeconomic Resources       
Position in the Workplace .11** (.05) 0.11 -.008 (.04)  
Income×10(-4) -.06 (.06)  .04 (.03)  
Education -.01 (.05)  -.05 (.04)  
Self-regarded Economic Status .12** (.06) 0.1 -.07 (.06)  
Self-regarded Social Status .01 (.07)  .03 (.05)  
Male -.19** (.09) -.10 -.01 (.08)  
Age .02 (.02)  .02 (.01)  
Age-squared×10(-4) -.57 (1.84)  -.03 (.01)  
Marital Status -.05 (.11)  -.02 (.24)  
Ethnic Background (Han) -.26 (.20)  .03 (.26)  
Father's Education -.06** (.03) -.1 -.0004 (.01)  
Father's Party Membership .08 (.10)  /  
Psychological Engagement       
Party Membership .36*** (.12) 0.14 .52*** (.11) 0.2 
Political Interest .08* (.04) 0.11 .21*** (.06) 0.17 
Political Knowledge .12 (.09)  .24** (.09) 0.11 
Internal Political Efficacy .18** (.09) 0.08 .34*** (.09) 0.18 
External Political Efficacy .04 (.07)  .06 (.07)  
Government Attitude .47*** (.09) 0.2 .11 (.07)  
Faith in People .06 (.09)  .19** (.09) 0.09 
constant -2.94*** (.59)   -1.65*** (.48)   
Number of observations 1070 
  
1754 
  
Note: substantive effect is the effect of the change of one standard deviation of an independent variable on 
participation. 
* P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01  
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While the importance of workplace decreased in the decade before 2002,40 the 
attributes of individual urban citizens, particularly one’s psychological engagement 
factors, such as party membership, political knowledge, internal political efficacy become 
more salient to motivate citizens’ to participate in politics in 2002 than in 1993.41  
Candidate Recruitment  
A third mode of participation is candidate recruitment. The results reported in 
table 4 are similar to those for campaigning.  Closeness of the work unit to the state has 
no direct effect on candidate recruitment, but political organization inside the workplace 
has a significant effect on candidate recruitment in 1993 but not in 2002. Psychological 
engagement indicators (i.e., party membership and internal political efficacy) have 
significant affects on candidate recruitment in both 1993 and 2002. Except for position in 
the workplace, socioeconomic variables have a small and sometimes negative affect on 
candidate recruitment.  A higher status position in the workplace significantly increases 
the probability of engaging in candidate recruitment behavior.  Overall, the analysis of 
the mode of candidate recruitment shows that while the workplace is less significant in 
affecting citizens’ political participation in 2002, the psychological engagement factors 
have a similar affect on candidate recruitment in both 1993 and 2002.   
 
 
 
                                                          
40
 I also conducted the statistical analysis on campaigning and other modes of political participation, 
including each type of work unit as a dichotomous variable, most of the workplace variables were not 
significant in either 1993 or 2002.  
41
 In the statistical analysis of the campaigning behavior in original data analysis, I also found that the 
household income is positively correlated with their campaigning behavior. I reported the results of the 
original ordered-probit analysis of campaigning behavior in the Appendix C.  
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Table 18. Analysis of the Mode of Candidate Recruitment 
 Table 18. Candidate Recruitment 
      
  
  
  
  
  
Independent Variables 
Candidate 
Recruitment 
(1993) 
Substantive  
Effect 
Candidate 
Recruitment 
(2002) 
Substantive  
Effect 
Workplace  .08 (.07)   -.08** (.04) -.08 
Political Organization .23* (.12) 0.12 /   
Socioeconomic Resources        
Position in the Workplace .17*** (.06) 0.16 .12** (.05) 0.13 
Income×10(-4) -.02 (.09)   .03 (.02)   
Education .008 (.05)   -.05 (.04)   
Self-regarded Economic Status .08 (.07)   .03 (.06)   
Self-regarded Social Status .11* (.07) 0.09 .05 (.06)   
Male -.08 (.10)   .02 (.09)   
Age -.02 (.02)   .04* (.02) 0.59 
Age-squared×10(-4) 2.66 (2.05)   -0.0008   
Marital Status .14 (.14)   -.07 (.17)   
Ethnic Background (Han) -.26 (.25)   -0.0589   
Father's Education -.04 (.03)   .02** (.008) 0.009 
Father's Party Membership -.26** (.13) -.11 /   
Psychological Engagement        
Party Membership .81*** (.14) 0.32 .48*** (.11) 0.19 
Political Interest -.01 (.05)   .23*** (.04) 0.18 
Political Knowledge .15 (.12)   -.10 (.14)   
Internal Political Efficacy .51*** (.11) 0.24 .36*** (.10) 0.19 
External Political Efficacy -.01 (.1)   .15 (.10)   
Government Attitude .1 (.11)   .08 (.09)   
Faith in People -.09 (.10)   .007 (.09)   
constant 
-2.01*** 
(.74) 
  -1.99*** 
(.68) 
  
Number of observations 1070   1754   
Note: substantive effect is the change of one standard deviation of an independent variable on participation. 
* P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01    
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The major difference that I found between the 1993 and 2002 analysis is the role 
of workplace in explaining the political participation of candidate recruitment. I found 
that while in 1993, besides the political organization, the types of the workplaces are not 
significantly correlated with recruitment behavior, the workplace type is negatively 
related to candidate recruitment in 2002. To further explore the influence of individual 
type of work units, I ran the analyses again with the work unit as dichotomous variable. 
However, the analysis fails to show that any work unit type is significant in predicting the 
behaviors of candidate recruitment.42 
 
Complaining 
The fourth mode of participation is complaining.  The findings shown in table 5 
are similar to those for campaigning and candidate recruitment.  Workplace has no direct 
effect and political organization has a significant effect on complaining in 1993, but not 
in 2002.   
When comparing the results of 1993 and 2002, the workplace context exerts a 
prominent influence on the complaining through political organizations inside the 
workplace in 1993, and citizens’ party membership is the strongest predictor of the 
complaining behavior in 1993. In the 2002 analysis, while the resources factors such as 
being male and middle-aged played a similar role in both 1993 and 2002 analysis,  
psychological engagement factors of individual citizens, such as one’s political interest, 
internal political efficacy and external political efficacy have started to become prominent 
                                                          
42
 In the ordered-probit model performed on the original data set, the analysis result shows that besides 
psychological engagement factors—the party membership, political interest and internal political efficacy, 
the household income of individual citizens exhibited strong correlation with the dependent variable. The 
result of the analysis is recorded in the Appendix C. 
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in effectively predicting citizens’ complaining behavior as theory predicts.  Citizens who 
trust in their capacity to participate in politics and believe in the responsiveness of 
political institutions are much more likely to engage in complaining in 2002 than in 1993. 
Table 19. Analysis of the Mode of Complaining 
 Table 19. Complaining         
Independent Variables 
Complaining 
(1993) 
Substantive  
Effect 
Complaining 
(2002) 
Substantive  
Effect 
Workplace  -.0003 (.05)   .004 (.03)   
Political Organization .20** (.09) 0.1 /   
Socioeconomic Resources         
Position in the Workplace .008 (.05)   -.02 (.03)   
Income×10(-4) -.006 (.07)   -.02 (.02)   
Education -.02 (.04)   .006 (.03)   
Self-regarded Economic Status .04 (.05)   -.12** (.05) -.10 
Self-regarded Social Status .04 (.05)   .06 (.05)   
Male .13* (.08) 0.07 .14** (.07) 0.13 
Age .04** (.02) 0.62 .04*** (.01) 0.59 
Age-squared×10(-4) -4.1** (.17) -.62 -.04*** (.01) -0.57 
Marital Status -.15 (.11)   -.04 (.13)   
Ethnic Background (Han) -.40** (.18) -.08 -.13 (.15)   
Father's Education .03 (.03)   .008 (.008)   
Father's Party Membership .02 (.11)   /   
Psychological Engagement         
Party Membership .46*** (.11) 0.18 .26*** (.09) 0.1 
Political Interest -.03 (.04)   .15*** (.04) 0.12 
Political Knowledge -.01 (.08)   -.05 (.08)   
Internal Political Efficacy .07 (.08)   .16** (.07) 0.08 
External Political Efficacy .06 (.09)   .13** (.06) 0.07 
Government Attitude -0.0153   -.07 (.06)   
Faith in People -.11 (.09)   -.07 (.07)   
constant -.64 (.60)   -1.71*** (.43)   
Number of observations 1070   1754   
Note: substantive effect is the effect of the change of one standard deviation of an independent variable on participation. 
† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01       
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One notable additional finding of the 2002 analysis is the importance of self-
regarded economic status in predicting the behavior of complaining. I found for urban 
citizens who are likely to perceive themselves better off in economic wellbeing are less 
likely to engage in complaining, when holding other variables constant. This variable had 
no effect on other modes of participation in either 1993 or 2002.  I suggest that the 
rational behind this finding may be that citizens’ with privileged economic status are less 
likely to complain out of possible fear that there might be retaliation and they would be 
losing more of their perceived advantage.43 
In addition, in the 1993 analysis, the ethnicity variable turned out to be critical in 
predicting complaining behavior. The ethnic minorities are about 40 percent more likely 
to engage in complaining as a means to solve the problems in their daily lives. This 
phenomenon did not repeat in the 2002 analysis, as the ethnic issues and differential 
treatment of minorities may have become a less salient issue in China in recent years.  
Official Contacting 
The last mode of participation is official contacting, which is one of the most 
important modes of political participation in urban China.  Workplace variables have no 
effect on this mode of participation, and a limited number of socioeconomic and 
psychological engagement variables are shown to affect official contacting behavior.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
43
 Similarly, the 2002 ordered-probit analysis of the original data reports that citizens’ household income is negatively 
correlated with the complaining through bureaucracy, which result is reported in the Appendix C. 
 
 118 
Table 20. Analysis of the Mode of Official Contacting 
 Table 20. Official Contacting     
  
  
Independent Variables 
Official 
Contacting 
(1993) 
Substantive  
Effect 
Official 
Contacting 
(2002) 
Substantive  
Effect 
Workplace  -.04 (.08)  .008 (.03)   
Political Organization -.12 (.15)  /   
Socioeconomic Resources        
Position in the Workplace .03 (.07)  -.005 (.03)   
Income×10(-4) -.04 (.09)  .003 (.02)   
Education .14** (.06) 0.16 .02 (.03)   
Self-regarded Economic Status .08 (.07)  -.01 (.04)   
Self-regarded Social Status .08 (.07)  .01 (.04)   
Male .08 (.11)  .04 (.06)   
Age .02 (.02)  .03** (.01) 0.44 
Age-squared×10(-4) -2.67 (2.18)  -.03** (.01) -.43 
Marital Status -.06 (.14)  -.12 (.13)   
Ethnic Background (Han) -.28 (.25)  .01 (.14)   
Father's Education -.004 (.04)  .006 (.007)   
Father's Party Membership -.02 (.13)  /  
Psychological Engagement        
Party Membership .26* (.16) 0.1 .05 (.08)   
Political Interest .05 (.05)  .21*** (.04) 0.17 
Political Knowledge -0.22* (0.12) -.11 .06 (.07)   
Internal Political Efficacy -.01 (.11)  .11* (.06) 0.06 
External Political Efficacy .17 (.11)  .10 (.06)   
Government Attitude -.45*** (.12) -.19 .11* (.06) 0.06 
Faith in People -.11 (.10)  -.06 (.06)   
constant .29 (.74)  -1.98*** (.42)   
Number of observations 1070   1754   
Note: substantive effect is the effect of the change of one standard deviation of an independent variable on 
participation. 
 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01  
 
In 2002, being middle-aged becomes an important variable to predict official 
contacting. Psychological engagement factors such as political interest, internal political 
efficacy and citizens’ belief in the government are also positively correlated with 
contacting officials in 2002. In 1993, education is found to be positively correlated with 
official contacting, and in 2002 analysis, I found that the education is at least significantly 
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and positively related to one of the individual types of participation of official contacting, 
the writing to government offices, as more education seems to better enable individual 
citizens to participate in writing to government offices.44  
  Finally, both the 1993 and 2002 analyses show that the workplaces are not 
significant in explaining official contacting. I argue that the obscurity of contextual and 
resources factors in predicting official contacting is attributed to the prevalence of the 
acts of leader contacting inside the urban workplaces. While the functions and status of 
the work units have been going through dramatic changes in the past decade, for 
employees who belong to the work unit, contacting one’s leader directly is still one of the 
most important if not the foremost means to solve one’s problems encountered in the 
everyday life. 
Contextual Analysis 
The analysis to this point has looked at the direct effects of workplace on various 
modes of participation.  I now turn to the analysis of workplace as a context to examine if 
different types of workplaces affect the relationships between socioeconomic resources 
and psychological engagement on the various modes of participation. 
In order to discover the contextual influence of the 1993 political participation, I 
evaluated the influence of workplaces in the following model. Following the 
categorization of the workplaces in Chapter IV, I differentiated the urban workplaces into 
two categories: one is the state work unit, which include governmental organizations, 
state institutions and state enterprises, and the other the non-state work unit, which 
includes collective enterprises, foreign enterprises, private enterprises and individual 
                                                          
44
 The result of the original ordered probit model is recorded in the Appendix C, along with the table that 
reports the influence of education on writing to government offices based on Clarify analysis. 
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enterprises. The criterion for this categorization is economic dependency and the sources 
of finance: the state work units are financially dependent on the state, and the non-state 
work units are financially independent and on their own.  
The dependent variables are the factor scores of various types of political 
participation, and the independent variables are political organization inside the work unit, 
socioeconomic resources and psychological engagement factors. The data employed in 
the analysis are the data sets produced by the Amelia program.45  
The contextual analysis for 1993 reported in table 7 reveals that political 
organization inside the workplace is positively and significantly correlated with voting 
both in the state workplaces and non-state workplaces in 1993. While being married 
remains an important indictor for citizens’ voting inside the workplace, being internally 
efficacious motivates citizens to participate in voting in non-state work units.  In the 2002 
analysis, being middle-aged and party membership tend to motivate to vote, few variables 
were significant in predicting citizens’ voting behavior. Overall the state work units in 
2002 were shown to provide citizens a more structured environment that motivated 
citizens’ voting behavior. 
                                                          
45
 This analysis differentiates the work unit into two categories, the state work unit and non state work units. 
In order to accommodate the imputed continuous data of work unit variable, I coded the work unit variable 
to converge to the integer that is closest to itself.  
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Table 21. Contextual Analysis of the Mode of Voting 
Independent Variables
β (s.e.) ∆ effect β (s.e.) ∆ effect β (s.e.) ∆ effect β (s.e.) ∆ effect
Political Organization .33*** (.11) 0.17 .37* (.21) 0.1
Socioeconomic Resources
Position
Income×10(-4)
Education
Self-regarded Economic Status
Self-regarded Social Status
Male
Age .06*** (.02) 1.5 .05* (.03) 1.1
Age-squared×10(-4) -.06*** (.02) -.98 -.04 (.03)
Marital Status .30** (.13) 0.15 -.16 (.23)
Ethnic Background 
Father's Education
Father's Party Membership
Psychological Engagement
Party Membership .22* (.11) 0.08 .17 (.19)
Political Interest
Political Knowledge
Internal Political Efficacy .10 (.10) .31* (.17) 0.31
External Political Efficacy
Government Attitude
Faith in People
State Units Intercept 
_cut1/ constant
Number of observations
Table 21. Contextual Analysis of Voting
Dependent Variables
PCA Score for 1993 Voting PCA Score for 2002 Voting
State Work Unit Non-state Work Unit State Work Unit Non-state Work Unit
.51 (1.54) -.16 (.91)
-1.93 (1.24) -2.38 (.73)
† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01 
Note 1: Aanalyses include all  varaibles listed and  signficant coefficents and their counterparts in the other  context are recorded.   Note 
2: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses. 
1070 1754
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Table 22. Contextual Analysis of the Mode of Campaigning 
Independent Variables
β (s.e.) ∆ effect β (s.e.) ∆ effect β (s.e.) ∆ effect β (s.e.) ∆ effect
Political Organization .26** (.11) 0.13 .39* (.22) 0.11
Socioeconomic Resources
Position .13* (.06) 0.14 .08 (.10)
Income×10(-4)
Education
Self-regarded Economic Status .12* (.07) 0.16 .10 (.12)
Self-regarded Social Status
Male
Age .03* (.02) 0.74 .005 (.03)
Age-squared×10(-4) -.03* (.02) -.62 -.01 (.03)
Marital Status
Ethnic Background 
Father's Education -.06* (.03) -.10 -.04 (.06)
Father's Party Membership
Psychological Engagement
Party Membership .36*** (.13) 0.13 .24 (.38) .55*** (.13) 0.2 .62*** (.21) 0.1
Political Interest .08* (.05) 0.11 .07 (.08) .23*** (.08) 0.31 .23*** (.09) 0.27
Political Knowledge .22* (.11) 0.11 .27** (.13) 0.11
Internal Political Efficacy
External Political Efficacy .15* (.08) 0.17 .03 (.11)
Government Attitude .51*** (.11) 0.71 .28 (.25)
Faith in People .22** (.09) 0.1 .21 (.14)
State Units Intercept 
_cut1/ constant
Number of observations
Table 22. Contextual Analysis of Campaigning
Dependent Variables
PCA Score for 1993 Campaigning PCA Score for 2002 Campaigning
State Work Unit Non-state Work Unit State Work Unit Non-state Work Unit
-.64 (1.59) -.46 (.88)
-.2.39 (1.43) -.54 (.77)
† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01 
Note 1: Aanalyses include all  varaibles listed and  signficant coefficents and their counterparts in the other  context are recorded.   Note 
2: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses. 
1070 1074
 
  
123 
The contextual analysis of the mode of campaigning is reported in table 8.  While 
political study is significantly correlated with both campaigning in the state work units 
and non-state work units in 1993, position, citizens’ self-perception of economic status, 
political interest, party membership and government attitude are significantly correlated 
with the campaigning behavior only within the state work units. Father’s education is 
negatively correlated with campaigning behavior in the workplace. Overall, the state 
work units provided a more structured environment for citizens’ campaigning behavior. 
Among the independent variables, political organization inside the work unit, party 
membership and belief in government are especially salient.  
In the 2002 analysis, while being middle-aged is particularly important in 
predicting campaigning in the state work units, the psychological engagement factors are 
dominant in predicting citizens’ campaigning behavior, especially in the state work units. 
Party membership, political interest, political knowledge, external political efficacy and 
interpersonal trust are significantly correlated with campaigning in the state work units, 
and party membership, political interest and political knowledge are important in non 
state workplaces.  
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Overall, the campaigning in non-state work units is less predictable and less 
structured in 1993 and 2002.  
For analysis of the mode of candidate recruitment (see table 9), political 
organization is especially important in predicting candidate recruitment in non-state work 
units, and both party membership and internal political efficacy are positively and 
significantly correlated with candidate recruitment in the 1993 analysis. The analysis 
reveals that psychological engagement factors are prominent predictors of citizens’ 
behavior in candidate recruitment across 1993 ad 2002, and psychological engagement 
such as party membership, political interest, political efficacy become increasingly 
important in 2002. The analysis also shows that besides psychological engagement 
factors, socioeconomic resources especially the position inside the workplace are 
exhibited close connections with the behaviors in candidate recruitment. The analysis of 
the candidate recruitment behavior exhibits certain consistencies especially in the 
importance of psychological engagement factors in analyses between 1993 and 2002.
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Table 23. Contextual Analysis of the Mode of Candidate Recruitment 
Independent Variables
β (s.e.) ∆ effect β (s.e.) ∆ effect β (s.e.) ∆ effect β (s.e.) ∆ effect
Political Organization .21 (.14) .41* (.24) 0.12
Socioeconomic Resources
Position .21*** (.07) 0.06 .10 (.12) .10* (.06) 0.13 .12 (.09)
Income×10(-4)
Education
Self-regarded Economic Status
Self-regarded Social Status
Male
Age .05* (.03) 1.23 .02 (.03)
Age-squared×10(-4) -.05* (.03) -1.03 -.02 (.04)
Marital Status
Ethnic Background 
Father's Education .02** (.01) 0.09 .02 (.02)
Father's Party Membership -.30* (.14) -.12 -.03 (.30)
Psychological Engagement
Party Membership .83*** (.16) 0.31 .63* (.38) 0.08 .48*** (.12) 0.18 .53** (.24) 0.08
Political Interest .19*** (.06) 0.25 .24*** (.10) 0.28
Political Knowledge
Internal Political Efficacy .52*** (.13) 0.52 .50** (.22) 0.47 .16* (.08) 0.19 .07 (.15)
External Political Efficacy .21*** (.08) 0.24 .08 (.11)
Government Attitude
Faith in People
State Units Intercept 
_cut1/ constant
Number of observations
Table 23. Contextual Analysis of Candidate Recruitment
Dependent Variables
PCA Score for 1993 Candidate Recruitment PCA Score for 2002 Candidate Recruitment
State Work Unit Non-state Work Unit State Work Unit Non-state Work Unit
-1.1 (1.64) -.94 (.98)
-.92 (1.49) -1.58* (.94)
† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01 
Note 1: Aanalyses include all  varaibles listed and  signficant coefficents and their counterparts in the other  context are recorded.   Note 
2: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses. 
1070 1754
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Table 24. Contextual Analysis of the Mode of Complaining 
Independent Variables
β (s.e.) ∆ effect β (s.e.) ∆ effect β (s.e.) ∆ effect β (s.e.) ∆ effect
Political Organization .18* (.11) 0.09 .24 (.18)
Socioeconomic Resources
Position
Income×10(-4)
Education
Self-regarded Economic Status -.12** (.06) -.17 -.09 (.08)
Self-regarded Social Status
Male .19** (.09) 0.09 .05 (.17) .12 (.08) .19* (.12) 0.07
Age .05** (.02) 1.2 .04 (.03) .03* (.02) 0.74 .08*** (.03) 1.65
Age-squared×10(-4) -4.6** (2.1) -.74 -3.4 (3.5) -.03 (.02) -.07*** (.03) -.80
Marital Status
Ethnic Background -.47** (.20) -.22 -.21 (.44)
Father's Education
Father's Party Membership
Psychological Engagement
Party Membership .36*** (.12) 0.13 1.14*** (.38) 0.16 .26*** (.10) 0.1 .27 (.21)
Political Interest .14*** (.05) 0.19 .17** (.08) 0.2
Political Knowledge
Internal Political Efficacy .13 (.08) .28** (.13) 0.3
External Political Efficacy .07 (.08) .26** (.12) 0.29
Government Attitude -.16* (.09) -.22 -.20 (.25) -.01 (.07) -.20** (.10) -.24
Faith in People
State Units Intercept 
_cut1/ constant
Number of observations
Table 24. Contextual Analysis of Complaining
Dependent Variables
PCA Score for 1993 Complaining PCA Score for 2002 Complaining
State Work Unit Non-state Work Unit State Work Unit Non-state Work Unit
.0007 (1.5) 1.78* (.98)
-.66 (1.19) -3.01*** (.83)
† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01 
Note 1: Aanalyses include all  varaibles listed and  signficant coefficents and their counterparts in the other  context are recorded.   Note 
2: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses. 
1070 1754
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For the mode of complaining, the 1993 analysis reveals political organization, 
being male, middle age effect and party membership are all significantly correlated with 
citizens’ complaining in the state work units. At the same time, mistrust in the 
government and being ethnic minorities are going to encourage citizens to engage in 
complaining in state work units as well. Similar to the results in the multivariate analyses, 
I propose that when ethnic minorities experienced difficulties in daily life, they were 
more likely to resort to complaints. Complaining inside non-state work units is much less 
predictable, with only party membership is significantly correlated with citizens’ 
complaining.  
For the 2002 analysis of complaining, I found the perception of one’s economic 
status, party membership, political interest and internal political efficacy are all 
significantly correlated with complaining behavior across state work units and non-state 
work units. Citizens with positive perception of their economic status are less likely to 
engage in complaining, and party membership and internal political efficacy are more 
likely to motivate citizens’ complaining inside the work units. At the same time, state 
work units exhibit noticeable difference in motivating citizens complaining with the 
significant state work units intercept. Although less likely to motivate citizens to 
participate complaining overall, the non-state work units do provide more structured 
context in predicting citizens’ participation in complaining, which is correlated with both 
socioeconomic resources and psychological engagement factors.  
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Table 25. Contextual Analysis of the Mode of Official Contacting 
Independent Variables
β (s.e.) ∆ effect β (s.e.) ∆ effect β (s.e.) ∆ effect β (s.e.) ∆ effect
Political Organization
Socioeconomic Resources
Position
Income×10(-4)
Education .15** (.07) 0.23 .09 (.19)
Self-regarded Economic Status
Self-regarded Social Status
Male
Age .01 (.02) .07** (.03) 1.44
Age-squared×10(-4) -.02 (.02) -.07** (.03) -.80
Marital Status
Ethnic Background 
Father's Education
Father's Party Membership
Psychological Engagement
Party Membership
Political Interest .17*** (.05) 0.23 .29*** (.07) 0.34
Political Knowledge
Internal Political Efficacy
External Political Efficacy
Government Attitude -.45** (.13) -.63 -.40 (.31) .15** (.07) 0.19 .004 (.10)
Faith in People
State Units Intercept 
_cut1/ constant
Number of observations
Table 25. Contextual Analysis of Official Contacting
Dependent Variables
PCA Score for 1993 Official Contacting PCA Score for 2002 Official Contacting
State Work Unit Non-state Work Unit State Work Unit Non-state Work Unit
.94 (1.8) 1.71** (.94)
-.54 (1.58) -3.25*** (.79)
† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01 
Note 1: Aanalyses include all  varaibles listed and  signficant coefficents and their counterparts in the other  context are recorded.   Note 
2: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses. 
1070 1754
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The last mode of behavior is official contacting. As official contacting is a 
prevalent political act, citizens’ official contacting is only significantly correlated with 
independent variables of education and citizens’ belief in government in the state work 
units and it is not correlated with any predictor in the non-state workplace. As leader 
contacting is a prevailing political act in urban China, different types of the workplaces 
tend to have less distinctive influence on official contacting, although education is shown 
to be an advantage in the state work units. I found the negative relationship between 
one’s belief in government and the behavior in official contacting puzzling. I suggest that 
it might be related to the content of official contacting inside the work unit, and usually 
citizens contacted officials to solve their problems or venture grievance in their life.  
In the 2002 analysis, few variables have a significant affect on official contacting.  
In state work units, official contacting is positively correlated with party membership and 
belief in government, and in non-state work units, being middle-aged and political 
interest are significantly correlated with citizens’ official contacting. Also, the analysis 
indicates that citizens employed by state work units are more likely to engage in official 
contacting as revealed in the intercept of state work units.  
The 1993 statistical result shows the state work units are more likely to provide a 
stable context for urban citizens to participate in acts of voting, campaigning and 
candidate recruitment, complaining and official contacting. Compared to participation in 
state work units, political participation in the state work unit is more regulated and 
structured in their relationship with the predictors, while political participation in non-
state work unit is much less predicable. Back to our original question about the state’s 
role in mobilizing citizens to participate in politics, the analysis shows that the state work 
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units and non-state work units tended to provide different contexts to facilitate citizens’ 
political participation, and participation in state work units were more structured.  
When we move from the 1993 contextual analysis to 2002 contextual analysis, I 
found the differences between state work units and non-state work units become more 
complex. The state work units and non-state work units become less distinctive in 
providing different contexts to motivate citizens to engage in different political acts, 
although there still remains difference between the two types of work units. While in 
voting, campaigning and candidate recruitment the state work units provided a slightly 
more structured context to motivate citizens to engage in these acts, for complaining and 
official contacting, the state work units are shown to provide a considerably more 
conducive environments and complaining and official contacting seemed to become more 
structured in non-state work units. Overall, the contextual analysis shows that political 
participation in 2002 tended to have much more similar relationships with predictors 
across different types of work units despite certain dissimilarities. Back to our question 
regarding the change of contexts of work units between 1993 and 2002, the empirical 
analysis yielded evidence that the state work units and non-state work units seemed to 
have nature that were similar to each other in motivating citizens’ political participation 
despite nuanced differences. Moreover, in addition to the analysis of workplace context, 
psychological engagement factors in 2002 are found to become more and more important 
in motivating citizens’ political participation in the recent decade, which is consistent 
with our theoretical expectation. 
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Workplace vs. Resources 
 For the mobilization effect of the workplace context, besides the theory addressed 
above as the workplace serves as an important mobilization context to engage citizens in 
political participation, there is a competing argument that the different contextual cues 
may lead to the change of the personal resources, which would sequentially lead to the 
different level of participation of individual citizens.   
The resource model was proposed by Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) in 
order to bridge the gap between socioeconomic resources and individual political 
participation. Brady, Verba and Schlozman (1995) argued that although high 
socioeconomic status may predict citizens’ political participation, it does not directly lead 
to citizens’ participation. Rather, it is the individual resources, such as time, money, and 
civic skills (education attainment and civic abilities to make a speech, write a letter or 
preside a meeting) that will directly engage citizens with political participation. Applying 
the Brady, Schlozman and Verba (1995) argument to this analysis of participation in 
China, other than arguing the workplace directly mobilizes citizens into politics, an 
alternative resource interpretation may be raised that asserts the affect of workplace 
context on individuals’ political participation is not achieved through the mobilization but 
rather by improving their personal resources, such as time, money and civic skills. 
The socioeconomic resources are not the center of our research question, yet I 
have them included in the model for controlling purpose. From the statistical analysis in 
1993, we see that the sociopolitical context, such as the workplace is shown to play an 
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important role in motivating citizens’ political participation, while citizens’ personal 
resources, such as income and education are not found so.46  
Unlike the developed western democracies, the political participation of Chinese 
urban citizens is not shown closely tied to the socioeconomic status of individual citizens 
in the statistical analysis. I contend that rather than through improving individual 
resources, the workplace in China is more likely to mobilize citizens into participation 
directly in 1993, which reveals the nature of China’s urban political participation to a 
certain extent: China’s urban political participation at the early stage of the reform is 
based less upon citizens’ own volunteerism but more on the political organization that 
was structured around individual citizens, and citizens’ participation was based less on 
their political knowledge or interest, but more on the established organizational paths 
existent in the society that are accessible to the citizens. Thus, China’s urban political 
participation was not much reflected in citizens’ educational achievement or merely 
economic wellbeing that are generally considered as more “resources.” Rather, China’s 
urban political participation at the early stage of the economic reform is more dependent 
on the socioeconomic organization citizens belong to and the access that citizens have to 
venture their political voice.  
 As Brady, Schlozman and Verba (1995) acknowledged in their account for 
individual resources and political participation, there are three fundamental determinants 
in structuring citizens’ political participation—the individual resources, psychological 
engagement and mobilization networks. The empirical analysis suggests that the context 
                                                          
46
 As the original data set did not collect information of individual citizens’ political skills such as the 
ability to make speeches or write letters effectively, in this study I mainly use the educational level as the 
surrogate variable to measure citizens’ civic skills. Brady, Verba and Schlozman  (1995) also employed 
civic skill acts, educational experiences and language abilities as a compositional score to measure 
individuals’ civic skills (279).  
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of workplace served as important mobilization network for citizens’ political 
participation in China in 1993.  
Discussion 
In the 1993 analysis, the major context in which citizens are engaged in political 
participation was the workplace, and the political organization inside the workplace was a 
critical variable relating urban political participation with context. Both the work unit 
type and political organization are important factors that mobilized citizens to participate 
in politics, and different types of work units provided different social contexts that shaped 
the means of citizens’ political participation as indicated by the analysis of work unit type 
and interactive effect of work unit and political organization inside the work unit. 
The 2002 empirical analysis shows that the work unit is no longer an influential 
contextual factor that explains citizens engaging in political participation, and the state 
and non-state work units are becoming similar in providing contexts mobilizing citizens’ 
political participation. Indeed, one of the side findings of the 2002 empirical analysis is 
that individual resources, particularly psychological engagement factors, turn out to be 
important predictors in determining political participation in urban China.  
Before the late 1990s, Chinese urban work unit was the foremost sociopolitical 
institution in urban China in charge of the distribution of economic benefits and various 
other selective sociopolitical goods. The work units controlled the employees and 
subjected them to close supervision of the state by measures such as holding weekly 
political studies sessions, maintaining the written political profiles of each employee and 
dutifully engaging employees in political participation in support of the regime, such as 
voting in congressional elections.  
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When the work units were rid of the aforementioned critical political tasks and to 
function as independent economic entities, it is no longer the most important variable 
motivating urban citizens’ participation. Consequently, the fundamental linkage between 
the state and society is quickly eroding away.  
Pervious literature on political participation in USSR and China noted that the 
interests distributed through the political system are “low-end” interests, such as various 
economic goods, instead of the “high-end” interests, such as the right to compete for 
offices and political power or form public policy. While the mobilization mechanism of 
citizens’ political participation has shifted in the economic reform, the political interests 
that the individual citizens have been competing for still remained at the low end in 2002. 
In other words, although the control of the state over the individual citizens has loosened 
during the economic reform and citizens are granted with more political liberty, the level 
that citizens are able to engage in politics is still at the low end and rather limited. Thus, 
as the sociopolitical resources available to the urban public are largely confined to mostly 
material interests, and as individual citizens are granted with certain freedom to choose 
whether or not to participate in politics, the analysis shows that a significant proportion of 
the urban public opted stay out of active participation after all.  
The analysis shows that while citizens’ political participation was subject to the 
mobilization of state-controlled sociopolitical organizations, political participation has 
been relatively equally distributed among the urban citizenry. One decade after 1993, the 
economic reform has largely dismantled previous sociopolitical institutions and lessened 
the control over individual citizens in political participation, and a substantial proportion 
of urban citizen did exercise this freedom and opted to refrain from political participation. 
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I argue that urban political participation in China has shifted from the model of state’s 
dominance in political mobilization to a civic model that relies on individuals’ resources.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
WORK UNITS AND STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS  
 
The central question of this study is to examine the influence of social context 
particularly the workplace on citizens’ political participation in an authoritarian regime, 
and how the influence of the grassroots sociopolitical institution on citizens’ political 
behavior has been evolving in the economic development. The empirical analyses 
presented in Chapter V exhibited that Chinese urban workplace assumed the vital status 
in mobilizing citizens’ urban political participation in 1993, while in 2002 the influence 
was on a sharp decline and at the same time urban citizens’ participation leaned heavily 
on individual resources, such as personal education and income.  
While the analysis empirically demonstrated that the influence of workplace 
obscured in motivating citizens’ political participation in 2002, the questions remain as 
why this was occurring and what changes that workplaces went through from 1993 to 
2002 that made the work units less relevant in mobilizing and motivating citizens’ 
political participation in urban China. In this chapter, we shall provide an in-depth 
qualitative analysis of the changes that Chinese urban units have gone through in the 
economic reforms for the last decade and examine why the functions and status of 
Chinese workplaces have changed in the daily life of China’s urban areas.  
Besides the theoretical concern on citizens’ political behavior, this chapter is also 
interested in the state-society relationship in an authoritarian regime that is reflected in 
the political behavioral pattern of individual citizens. Particularly we are interested in 
how the state-society relationship shifts in the rapid economic development of the 
authoritarian regime. Previous political development literature has long noted that 
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economic development and growing national wealth would have a remarkable effect on 
the sociopolitical structure and political liberalization process in authoritarian regimes 
(Lipset 1959; Dahl 1989; Burkhart and Lewis-beck 1994). In this study, we would like to 
provide further and in-depth qualitative analysis of the evolving state-society relationship 
of a non-democratic regime in the context of rapid economic development. 
Last but not the least, another theoretical contribution this chapter attempts to 
make is to address the state-society relationship from the perspective of “meso” level 
institutions. Within the context of economic reform, the social structure of the non-
democratic regime may be undergoing profound transformations at the macro state’s 
level, meso institutional level and micro individuals’ level. These three levels of social 
structures are closely connected and deeply intertwined with one another. That is, the 
change of the relationship between the macro level state and meso level institutions is 
going to affect the behaviors of micro level of individual citizens, and at the same time 
the changes of the relationship between the macro level state and micro level individuals 
will be reflected at the changes at the meso level political institutions as well. As the state, 
sociopolitical institutions and individual citizens are organically connected within one 
society, the decision-making at the state level that is implemented through middle level 
institutions will sequentially instill to the individual level. In this chapter, we would like 
to provide a closer examination of the change of the state-society relationship in urban 
China from the perspective of meso level grassroots sociopolitical institutions.  
The pervious literature elaborating on the evolvement of the state-society 
relationship in the economic and political changes in both Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union has largely placed the distinguishing political fault line between the state and civil 
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society (Weigle and Butterhead 1992; Arato 1990; Szelenyi 1988).  As Zbigniew Rau 
(1991) noted, the state and civil society come to constitute “distinctive entities that have 
distinct domains outlined by firm boundaries” (4). By placing the political fault line 
between the state and society, the previous literature has not captured the complexity of 
the relationships among the state, institutions and individual citizens in the process of 
economic liberalization. While stressing on the direct interactions between the state and 
individual citizens, the previous literature hasn’t acknowledged the linkage between the 
state and individual citizens and explored how the evolving state-society relationship is to 
be reflected in the transformation of grassroots sociopolitical institutes. In this chapter, 
the theoretical concern of the qualitative analysis is on the transformation of meso level 
institutions in an authoritarian regime during the economic development. Our analysis 
reveals that the meso level sociopolitical change, that is, the transformation of grassroots 
political institutions play a critical role in demonstrating and facilitating the relationship 
shift between the macro level state and micro level individual citizens.  
The analysis of this chapter is to be divided into three sections, in which we will 
address economic, political and social transformations of Chinese urban work units 
respectively. We will examine how the function and status of work units have evolved in 
China’s urban setting during the economic development in the past decades, and how the 
meso level transformation has been closely connected with the relationship adaptation 
between the macro level state and micro level individuals. Also, at the end of the analysis 
we would provide a number of theoretical reflections regarding the state-society 
relationship shift of an authoritarian regime in the economic development, as how the 
state, sociopolitical institutions and individual citizens are concerned in the economic 
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reform and how they are interconnected with one another during the transformation 
process. 
Economic Transformation 
 The first and foremost aspect that we shall address is the economic transformation 
that China’s urban work units have been experiencing in the economic reform. 
 Although the work units are multi-functional sociopolitical institutions in urban 
China, the most important ties that the work units have with individual citizens and state 
is the economic connection. As Walder (1986) astutely examined in his analysis of 
Chinese urban work units, the communist state set up the concrete rewarding system to 
control and motivate individual citizens to adhere closely to the state ideological route 
and observe the party policies. With the economic resources mostly vested from the state, 
the work units were in charge of direct distribution of income, tenure, housing, pension, 
benefits and other economic resources to Chinese urban citizens, and this is especially 
true for the governmental organizations, state institutions and state owned enterprises.  
“All workers are dependent on their enterprises for the satisfaction of their 
need. … Two aspects for the employment relationship define the extent to 
which worker dependence. The first is the proportion of the workers’ needs 
satisfied (or potentially satisfied) at the workplace. This involves, at a bare 
minimum, the money wage. But, in a variety of contemporary and historical 
setting, this has also involved the satisfaction of other social and economic 
needs: health insurance, medical care, pensions, housing, loans, and 
education” (Walder 1986, 14). 
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Tenure & Labor Relationship  
 Before the economic reform initiated in the mid-1980s, the work units in the 
urban setting were to provide life-long employment to their employees, and citizens were 
expected to remain in the same work unit or in the same work units system from 
graduation till retirement. Although citizens’ transferring to other work units did occur, 
they were largely anomalies of the employment system instead of commonalities. 
 While the employees were expected to stay in the same work units since they 
started working and few would obtain the right to transfer to other unit, the work units 
were not able to fire the employees at discretion either. As Tang and Parish (2002) 
observed the labor relationship in the work unit before the reform: “Once one got a state 
job, it became an “iron rice bowl” (tie fan wan): no one could be laid off; though an 
employee’s malfeasance was disciplined within the work unit, the employee could not be 
fired” (128). This tied employment relationship guaranteed citizens’ lifetime employment 
against loss of labor mobility, and it also reaffirms the economic dependence of the 
employee on a particular work unit. 
 The raises and bonuses of individual citizens in the work unit depended heavily 
on their biaoxian, which can be roughly translated into “performance” but does not only 
include the employee’s industrial performance at one’s own position in the workplace, 
but also the supervisors’ evaluation of the employee’s political attitude and behaviors in 
the workplace (Walder 1986). This biaoxian was closely related to employees’ economic 
remuneration from the workplace, and it was also concerned with employees’ promotion 
opportunity and the prospect as whether one would be admitted into the Party, which was 
an important economic status boost on the floor. Thus, in order to obtain the selected 
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economic benefits from the workplace, the employee should perform industriously on 
their positions and exhibit “correct” social attitude and behaviors in the work unit. 
 Besides the tenured system and the review of employees’ biaoxian, some urban 
enterprises used to offer training for employee’s children in their own vocational-
technical high schools and hire them after graduation or let the children of the worker 
inherited the job directly after the worker retired, which is known as the dingti practice 
(Korzec & Whyte 1981; Shirk 1981; Emerson 1983; Walder 1986; Dittmer & Lu 1996). 
The dingti practice used to be considered as the sanctioned benefit for the employees, 
which extended work units’ economic opportunities to the families of workers. 
 With the deepening of economic reform and the acceleration of economic 
development in Chinese society, few workers would expect to work for the same work 
unit ever since graduation. The dingti practice also has gradually disappeared in Chinese 
urban work units since the mid-1990s. Nowadays Chinese urban residents are able to 
seek employment on the market, and enterprises can hire productive employees at will 
and let off the unqualified ones. This change of labor contract in the workplace was not 
accidental but rather a truthful reflection of the relationship change between the state and 
individual citizen. Before the CCP government strived to achieve high-speed economic 
development, the party emphasized on economic equality and offered urban residents 
with essential economic goods to ensure a stable economic order. Guided by this 
ideology, Chinese urban work units carried out thorough economic control and provision 
to individual citizens through multi-aspects of labor relationship, until the relationship 
between the state and society started to liberalize in the 1990s. 
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Health Insurance & Pension  
 The liberalization trend of the economic connection between the state and citizens 
is also reflected in the benefit system set up in China’s urban areas.  
Before the economic reforms, the health insurance for Chinese urban residents 
was mainly a workplace-based system that provides medical treatment to urban dwellers. 
In the 1950s, the government organizations, state institutions, state enterprises and urban 
collectives enterprises participated in the public health insurance or the labor insurance in 
urban China, and the individual employees received free or subsidized medical treatment 
from their work units as part of their package of non-wage benefits. As the public sector 
expanded rapidly in China in the mid-1950s within the socialist reforms, this work units 
based health insurance virtually covered a majority of urban dwellers in the early 1960s 
(World Bank 1997).  
Ever since the economic reform took off in urban China, more and more urban 
citizens started to work for the foreign, joint ventures and private enterprises, which fell 
out of the original health insurance plan that was mainly designed for the public sector. 
At the same time, many of the state enterprises and collective enterprises were not able to 
finance the health insurance of their employees as many of them were experiencing 
financial difficulties as facing increasingly open competition from the economic reform. 
Also, the rising costs of prescriptions and high technological treatment have been a 
mounting burden on the work units. Studies show a significant decline in the proportions 
of the urban population covered by health insurance from 52 per cent in 1993 to 39 
percent in 1998 (Gao et. al. 2001). 
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In 1998, the CCP government founded the Ministry of Labor and Social Security 
and initiated the nationwide new health insurance program for the urban residents. 
Instead of basing the health insurance on a particular type of work unit, the 1998 health 
insurance program is based on the mutual funds set up by the urban residents and their 
employees, which include the public sector, state enterprises, collective enterprises, 
foreign invested enterprises, private enterprises, etc. The proposed health insurance 
program aimed to provide a non-discriminatory health benefit to the employed urban 
residents, and it also provides specific benefits terms to the retirees and laid-off workers 
(Duckett 2004). Although under the new health insurance program, the employees of the 
public sector, such as the government organizations and state institutions may pay a 
higher percentage of out-of-pocket co-payment, over the 1998 health insurance has 
successfully attempted to provide the health insurance to urban residents not based the 
type of the work unit, but rather to the entire urban residential body indiscriminately. 
Before the late 1990s, the health insurance system was largely workplace based 
and urban resident had to depend on their work units to provide for their health benefits, 
which once again reaffirmed the focal status of workplaces in the everyday economic life 
of urban China. Ever since the insurance reform in 1998, the dependency of the urban 
citizens on their work units for health insurance was deduced significantly as the state set 
up the social safety net for the whole urban residential body, no matter the citizens are 
employed in the public sector or private sector or even whether they are employed or not. 
This changed functionality of the meso level workplace to provide for essential economic 
resource to urban citizens implied the changing and liberalizing relationship between the 
state and individual citizens.  
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Besides the health insurance, the urban citizens no longer depended on work units 
for their monthly pension as well. 
Before the 1990s, it was the work units that were responsible for providing 
retirement pensions for their workers. After retirement, the worker received 100 percent 
salary if one began working before 1949 and 75 percent if one worked continuously for 
twenty years or more (Editorial Group, 1990). With the improved life expectancy and 
increased number of mature workers, the Chinese urban work units had started to have 
difficulty providing the full-amount of pension for the retired workers.  
Faced with the poor welfare coverage based on the work unit system, the Ninth 
Five-Year Plan of National Economy and Social Development passed the program at the 
Eighth National People’s Congress in 1996 that sets the agenda “to quicken the reform of 
the system of provisions for the aged, unemployment and medical insurance and form a 
multi-layered social security system combining social insurance, social assistance, social 
welfare, favorable treatment and compensation, social mutual aid and individual savings” 
(Liu 1996).  
The new social welfare reform has three key objectives: 1) to establish a society-
wide system of pension-fund mobilization and management which takes over from the 
enterprises; 2) to share the costs of pension insurance between individuals as well as the 
enterprises and the state, and 3) to shift the focus of this social welfare reform from the 
previous enterprise-based system to the society-based system (Ge 1996). In the program, 
commitment is made to include employees in the private sectors, such as employees in 
the foreign enterprises or private firms.  
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One of the most important trends of the [social welfare] reform program of the 
1990s has been the growing separation of social welfare from its previous enterprise base. 
The overriding aim of “socializing” social welfare and the tentative establishment of 
separate social security, service and assistance systems which are not employee-exclusive 
and enterprises based is a major new dimension of both government reform and local 
initiatives (Croll 1999) 
From the analysis above, we may see that while the pension and benefits system 
of the work units used to provide essential economic resources to the urban employees, 
the citizens’ dependence on the work units for these benefits have largely waned away 
late 1990s. Instead of ensuring the economic and social control on individual citizens 
throughout the work place, the state provided non-discriminatory safety net to provide 
health benefits and pension to every eligible citizen in the urban area. The previous 
economic dependency of individuals on the work units was largely relinquished. Instead 
Chinese state is building up the economic and social benefits’ ties with individual citizens 
indiscriminately on the basis of employment.   
Housing Reform  
 Finally, before we move on to the discussion of the workplace transformation in 
political and social perspectives, we would like to further discuss the housing reform that 
has been going in China in the past decade with considerable public attention and debate. 
 The housing program was the most sensitive and important economic resource 
that the work units were able to distribute to their employees. Except for heritage, to wait 
for the housing assignment from the work place is the major if not the sole source for 
Chinese urban citizens to improve their living conditions.  
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 In alignment with the state’s egalitarian social policy, the workplaces were 
responsible to assign the housing arrangement to urban residents through employment, 
and urban citizens needed only to pay a small amount of nominal fee as the monthly rent 
for the public housing. The maintenance of the housing was free to the urban citizens and 
was taken care by the state housing bureaus. Although the citizens did not own the 
housing themselves, they were entitled to live in it once it was allocated to them and they 
were free to pass the housing to their children. In a forty city housing survey conducted 
by the Economic System Reform Institute of China in 1991, about 42 percent of the 
urban residents lived in publicly-owned housing inherited or assigned by the work unit, 
another 42 percent in work unit housing, 10 percent in private housing, 3 percent in rent 
and 4 percent in borrowed housing.  
 As the housing is a vital living material and is closely concerned with citizens’ 
everyday life and family, and the work units being the major if not the sole source for 
urban citizens’ housing before the 2000s, the dependence of the employees on the work 
units was ponderous in order to qualify for the housing option. 
 The assignment of the housing in the work unit is generally based on seniority, 
need, merit, biaoxian and policy considerations. While seniority in the workplace and 
need for the housing (three generation household or less than a certain number square fee 
per person), the biaoxian of the employee, such as one’s political attitude and political 
behavior in the workplace was also important in determining whether one was eligible for 
the housing. Most importantly the priority option to the public housing was usually given 
to the cadres in the work unit, who were usually the position holders or party members in 
the workplace, and one needs to have had consistent good biaoxian for many years to be 
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able to promoted to leadership positions or to be admitted into the Party.  In short, if one 
needed to obtain timely and satisfactory housing for one’s family, he or she had to wait 
for one’s turn and had consistent good biaoxian—in both industrial performance and 
more importantly in sociopolitical attitude and behavior—in the work unit. 
 Since 1988, Chinese government has experimented the reform to privatize urban 
housing within a limited scope, although the pace of the housing reform was slow due to 
the construction cost going far beyond the means of average urban household at that time. 
With the quickened economic development, ten years later the government intensified its 
public campaign for housing marketization in 1988—by selling housing to employees at 
distressed prices and gradually raising rents to near market prices, urban residents were 
urged to purchase their own apartments from the market (China Daily, 1999 June).  
 While at the beginning of the housing reform campaign, urban citizens were able 
to purchase the housing from their work units (instead of being assigned to) with heavy 
subsidies, the housing market was privatized to a significantly degree in 2002. Instead of 
waiting for their work units to assign public housing, nowadays the major resources for 
Chinese urban public to obtain their own housing is to purchase commercial housing on 
the market. In a survey conducted by the National Statistical Bureau in 2000 in median-
sized cities, urban citizens’ monthly expense on housing has increased by over nine times 
as compared to 1994. While the problem entails that price of commercial apartment is 
still high in comparison with the income of average urban family, the housing reform did 
release the overwhelming control of workplaces over individual citizens, and housing 
resources are made readily available to the public through economic means.  
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From the analysis above, we may see that within the context of economic 
development in the past decade, the workplaces’ status and functionality in the Chinese 
urban daily life have gone through important and dramatic changes. Previously, work 
units were the key sociopolitical institution in the urban area exercising strict state’s 
control over urban citizens and were responsible to distribute essential living materials; 
nowadays Chinese urban work units have gradually and steadily shed off various multi-
functionalities and started to establish the uni-dimensional employment relationship with 
individual citizens. From the changes that the work units went through, we may have 
more understanding of the evolving relationship between the state and individual citizens, 
as the strict control of the state over individual citizens in the workplace setting has been 
on the wane and the relationship between the state and individual citizens has become 
more detached and liberalized in the urban setting.  
Political Transformation 
 Besides the economic transformation, workplaces have also gone through 
important transformation in the political perspective, and the political control of 
workplaces over individual citizens has continuously been weakened. 
Political Study 
 Political study is one of the critical independent variables in our empirical 
analysis that describes the intensity of political organization inside the workplace and 
measures the control of the workplace environment over individual citizens. Following 
the empirical analysis, we would like to further elaborate on the influence and 
functionality of political studies and its evolvement in the work unit. 
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 When addressing the political study in the workplace, Walder made the following 
notes: “The Party employs two institutionalized means of intelligence gather and record 
keeping to help in this task. … The formal component is the system of regular group 
meetings in workshops. When workers take part in the political meetings, they are not 
just talking among themselves—they are talking directly to the party organization” (90).
 From this note we may see that political studies was an important means for the 
state to tally the political attitudes and behaviors of individual employees with the party 
line and the political study exerts political control over the individual citizens. 
 Political studies were mandatory meetings for urban residents to study political 
issues, which were usually held in the workplace setting. Political studies peaked during 
the Cultural Revolution, as many of the work units were required to have political 
meetings to study Mao’s writings and class struggles every day. The ideological 
orientation and the frequency of the political study had declined ever since the end of the 
Cultural Revolution in 1976, but the content of the political study was by no means less 
political. Political studies stipulated citizens’ duties, inculcated citizens of the Party’s 
standpoint on current issues and informed employees of “right” political attitude and 
political behavior. Many work units would have at least one political study session on the 
floor each week before the mid-1990s.  
We still had political study three days a week for two hours to read editorials 
and documents… We had a campaign against factionalism about 1979 or so, 
against followers of the Gang of Four. There were several campaigns against 
corruption and waste. In 1983 they had the “spiritual pollution” campaign. It 
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was pretty serious. They interfered with the way you dressed, what you read 
and your lifestyle (One interviewee, in Walder 1986, 231). 
 The existence of political study in the workplace revealed the state’s strict control 
and deep penetration at the micro individual level. The citizens were required to take part 
in the political studies in the workplaces, and it was considered as part of their “biaoxian” 
on the floor. With the acceleration of the economic reform and work units focusing on 
maximizing one’s productivity in an open market, less and less workplaces still took time 
to have political studies. While in the 1993 Social Mobility and Social Change data set 
we still documented the existence of political study in the workplace, the political studies 
have largely been disappearing from the urban setting in the late 1990s. 
 Political studies was an important and strong tool for the state to control urban 
residents mentally and psychologically, as the urban citizens were required to be 
continuously exposed to political teachings and political information from the communist 
state on a regular basis. The revocation of the political studies system in the workplace 
provides good evidence indicating that the state has been withdrawing from the everyday 
life in urban China and granted individuals citizens more freedom in the ideological 
realm. 
Individual Political Dossiers 
 Besides the political study, another important aspect of the political control 
exercised by the workplace on the employees is the political dossier for each individual 
citizen kept by the work unit. 
 The political dossier kept important and sensitive political information of each 
individual citizen in the urban area, which included but not restricted to employee’s 
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ethnicity, family background, parents’ political classification, one’s historical political 
performance on important periods since 1949 (such as Great Leap Movement, Cultural 
Revolution, Tiananmen Square incidents), one’s political performance in previous work 
units, one’s political performance in college and up till in high school.  
 Each employee’s political dossier is kept in the personnel department in the work 
unit, and one’s supervisors and leaders in the work unit were the ones eligible and 
responsible to update employee’s political dossier every year based on employees’ 
political performance in the work unit. Only the work unit leaders and the staff of the 
personnel department could read the political dossiers, and employees themselves had no 
access to their own political dossiers. Employees had no rights to know the reviews they 
received every year not to mention the opportunity to appeal or change them.   
 Employees in the work units were acutely concerned with their performance 
reviews recorded in the political dossiers, as the political dossier would tag employees 
throughout their life. The political dossiers would affect employees’ job assignment, 
promotion, career opportunities within the work unit, and if they were ever to transfer to 
another work unit, the new unit would read their files closely as formal reviews and 
recommendations from the former work unit.   
Bad reviews in the political dossier can be detrimental and even fatal to the 
employee in the work unit. The work units in urban China had developed a 
comprehensive recording and punishing system for the dossier reviews. The bad reviews 
were classified into three categories: warning, minor misconduct and major misconduct. 
While the warning ticket was retrievable based on the employee’s performance in the 
probation period, the minor misconduct and major misconduct tickets would permanently 
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stay in the employees’ political dossiers. The misconduct tickets would have severe 
detrimental effect to the economic and political opportunities of the employee in the 
current work unit and tag the employee wherever one would go.  
The work units were no courts to give citizens criminal citations, however, the 
work units did have the jurisdiction over individual citizens’ political performance and 
were able to document employees’ political transgressions and offenses in the work units 
that would affect the economic and social wellbeing of the citizen considerably. Through 
the political dossier system that was implemented at the work unit level, the communist 
state gained significant control over individual citizens to make sure their attitudes and 
behaviors comply with the state’s requirements, and the state was also able to track the 
political performance of each individual citizen throughout one’s lifetime.  
The political dossier system has been going through slow but important changes 
in the urban setting. Except for the party organizations and state institutions, most 
enterprises in the urban areas do not require citizens’ political dossiers when admitting 
them in the unit anymore. In Dittmer and Lu’s (1996) discussion of the reformed system 
of political dossier system, the authors noted that even among SOEs, there are two 
parallel personnel system in operation: some that still require a dossier to get in, others 
that do not.  
From the political transformation that urban work units went through, we may 
gain more insights as how the communist state had been exercising strict control over the 
individual citizens and how the state had been regulating citizens’ political attitude and 
behaviors. The state established systemic motivation and punishment mechanism to make 
sure that urban citizens would adopt the political ideology that the party state had been 
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advocating. The political study was to inculcate individual citizens on a regular basis of 
the “right” political standing according to the government, and the political dossier 
system allowed the state to track long term and meticulous political background and 
political history of each individual citizen, and the records would be directly connected 
with each citizen’s socioeconomic well being. From these practices carried out in the 
work units, we see that the state’s control over individual citizens through work units was 
thorough and forceful. The relinquished political study system and toned down emphasis 
on political dossiers provided important evidence of the state’s retreat from the civil life 
in urban China in the economic development, as individual citizens were under 
remarkable less command from the state in terms of “correct” political thoughts and 
“good” political behaviors. From the political transformation at the meso level, we are 
able to gain more insight into an increasingly liberalized state-society relationship that is 
emerging in urban China now. 
Social Transformation 
The final aspect of the work units’ transformation that we shall address is the 
societal connection between the urban work units and individual citizens.  
The societal connection between the work units and individual citizens is the last 
but not the least tie between the state and individual citizens: the close supervision of 
workplaces over employees is concerned with private and vital aspects of employees’ 
everyday life, such as traveling, migration, marriage, family planning and children’s 
education, etc. 
Since the founding of China in 1949, the governance in the urban area was 
directed by the communist ideology of equality of citizens, disregarding their 
  
154 
socioeconomic status. Following this ideological orientation, the hotels and 
accommodation facilities in the urban areas were provided with a nominal fee as long as 
business travelers could provide verifying document from their work units, which was 
called the “recommendation letter”. The recommendation system slowly died down in the 
early 1990s as China’s economic development made business travels more and more 
common among urban employees. However, for overseas traveling, urban citizens still 
had to provide the recommendation letters from their work units to the State Security 
Department to verify their official identity and obtain the passports. This practice has just 
been abdicated in China in 2002. 
More importantly, urban citizens’ migration to other cities also had to be 
permitted and endorsed by the work unit. In order to regulate population distribution and 
movement, China set up the household registration (Hukou) system in 1951, which 
served as the monitoring and controlling mechanism of population migration, and urban 
citizens were required to register in the Hukou system to ensure legal residential status in 
the city.47 Hukou system was concerned with many essential aspects of everyday urban 
life, such as citizens’ eligibility for public housing and food ration coupons, the rights for 
residents’ children to receive public education, etc., and in order to be able to register in 
Hukou in the migrated city, urban citizens must provide formal recommendation letters 
from both the previous work unit and the transferring work unit.  
Also as part of the social control, Chinese urban citizens had to provide 
recommendation letters from their own work units in order to obtain marriage licenses.  
                                                          
47
 Source: Reference Material on the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China 1956 (Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Minfa Cankao Zilao). Volumn I. Beijing: China’s People’s University.  
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As family planning was a fundamental policy in urban China and the state urged 
young urban residents to get married at least at one’s mid-20s, the recommendation 
letters from the work units served as an important means for the work unit to supervise 
the marriage age of young Chinese. Many work units have concrete economic incentives 
and punishments to encourage employees to marry at least at their mid-twenties. 
Moreover, in order to obtain divorce, urban citizens also had to show the court 
recommendation letters from the work units. The involvement of the work units in the 
private lives of Chinese urban citizens of marriage and divorce was revoked in October 
2003.48 
Indeed, the work units have been acting as the most important controlling 
institution in urban China to implement the family planning policies at the grassroots 
level. The family planning policy is advocated as one of the “fundamental state’s 
policies” to control rapid increase of an already gargantuan population, and the 
implementation of the family planning policy is mostly carried out in the context of work 
units—the most related and surely forceful institution in Chinese urban lives.  The breach 
of family planning policy will incur serious punishments in the work unit, such as 
withdrawing one’s salaries and bonuses and delaying one’s promotion in the work unit. 
Severe violation may result in probation in the work unit or even being discharged from 
the unit. The following is an extracted regulation of the family planning policy of a 
provincial university in China, which was published on line in 2004: 
1)      “The family policy applies to every and each employee of the university. 
2)      …The employees should get married at least three years older than the 
legal marriage age prescribed by the state; women who are to give birth must be 
                                                          
48
 Source: The Provisional Regulation for Marriage Registration in 2003. Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs. 
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at least 23 years old. For the employees who get married younger than the 
mandatory age, they will be deprived of “family planning” bonuses at the end of 
the year till reaching the mandatory age. For women who gave birth younger 
than 23, they will receive only partial salaries till 23 years old and they will 
have to conduct family planning studies in the unit. 
3)      … Employees who get married at least three years older than the legal 
age will be awarded with an extra ten-day vacation. Female employees who 
give birth after 23 years old will be awarded with an extra fifteen-day vacation. 
4)      … For the employees who have only one child, the child will receive 
monthly allowance of 10 RMB since his or her birth until fourteen years old.  
5)      … Employees who violate the family planning policy will receive fines 
and be given misconduct tickets. For those who give births to more than one 
child without the state’s permission, they will be discharged from the work 
unit.” 
As the examples and analysis above demonstrate, Chinese work unit infiltrated 
deeply into the lives of urban individual citizens up to the most private aspects. The work 
units had the authority over urban citizens’ traveling abroad, migration, household 
registration, getting married or divorced and their family planning practice, and this list is 
far from being exhaustive. Some of the practices such as traveling or marital registration 
were rescinded in the recent years, but some civil affairs in close connection with 
citizens’ everyday life still remain in the jurisdiction of work units.  
This thorough and stringent control of work units over individual citizens does not 
only stand for the command of the work units over individual citizens alone, but it is also 
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part of the state’s infiltration into the everyday life of Chinese citizens. Before the 
economic reform, the Chinese state is deeply infiltrated into nearly every aspect of 
individual urban citizens’ lives through the workplace, from the provision of economic 
resources and housing to permission to travel and to get married. Through the work unit, 
the state is penetrated deeply into Chinese urban life with astringent control and close 
supervision. The close supervision that work units had over the citizens was guided by 
the ideological orientation endorsed by the state, which was conducted in accordance 
with the requirements of “social equality” and “ideological unification” advocated and 
ensured by the communist China. Before the deepening and stabilization of the economic 
reforms, Chinese state-society relationship had been tremendously close with the state 
dominating society in almost every civil aspect. With the same rational, the release of the 
work units’ control over Chinese urban life in the recent years does not merely imply the 
changes of functionality and status of Chinese work units, but it also reflects the growing 
detachment between the state and society in urban China and the increasing liberalized 
state-society relationship within the context of China’s economic reform and economic 
development in the past decades. The change of the status and functionality of 
workplaces started from the toning down of the communist ideology inside the CCP 
government since its economic reform. At the same time, China set up its market 
economy in the early 1990s, with the government gradually shifting its role from the 
market distributor to regulator. With the decreased priority of ideology in contemporary 
China, the state has devolved more freedom and civil rights to the society to fuel and 
accommodate economic growth. 
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Conclusion 
Following the empirical analysis in the previous chapters, which indicated a 
decreasing significance of the work units in mobilizing Chinese urban political 
participation in the past decade, this chapter provides further qualitative analysis on the 
changing functionality and status of the work units in Chinese urban settings. Also, this 
chapter attempts to address the theoretical concern of the close sociopolitical interactions 
among the macro, meso and micro subjects within an authoritarian regime and how the 
changes of meso level social institutions could be related to the relationship evolution 
among the macro-level state and micro level individuals. Specifically, by examining 
evolving functionality and status of Chinese urban work units, this chapter attempts to 
shed light on the transforming state-society relationship that China is currently 
experiencing within the context of rapid economic development. 
We succinctly examined and compared Chinese urban work units’ economic, 
political and social functionalities and standing before the economic reform and in the 
early 2000. Evidences reveal that Chinese urban work units have been going through 
dramatic transformations in almost every aspect, and the provision and control of the 
work units to individual citizens were severely weakened and abated. These changes did 
not take place overnight, however, they were gradually made true in urban China in the 
past decade. The most important and substantial changes of the work units were taking 
place in the most recent years as the changes gradually collected its momentum in the 
past decade, which well coincides with the time span of our empirical analysis of 1993 to 
2002.  
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Although the emphasis of our analysis is mainly placed on the transformation of 
Chinese urban work units, we are concerned with the evolving state-society relationship 
in urban China as well. As the key socioeconomic grassroots institutions in urban China, 
the work unit exerted astringent and strong control on individual employees on behalf of 
the state, and it provided essential economic and political goods for the Chinese urban 
residents in compliance with the communist ideology embraced by the regime. The 
changes work units have been going through in the economic development are dramatic 
and diverse, and these change do not simply point to the altered functionality and status 
of workplaces alone: as the most important linkage and substantial sociopolitical 
institution between the communist state and individual citizens, the changes that 
happened to the workplace also implied the evolvement of the relationships between the 
state and society. We believe that to examine the alteration in the relationship between 
the state and individual citizens, Chinese work units provided a critical perspective to 
enable the researchers to do so. From the initial control and high infiltration of the work 
units over individual citizens in the early stage of the reform, to the retreat and 
detachment in economic, political and social realms in the urban life at a later time, we 
see that the changes of the work units reveal the state’s relationship in its connection with 
Chinese urban individual citizens has been continuously liberalizing in China’s economic 
development.  
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
This dissertation attempts to address the following questions: 1) the mechanism of 
individual citizens to participate in politics in an authoritarian regime, particularly the 
influence of social context on citizens’ political behavior; 2) how the macro level state, 
meso level institutions and micro level individual citizens are interrelated with one 
another in the sociopolitical transformation, especially how the meso level institutions 
play a key role in connecting state and individual citizens in an authoritarian regime; 3) 
how the state-society relationship of an authoritarian regime shifts in the rapid economic 
development, as implied in the changes of citizens’ political behaviors.  
How citizens participate in politics in non-democratic regimes is an important and 
emerging question in political behavioral studies.  
Political behavioral researches originate from the study of political participation 
in democracies, as inclusive and quality political participation from the public is an 
essential component of the healthy and sustainable democratic system. Since the political 
behavioral revolution took place in the 1960s, increasing scholarly attention has been 
devoted to citizens’ political participation in democracies.  
With the deepening of researches in political participation, there have been three 
theoretical paradigms to account for the mechanism of citizens’ political participation in 
democratic societies. These three theoretical models address different and distinctive 
aspects of the motivating mechanisms of citizens’ political behavior, which are citizens’ 
socioeconomic resources, psychological engagement with politics and the social context 
that surround and influence individual citizens. 
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The current studies of political participation in democratic countries are closely 
connected to these three models to account for citizens’ participation, and the empirical 
analyses on participation in democracies have long noted that individual socioeconomic 
resources (such as education and income), citizens’ psychological engagement with 
political affairs (such as one’s political knowledge and political interest), and the social 
environment of citizens’ everyday life (such as the neighborhood and churches) play an 
important role in influencing and mobilizing citizens’ political participation in the 
democratic system (Almond and Verba 1963; Campbell et. al.1964; Verba, Sidney and 
Norman 1972; Sidney, Nie and Kim 1978; Huckfeldt 1979; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 
1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Brady, Verba and Schlotzman 1995). 
In the past two decades, political behavioral scholars started to explore and 
examine the political participation in non-democratic countries. Foremost, the scholars 
attempted to find out whether there existed genuine and meaningful individual 
participation in politics in the non-democratic countries, and series of influential studies 
on political participation in the former Soviet Union and communist China had noted that 
there were non-trivial forms of political participation of individual citizens to vie for 
various sociopolitical interests in non-democratic systems (Little 1976; Hough 1976; 
Friedgut 1979; Bahry and Silver 1990; Shi 1997; Jennings 1997; O’Brien and Li 2001).  
The question of political participation in non-democratic systems still persists: if there is 
real and non-trivial political participation in an authoritarian regime, then what factors 
determine citizens’ political participation in non-democratic countries? In other word, 
students of political behavioral studies are interested in who participate more in politics in 
non-democracies and what the motivational mechanism of citizens’ participation is.  
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Building on the political participation researches in democratic countries, recent 
studies on individual participation in non-democratic countries found that individual 
resources such as citizens’ education, income, gender and age, and individual 
psychological engagement in politics such as one’s political interest and political efficacy, 
are important determining factors that will strongly affect the level and variety of 
citizens’ participation in non-democratic countries (Bahry and Silver’s 1990; McAllister 
and White1994; Jennings 1997; Shi 1998; Tong 2003). These scholarly works built 
important cornerstones for studies of motivational mechanism of citizens’ political 
participation in non-democratic regimes, and they also served to bridge the research and 
literature on citizens’ political participation in democracies and non-democracies. 
However, so far few studies on political participation in non-democracies have 
systematically explored the influence of social contexts in mobilizing and influencing 
participation in non-democracies, although that the influence of social contexts on 
political participation in democracies is a widely researched and remarkably fruitful field 
in political behavioral studies. Prominent scholarly works long noted that social contexts 
provide important socializing and mobilizing environments that affect opportunities and 
decisions of individual citizens to participate in politics (Huckfeldt 1979; Wolfinger and 
Rosenstone 1980; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; 
Oliver 2001; Plutzer 2002; Mutz and Mondak 2006). Neighborhoods, families, churches, 
workplaces have all been found to have an important and non-negligible influence that 
affects individual citizens’ political participation in political affairs.  
The importance of social contexts particularly the significance of grassroots 
sociopolitical institutions in authoritarian regimes, was also well documented in the 
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theoretical studies on state-society relationship and political participation in non-
democratic countries. Allardt (1961) noted the “totalitarian populist” nature of the Soviet 
society, as the Communist state had strict control and all-inclusive ideologies to guide 
local institutions and political participation forms, and local institutions tended to 
mobilize local residents to an extensive extent. Hough (1977) also noted the “institutional 
pluralism” political structure in the communist USSR, and instead of going through any 
interest groups, citizens’ interests were articulated through formalized institutional 
channels. Similarly, Walder (1986) pointed out that the work units were defining systems 
in urban China that ensured social and political control on the society and exerted 
significant influence on citizens’ political attitude and behavior. Social contexts, 
particularly the grassroots sociopolitical institutions were documented in theoretical 
literature to play an important role affecting and shaping citizens’ political behaviors in 
authoritarian regimes.  
In this study, we attempt to empirically test this paradigm of social context and 
citizens’ political participation in non-democracies. The case we employed is 
contemporary China from 1993 to 2002, the urban areas particularly, and the social 
context that we focused on is the Chinese work units system.  
We examined Chinese citizens’ political participation within and outside the work 
units, and the empirical analysis provided evidence pointing the workplaces exerted a 
significant effect in motivating and mobilizing citizens’ political participation in urban 
China in 1993, and the effect of the political organization inside the work unit was 
comparable to being a party member in encouraging citizens’ political participation. As 
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the previous literature noted, local sociopolitical institutions in the authoritarian regime 
channeled and mobilized citizens’ political participation to a significant extent.  
Why do local institutions in an authoritarian regime have such a strong influence on 
citizens’ political participation in non-democratic countries? In the attempt to address this 
question, our analysis moves to the state-society relationship in non-democratic regimes.  
Although the research on political behavior is a prominent and distinctive field in 
contemporary political studies, the question of individual political behavior is never an 
isolated phenomenon in the society. On the contrary, the behavioral pattern of individual 
citizens, as how citizens are engaged with sociopolitical affairs and how much citizens 
are engaged in politics, is always embedded in the political structure and state-society 
relationship of a particular society. In democratic nations, citizens are encouraged to 
participate in politics at various levels to compete for high and low political interests, 
ranging from the national offices or local school boards, and citizens in democracies are 
allowed for the freedom to choose to participate or not. In absence of close state’s 
supervision on individual citizens, the grassroots sociopolitical environments, such as 
neighborhoods and churches, tend to facilitate citizens’ opportunities and capabilities to 
engage in politics instead of enforcing citizens to do so. At the same time, with the 
emphasis on economic efficiency and protection of private resources, individual citizens 
with more resources are empirically known to be more active and influential in politics. 
In short, individual political behaviors in the democratic society is not only related to 
individuals’ choices as whether one would participate or not, but also is closely 
connected with nature of the regime and the state-society relationship of the country. 
This is also true for citizens’ political participation in non-democratic regimes.  
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As the previous literature on communist and the empirical analysis of this study 
noted, local sociopolitical institutions exert critical influence in facilitating and 
mobilizing citizens’ political participation in the authoritarian regime. The influence of 
the grassroots institutions on citizens’ political behavior is not merely accidental but 
rather the outcome of astringent and comprehensive state’s control on individuals citizens 
implemented through the local sociopolitical institutes.  
The state of a communist regime has a comprehensive and close control over 
individual citizens in various aspects of citizens’ everyday life, and one of the most 
important local institutions that help realize the state’s control is the urban unit system. 
Work units, especially the work units before the late 1990s, were in charge of diverse 
interests and resources of citizens’ everyday life. These included citizens’ salaries, 
bonuses, health benefits, housing options, political dossiers, citizens’ rights to travel, 
rights to migrate, family practice, etc. Given the heavy dependence of individual citizens 
on the work units, the socioeconomic well being of each employee was closely connected 
with their performance in the unit and their political attitudes and behaviors in the unit. 
With the resources and civil authority vested from the state, Chinese urban work units 
exerted close supervision over individual citizens in terms of industrious performance and 
political “biaoxian”, and the workplace was found to carry a significant effect in 
mobilizing and determining citizens’ political behavior within and outside the work unit. 
In sum, it was through the control of work units that state maintained close supervision 
over individual citizens, and it is with the state’s infiltration into society that work units 
played a key role in mobilizing and motivating citizens’ participation in urban China.  
  
166 
      Previous studies on the transformation of state-society relationship in post-
communist regimes have largely focused on the state and individual citizens, and the 
meso level sociopolitical institutions only received scarce attention. In this study, the 
focus of our analysis is chiefly on the grassroots sociopolitical institutions in the 
authoritarian regime, as the local institution provided key connection between the state 
and individual citizens. Through examining the meso level social institutions, we would 
be able to obtain further understanding about the relationship between the state and civil 
society of urban China. 
   Since the state, sociopolitical institutions and individual citizens are closely 
interrelated in an authoritarian regime and the meso level political institutions provide 
critical context for the state to engage with individual citizens, the changes at the meso 
level institutions may also imply the relationship shift between the state and individual 
citizens. In the past twenty years, Chinese urban work units have gone through 
comprehensive and dramatic sociopolitical changes in the economic reform, which have 
significantly altered the relationship between work units and urban residents. Nowadays, 
Chinese urban citizens do not depend on their work units to reimburse their prepaid 
medical bills; retired employees do not depend on the work units for their monthly 
pension, and urban citizens do not need to wait for the unit to assign them housing option 
while all they need to do to improve their housing condition is to choose and purchase the 
apartment on the market. Chinese urban citizens do not have political studies to attend 
every Wednesday afternoon, and they do not have to worry about their political dossier if 
they ever intend to find the employment with national or foreign enterprises. Moreover, 
Chinese urban citizens do not need the endorsement and approval forms from their work 
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units to travel abroad or register for marriage. In short, Chinese urban units have shed off 
most its multi-functionalities up till 2000s, and work units started to establish 
relationships with individual citizens based on sole employment relationships. The urban 
work units are withdrawing from the daily life of Chinese urban residents overall.  
The transformation that the work units have been experiencing in the past decade 
reflects an overall retreat of the state from Chinese urban life. Once again, the changes at 
the meso level institutions point to the relationship shift between the macro state and 
micro level individuals. Previously, the urban residents depended heavily on their work 
units for their everyday living material, and the urban employees would need to exhibit 
appropriate political attitudes and behaviors in the units to acquire everyday economic 
and social interests, such as to attend political studies and keep a clean “political history”. 
The state exercised close supervision and control over individual citizens through the 
work unit. However, with the economic, social and political dependency of individual 
citizens on workplaces decreasing sharply in the past decade, the control of the 
communist state on its citizens has also been disappearing gradually. Instead of 
maintaining its control over individual residents through the workplace, the state 
established individual account for every urban citizen for their health benefit and pension, 
disregarding their employment type or status. The state does not require that every urban 
citizen be tagged with the political dossier in order to get employed or be able to transfer 
to another unit. The state now permits individual citizens to sue the state if the state is 
considered to have violated individuals’ interests and rights. The state has withdrawn 
from the realms of urban individuals’ civil liberties, such as traveling overseas and 
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migration. While some civil affairs are still subject to the state’s control, these controls 
are mainly resulted from domestic geographic concern rather than pure political concerns.  
Since China decided to initiate its open-door policy and economic reform under 
the rule of Deng Xiaoping, China has been experiencing dramatic economic development 
in the past few decades. The economic achievement has changed China’s status and role 
in the international world, but more importantly, Chinese economic development has 
significantly improved the living conditions of average Chinese citizens, the development 
also brought drastic changes to Chinese state-society relationship.  
   Since China started its economic reform in 1978, the country has enjoyed rapid 
development rate and accumulated tremendous national wealth. Compared to 1978, 
China’s national GDP has increased by 12.1 times by 2000, and was ranked the 7th largest 
economy in the world. Taking into consideration of inflation factors, the average growth 
rate of the GDP has been about 9.5% from 1978 to 2000. Also, Chinese population under 
the poverty line has decreased from 250 million in 1978 to less than 30 million in 2000. 
The average yearly income of Chinese urban households has increased from 400 RMB 
(less than 50 US dollars) in 1978 to more than 10,000 RMB (more than 1,250 US dollars) 
in 2000. The foreign investments that flowed into China increased from 12.46 billions US 
dollars in 1983 to 506.46 billion dollars in 2000 (Economic Daily, 2006 June). In short, 
during its economic reform in the past two decades, China has been experiencing 
remarkable changes in the economic realm. 
The economic development and accumulated national wealth are not isolated 
social phenomena, and their effect is to be rippled to other sociopolitical realms in the 
country. Political studies on economic development and transition of the regimes have 
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long noted that stable economic development is essential to the bourgeoning, formation 
and stability of political liberalization and democracy. As Lipset (1959) argued that: “thus 
we have an interrelated cluster of economic development, Protestantism, monarchy, 
gradual political change, legitimacy and democracy; men may argue as to whether any 
aspect of this cluster is primary, but the cluster of factors and forces hangs together” (59). 
Dahl (1989) also noted that the increasing economic benefits to the masses intensified 
public demand for democracy, as economic development spreads authority and 
democratic aspirations across a variety of people, which fosters political liberalization 
and democracy.  Employing the pooled time series analysis of 131 nation-states from 
1972 to 1989, Burkhart and Lewis-beck (1994) tested whether economic development 
causes democratic development, and they found that the nation’s economic development 
substantially improves its democratic prospect, with the causal arrow most probably 
running from economic development to democracy instead of vice versa. As argued in 
the previous literature, the national economic development is not an isolated social 
phenomenon, and rather it is closely tied to the changes of the sociopolitical structure 
within a nation. With stable, rapid and continuous economic development, the prospect of 
democratization or liberalization is significantly improving for the authoritarian regime.  
Although the key theoretical concern of this study is citizens’ political behavior within a 
non-democratic system, we found that citizens’ behavioral pattern is nevertheless closely 
associated with the state-society relationship of a particular nation. As Chinese urban 
citizens’ participation in politics was document to exhibit variations in both participation 
intensity and participation mechanism from 1993 to 2002, we are further interested in 
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whether and how the state-society relationship has been going through transformation in 
urban China. 
Combining the quantitative and qualitative analyses addressed in the previous 
chapters, we conclude that Chinese state-society relationship is going through important 
and non-negligible liberalization during China’s fast economic development in the past 
decades. This political liberalization was especially embodied in the withdrawal of the 
state’s control from Chinese civil affairs and more freedom granted to Chinese urban 
citizens in economic, social and political realms. 
To address how has Chinese state shifted its connection with the society and 
liberalized its attachment with individual citizens, we speculated the following linkages 
that may help us further understand the state-society relationship shift in contemporary 
China.   
First, since the CCP government shifted its policy emphasis from adhering closely 
to the communist ideology to attaining rapid economic development, the communist 
ideology has been gradually toned down in China since the 1980s, which releases the 
control of the state over individual citizens. 
In Mao’s era, the Chinese state placed top priority in its political agenda to 
advocate the communist ideology within the country. Such zeal studying the communism 
and Mao’s thoughts peaked during the Cultural Revolution, when the whole nation was 
required to focus on “class struggle” and condemn “capital routers” in the country. Urban 
employees were organized to study Mao’s teachings and state’s policy at the political 
study sessions several times a week. Economically, the state mainly focused on the purity 
of the “socialist economy” and economic equality among citizens. One famous saying in 
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the Cultural Revolution went that “the socialist weeds are better than capitalist seedlings”. 
After the Cultural Revolution finished in 1976, China recovered from its national fever to 
pursue utter communism and shifted policy priority to practical economic development. 
Economically, the national emphasis turned from economic equality to economic 
efficiency, and “some people in the nation are allowed to get rich first”. One saying of Mr. 
Deng Xiaoping that “communism is no poverty” was widely spread in the country. Along 
with upholding economic development as the national priority is the toning down of 
communist ideology. Chinese state started to encourage the establishment of private and 
foreign businesses in the country, which are regarded as healthy complement to the 
“socialist economy”. Political correctness is no longer the key element in judging whether 
or not a business interest is appropriate and acceptable, and political correctness was 
toned down in evaluating citizens’ performance. Urban residents were no longer 
constantly required to exhibit desired political attitudes and behaviors in order to ensure 
their socioeconomic interests in the work unit. In other word, as the communist China 
shifted its national priority from ideological correctness to economic development, the 
state relented its control over ideological unity and individual citizens were no longer 
required to tally their political attitude and behavior along with the state’s standing point. 
At the same time, urged by the need to maintain economic gains, the state granted more 
economic rights and sociopolitical rights to urban residents, such as permitting citizens to 
own their own businesses and encouraging citizens to establish personal properties. 
Instead of being subject to astringent political control from the state socially and mentally, 
Chinese urban citizens are granted with more civil rights and liberties than ever since the 
  
172 
founding of China, as the communist China decided to tone down its ideological control 
and strive for economic development full speed.  
Second, in order to facilitate economic exchange and growth, China started to 
establish the market economy to replace the “planned economy” in the mid-1980s, and 
the role of the state shifted from the previous market distributor in the planning economy 
to the market regulator and market arbitrator. This further deduced the economic 
dependence of Chinese urban citizens on the state, and it propels the state to establish 
relationship with individual citizens within a legal frame.  
Within the planned economy, the role of the communist state was responsible to 
dispense economic goods to the national population, and work units played the key role 
to distribute nationally regulated income, health benefits, pension, housing options to 
Chinese urban citizens. However, although the planning economy well ensured citizens’ 
economic security and equality, it severely impeded the accumulation of national wealth 
by suppressing open competition and individual economic incentives. As China initiated 
its economic reform in the 1980s, one important goal of the reform was to build up 
“socialist market economy” to facilitate economic exchanges and development.  
Once being the source and distributor of the planned economy, Chinese government 
started to gradually adjust its role from the market distributor to market arbitrator by 
taking measures to privatize state’s owned enterprises, allowing the development of 
foreign enterprise and private enterprises, and supplying standard rules to regulate the 
performances and behaviors of state-owned, foreign, collective, private enterprises, etc. 
All in all, instead of assuming its control and responsibility of the economy, the state has 
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become an equal party in the market and shifted its role to market regulator to facilitate 
effective economic development.  
While this change of the state’s role has significantly boosted the economic 
opportunities of the nation institutionally, it has been detrimental to the state’s authority 
in the market and further reduced the dependency of individual citizens on the state. For 
example, while previously Chinese urban citizens had to wait for their housing options in 
the work unit and their housing assignment heavily depended on their “appropriate” 
political attitude and behaviors, nowadays Chinese citizens no longer need to behave in 
accordance with the state’s requirement to obtain everyday living essential, and they will 
purchase housing openly on the market as long as they can afford them. As the state 
shifted its role from resources distributor to market regulator, its control over individual 
citizens have also been severely reduced, and sequentially the civil society is allowed 
more freedom in the economic, social and political realms.  
Finally, the rapid economic development China has been experiencing in the past 
decade leads to the emergence of new social cleavages in the society, and in order to 
maintain stable political configuration and long-term economic development, the state 
was obligated to respond and incorporate the voices and demands of the new social 
cleavages, which leads to further political liberalization in urban China.  
As Chinese state shifted its policy priority from economic equality to economic 
efficiency, a considerable proportion of the population “became rich first” through raising 
up one’s own businesses and working for foreign and private enterprises. While prior to 
the reform Chinese urban population was largely homogeneous in their economic status, 
now the economic disparities among urban residents become increasingly substantial. 
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This economic classification leads to the emergence of social cleavages in urban China. 
With China’s economic reform accelerating in the past decade, new social cleavages have 
turned out to be a major characteristic of contemporary Chinese society.  
In its effort to incorporate different political demands of various groups, Chinese 
state is liberalizing its relationship with the civil society in the past decade and grants 
generous political freedom to the emerging new social class in the recent years, such as 
allowing more freedom of expression at the grassroots level. Nowadays Chinese citizens 
may openly challenge many aspects of government policies, even CCP’s basic 
developmental strategies included. One example is that when the CCP government 
introduced its tax reforms in 1993, prominent China scholars Angang Hu and Shaoguang 
Wang published their book challenging the particular reform measures chosen by the 
state, and in 1995 when the state indulged itself with the high growth rates and advocated 
the growth would eventually resolve all problems facing China, the two published 
another book challenging the rational of such state’s policies.  
In sum, during the economic reform and economic development in the past 
decades, Chinese state has chosen to and been compelled to release its control over the 
citizens and liberalize its relationship with society. This was exhibited in the empirical 
analysis of this study, and it was also documented in the survey data collected in urban 
China. 
The following data were collected in 2002 summer as part of Asian Barometer 
Survey, and when asked of their impression of the government performances of the year 
2001 as compared to 1979, the interviewed urban respondents gave responses presented 
below. The interview data clearly demonstrate that the majority residents felt the civil 
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liberties in the urban setting improved dramatically in China, such as religious freedom, 
freedom of speech, freedom of residence and freedom of association. At the same time, 
while an overwhelming majority of urban residents agreed on the positive economic 
development from 1979 to 2002, a substantial proportion of the citizens felt that 
economic inequality had deteriorated since 1979. 
Table 26. Perception of Performance of the Current State as Compared to That of 
1979 
 Better No Change Worse B-W 
Civil Liberty     
  Freedom of Expression 86.2% (1,350) 10.0% (157) 3.8% (59) 82.4% 
  Freedom of Residence 88.8% (1,373) 9.2% (142) 2.0% (32) 86.8% 
  Freedom of Religion 78.6% (1,043) 19.6% (260) 1.8% (24) 76.8% 
  Freedom of Association 74.5 (926) 21.6% (269) 3.9% (48) 70.6% 
Economic Performance     
  Economic Development 96.8% (1,620) 0.8% (14) 2.3% (39) 94.5% 
  Inequality 10.6% (175) 2.2% (36) 87.3% (1,445) -76.7% 
Social Order     
  Public Security 32.7% (541) 4.3% (71) 63.0% (1040) -30.3% 
Source: 2002 Mainland China Survey 
Note:  Entries in parentheses are the number of observations.   
 
 
Future Studies 
Before closing the study, we would like to briefly address the areas that future 
researches might be interested to explore regarding political participation in non-
democratic regimes and state-society relationship shift of the authoritarian regime.  
First, future studies are demanded to explore the nature of citizens’ political 
participation in the non-democratic regime during the economic development. As the 
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previous studies on the political participation in non-democracies noted that the stakes for 
the participation in non-democracies mainly concentrate on the low-end political interests, 
such as everyday living materials, and very few participation forms were able to reach the 
“high-end” political interests, such as policy formation and implementation. With the 
liberalizing state-society relationship that the authoritarian regime has been experiencing 
in economic development, future studies could be delved into inquiring whether the 
nature of political participation has shifted to the “high end” along with the altered 
sociopolitical structure. The question that the research would be asking is that along with 
the rapid economic development and liberalized state-society relationship, whether or not 
individual citizens of an authoritarian regime are able to gain higher level access into 
political affairs. 
Moreover, future studies would be devoted to compare the political participation 
mechanisms in contemporary China to other types of the regimes and examine how 
individual resources may affect citizens’ choice and capabilities to participate in politics. 
As the empirical analysis of this study noted, citizens’ individual resources are playing an 
increasingly prominent role in mobilizing citizens’ political participation in contemporary 
urban China. Following this initial finding, future studies may be comparing the influence 
of individual resources on citizens’ political participation in contemporary China and in 
democratic countries. These studies would hopefully shed light on answering the question 
as whether and to what extent that individual resources may affect citizens’ opportunities 
to participate in politics across different types of political settings.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
Appendix A: Profession and Positions  
   
Occupation Position Frequency Percent Cumulative Percentage 
unemployed 0 6 0.56 0.56 
sci-tech staff 1 2 0.19 0.75 
civil engineer 3 29 2.71 3.46 
agric-forestry tech staff 2 4 0.37 3.83 
sci-tech manager/staff 3 11 1.03 4.86 
medical/health staff 2 28 2.62 7.48 
economic/acctg staff 2 67 6.26 13.74 
legal staff 2 6 0.56 14.3 
teacher 3 61 5.7 20 
cultural staff 2 2 0.19 20.19 
student 0 11 1.03 21.21 
military personnel 2 3 0.28 21.5 
government office senior official 4 7 0.65 22.15 
party/mass org senior official 4 9 0.84 22.99 
enterprise/org senior official 4 11 1.03 24.02 
orgztn basic official 2 12 1.12 25.14 
pre-49 official/gentry 4 1 0.09 25.23 
admin staff 2 33 3.08 28.32 
political/security staff 2 29 2.71 31.03 
post/telegraph staff 2 4 0.37 31.4 
township cadre 3 6 0.56 31.96 
village cadre 3 2 0.19 32.15 
other office staff 2 10 0.93 33.08 
sales clerk 2 43 4.02 37.1 
purchasing/sales agent 2 27 2.52 39.63 
individual ind/commerce 4 37 3.46 43.08 
private enterprise owner 4 5 0.47 43.55 
foreign/private enterprise mgr 3 1 0.09 43.64 
other commercial staff 2 11 1.03 44.67 
service worker 1 19 1.78 46.45 
cook or kitchen staff 1 13 1.21 47.66 
housewife 0 52 4.86 52.52 
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Occupation (Appendix A continued)     
other service trades 1 33 3.08 55.61 
state farm worker 1 5 0.47 56.07 
agr/forestry laborer 1 12 1.12 57.2 
part agr/part other 1 2 0.19 57.38 
fishery laborer 1 4 0.37 57.76 
agr sideline producer 1 1 0.09 57.85 
tve cadre 2 3 0.28 58.13 
tve worker 1 1 0.09 58.22 
enterprise foreman 3 32 2.99 61.21 
mine/salt/other worker 1 17 1.59 62.8 
metal processing worker 1 12 1.12 63.93 
chemical worker 1 10 0.93 64.86 
rubber/plastics worker 1 7 0.65 65.51 
textile/embroid/dye worker 1 22 2.06 67.57 
leather worker 1 1 0.09 67.66 
garment industry worker 1 17 1.59 69.25 
food/drink worker 1 7 0.65 69.91 
tobacco worker 1 2 0.19 70.09 
wood/bamboo/hemp/other worker 1 11 1.03 71.12 
tool/machinetool maker/operator 1 36 3.36 74.49 
machinery/instrument maker 1 12 1.12 75.61 
electrician 1 44 4.11 79.72 
plumber/welder/metal worker 1 13 1.21 80.93 
glass/ceramics/enamel worker 1 8 0.75 81.68 
painter 1 6 0.56 82.24 
other production worker/staff 1 81 7.57 89.81 
construction worker 1 14 1.31 91.12 
crane operator 1 6 0.56 91.68 
loader 1 16 1.5 93.18 
transport equip operator 1 41 3.83 97.01 
inspector 3 24 2.24 99.25 
not applicable or no answer . 8 0.74 100 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table B-1. Initial Factor Analysis Matrix of Participatory Acts of Amelia Data in 1993  
 
 
Factor Loadings 
Participation Variables 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
Factor 
5 
1.  Voting in the 1992 PC Election 0.21 -0.27 0.3 0.04 0.05 
2.  Voting in the work unit 0.17 -0.26 0.29 0.13 0.19 
3.  Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v. 0.39 -0.35 0.31 0.06 -0.13 
4.  Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v. 0.55 -0.23 -0.04 -0.25 -0.23 
5.  Recommend candidates when asked in c.v. 0.55 -0.22 -0.11 -0.24 -0.19 
6.  Attend meetings that brief candidates in w.v. 0.39 -0.35 0.24 0.21 0.02 
7.  Nominate candidates in work units in w.v. 0.56 -0.22 -0.17 -0.11 0.24 
8.  Recommend candidates when asked in w.v. 0.51 -0.23 -0.22 -0.12 0.29 
9.  Express to the leaders directly 0.45 0.31 -0.12 0.19 0.03 
10.  Ask other leaders to intervene 0.39 0.46 -0.04 0.07 0.08 
11. Complain through hierarchy 0.49 0.23 -0.14 0.21 -0.12 
12. Complain through workers' union 0.39 0.06 -0.14 0.22 -0.12 
13. Ask others to persuade the leader 0.34 0.49 0.15 -0.08 0.09 
14. Wrote to government offices 0.3 0.21 0.02 0.19 -0.08 
15. Help from official's friends 0.26 0.46 0.24 -0.2 0.04 
16. Gifts and dinner 0.14 0.43 0.3 -0.2 -0.04 
Variance Proportion 0.57 0.36 0.14 0.1 0.08 
Eigenvalue 2.6 1.62 0.65 0.47 0.34 
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Table B-2. Principal Component Analysis of Participatory Acts of Amelia Data in 1993 
 
 
Eigenvector   
Participation Variables Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 
1.  Voting in the 1992 PC Election 0.13 -0.24 0.42 0.12 0.12 
2.  Voting in the work unit 0.11 -0.23 0.41 0.25 0.41 
3.  Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v. 0.24 -0.28 0.30 0.06 -0.34 
4.  Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v. 0.33 -0.18 -0.06 -0.33 -0.34 
5.  Recommend candidates when asked in c.v. 0.33 -0.17 -0.13 -0.32 -0.24 
6.  Attend meetings that brief candidates in w.v. 0.24 -0.28 0.22 0.25 -0.07 
7.  Nominate candidates in work units in w.v. 0.34 -0.17 -0.17 -0.22 0.34 
8.  Recommend candidates when asked in w.v. 0.31 -0.18 -0.22 -0.24 0.43 
9.  Express to the leaders directly 0.29 0.23 -0.15 0.23 0.17 
10.  Ask other leaders to intervene 0.25 0.34 -0.03 0.07 0.22 
11. Complain through hierarchy 0.31 0.17 -0.20 0.28 -0.16 
12. Complain through workers' union 0.26 0.04 -0.24 0.34 -0.20 
13. Ask others to persuade the leader 0.21 0.37 0.19 -0.12 0.15 
14. Wrote to government offices 0.20 0.17 0.01 0.38 -0.17 
15. Help from official's friends 0.17 0.35 0.32 -0.26 -0.02 
16. Gifts and dinner 0.09 0.34 0.40 -0.26 -0.17 
Variance Proportion 0.21 0.15 0.09 0.07 0.06 
Eigenvalue 3.28 2.33 1.39 1.19 1.03 
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Table B-3. Initial Factor Analysis Matrix of Participatory Acts of Amelia Data in 1993 
 
 
Factor Loadings   
Participation Variables 
Factor 
1 
Factor 
2 
Factor 
3 
Factor 
4 
Factor 
5 
1.  Voting in the 1992 PC Election 0.15 -0.27 0.30 0.21 0.00 
2.  Voting in the work unit 0.17 -0.30 0.26 0.17 0.08 
3.  Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v. 0.47 -0.34 0.31 0.07 -0.03 
4.  Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v. 0.58 -0.22 0.00 -0.25 -0.23 
5.  Recommend candidates when asked in c.v. 0.59 -0.18 -0.07 -0.24 -0.21 
6.  Attend meetings that brief candidates in w.v. 0.41 -0.35 0.17 0.13 0.11 
7.  Nominate candidates in work units in w.v. 0.54 -0.20 -0.17 -0.11 0.26 
8.  Recommend candidates when asked in w.v. 0.49 -0.15 -0.21 -0.19 0.27 
9.  Express to the leaders directly 0.44 0.35 -0.10 0.21 0.04 
10.  Ask other leaders to intervene 0.37 0.48 -0.04 0.09 0.09 
11. Complain through hierarchy 0.49 0.21 -0.16 0.25 -0.14 
12. Complain through workers' union 0.37 0.02 -0.15 0.18 -0.15 
13. Ask others to persuade the leader 0.32 0.51 0.16 -0.03 0.13 
14. Wrote to government offices 0.28 0.22 -0.08 0.18 -0.08 
15. Help from official's friends 0.19 0.48 0.31 -0.18 0.00 
16. Gifts and dinner 0.12 0.40 0.30 -0.20 -0.04 
Variance Proportion 0.58 0.37 0.14 0.11 0.07 
Eigenvalue 2.59 1.65 0.64 0.51 0.33 
 
 
Table B-4. Principal Component Analysis of Participatory Acts of Amelia Data in 1993 
 
 
Eigenvector   
Participation Variables Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 Comp5 
1.  Voting in the 1992 PC Election 0.10 -0.23 0.42 0.34 0.02 
2.  Voting in the work unit 0.11 -0.26 0.37 0.27 0.21 
3.  Attend meetings that brief candidates in c.v. 0.28 -0.27 0.32 0.03 -0.10 
4.  Nominate the candidate oneself in c.v. 0.35 -0.16 -0.01 -0.29 -0.40 
5.  Recommend candidates when asked in c.v. 0.35 -0.14 -0.09 -0.29 -0.34 
6.  Attend meetings that brief candidates in w.v. 0.25 -0.28 0.17 0.09 0.17 
7.  Nominate candidates in work units in w.v. 0.33 -0.16 -0.18 -0.21 0.37 
8.  Recommend candidates when asked in w.v. 0.30 -0.12 -0.22 -0.32 0.40 
9.  Express to the leaders directly 0.28 0.26 -0.11 0.26 0.18 
10.  Ask other leaders to intervene 0.24 0.36 -0.03 0.09 0.25 
11. Complain through hierarchy 0.31 0.15 -0.20 0.34 -0.17 
12. Complain through workers' union 0.24 0.01 -0.23 0.29 -0.30 
13. Ask others to persuade the leader 0.20 0.38 0.21 -0.06 0.24 
14. Wrote to government offices 0.19 0.18 -0.11 0.31 -0.17 
15. Help from official's friends 0.12 0.37 0.39 -0.22 -0.07 
16. Gifts and dinner 0.08 0.32 0.40 -0.26 -0.20 
Variance Proportion 0.20 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.06 
Eigenvalue 3.27 2.36 1.39 1.24 1.01 
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Table B-5 Initial Factor Analysis Matrix of Participatory Acts of Amelia Data in 2002 
 
 
Factor Loadings 
Participation Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 
Voting in the PC Election 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.07 
Voting in the work unit 0.29 0.43 0.24 -0.01 
Attend meetings that brief candidates 0.42 0.38 0.14 -0.02 
Nominate candidates in work units  0.40 0.30 -0.38 0.00 
Recommend candidates when asked 0.47 0.34 -0.30 -0.06 
Express to the leaders directly 0.52 -0.20 0.15 -0.05 
Ask other leaders to intervene 0.49 -0.26 0.05 -0.21 
Complain through hierarchy 0.55 -0.30 0.02 0.13 
Complained through workers' union 0.43 -0.12 0.01 0.17 
Ask others to persuade the leader 0.33 -0.28 -0.01 -0.20 
Wrote to government offices  0.38 -0.28 -0.09 0.19 
Variance Proportion 0.78 0.40 0.17 0.07 
Eigenvalue 1.96 1.00 0.42 0.18 
 
 
Table B-6. Principal Component Analysis of Participatory Acts of Amelia Data in 2002 
 
 
Eigenvector 
Participation Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 
Voting in the PC Election 0.21 0.34 0.44 -0.18 
Voting in the work unit 0.21 0.45 0.33 0.05 
Attend meetings that brief candidates 0.30 0.39 0.16 0.08 
Nominate candidates in work units  0.28 0.27 -0.60 0.01 
Recommend candidates when asked 0.32 0.31 -0.47 0.12 
Express to the leaders directly 0.37 -0.18 0.24 0.09 
Ask other leaders to intervene 0.35 -0.25 0.10 0.43 
Complain through hierarchy 0.38 -0.27 0.05 -0.24 
Complained through workers' union 0.32 -0.12 0.02 -0.42 
Ask others to persuade the leader 0.25 -0.30 0.01 0.55 
Wrote to government offices  0.28 -0.29 -0.13 -0.47 
Variance Proportion 0.25 0.16 0.11 0.09 
Eigenvalue 2.72 1.77 1.17 0.98 
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Table B-7. Initial Factor Analysis Matrix of Participatory Acts in 2002 
 
 
Factor Loadings  
Participation Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Uniqueness 
Voting in the PC Election 0.30 0.28 0.33 0.02 0.72 
Voting in the work unit 0.33 0.40 0.26 -0.02 0.67 
Attend meetings that brief candidates 0.44 0.31 0.12 -0.01 0.70 
Nominate candidates in work units  0.43 0.33 -0.36 0.07 0.57 
Recommend candidates when asked 0.49 0.39 -0.27 -0.04 0.53 
Express to the leaders directly 0.50 -0.24 0.09 -0.08 0.68 
Ask other leaders to intervene 0.50 -0.25 -0.04 -0.22 0.64 
Complain through hierarchy 0.53 -0.34 0.03 0.13 0.58 
Complained through workers' union 0.41 -0.16 0.08 0.16 0.77 
Ask others to persuade the leader 0.34 -0.27 -0.03 -0.21 0.77 
Wrote to government offices  0.37 -0.29 -0.05 0.21 0.73 
Variance Proportion 0.77 0.39 0.16 0.07  
Eigenvalue 2.01 1.02 0.41 0.19  
 
 
Table B-8 Principal Component Analysis of Participatory Acts of Amelia Data in 2002 
 
 
Eigenvector 
Participation Variable Comp1 Comp2 Comp3 Comp4 
Voting in the PC Election 0.22 0.32 0.53 0.02 
Voting in the work unit 0.23 0.43 0.34 -0.06 
Attend meetings that brief candidates 0.31 0.34 0.11 -0.05 
Nominate candidates in work units  0.29 0.30 -0.58 0.14 
Recommend candidates when asked 0.32 0.35 -0.43 -0.05 
Express to the leaders directly 0.35 -0.22 0.16 -0.16 
Ask other leaders to intervene 0.35 -0.23 -0.06 -0.43 
Complain through hierarchy 0.37 -0.31 0.07 0.23 
Complained through workers' union 0.31 -0.16 0.16 0.39 
Ask others to persuade the leader 0.25 -0.28 -0.05 -0.55 
Wrote to government offices  0.27 -0.29 -0.07 0.51 
Variance Proportion 0.25 0.16 0.10 0.09 
Eigenvalue 2.76 1.77 1.15 0.98 
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Campaigning
Independent Variables
Vote in Local 
Congressional 
Elections
Vote in the Work Unit 
Elections 
Attended Campaign 
Meetings in Work Unit
Nominating 
Candidates in Work 
Unit 
Recommending 
Candidate in Work Unit
PCA Campaigning 
and Candidate 
Recruitment
Workplace .09** (.04) -.04(.08) .07 (.06) -.11 (.07) -.01 (.07) -.04 (.07)
Father's Education .005 (.01) -.002 (.02) .001 (.01) .03 (.02) .02 (.02) .02 (.02)
Socioeconomic Resources
Position .06 (.05) .2** (.1) .06 (.07) .03 (.08) .17** (.08) .11 (.08)
Income×10(-3) .05* (.03) .17* (.1) .08** (.04) .05 (.04) .07* (.04) .1** (.04)
Education .05 (.04) -.03 (.09) -.10 (.06) -.01 (.07) -.16** (.07) -.10 (.07)
Self-regarded Economic Status -.03 (.07) -.02 (.12) -.04 (.09) .02 (.10) -.02 (.10) -.002 (.10)
Self-regarded Social Status -.07 (.07) .08 (.12) -.08 (.09) .09 (.11) .06 (.11) -.004 (.10)
Male -.01 (.1) -.03 (.18) -.13 (.13) -.04 (.16) .08 (.16) -.04 (.14)
Age .11*** (.02) .11** (.04) .05 (.05) .11* (.05) .09** (.05) .09** (.04)
Age-squared×10(-3) -.1*** (.02) -.11** (.04) -.05 (.04) -0.0055 -.1** (.05) -.09** (.04)
Marital Status -.04 (.22) ‘-.46 (.40) -.03 (.3) -.45(.37) -0.2278 -.45 (.32)
Ethnic Background -.004 (.22) -.42 (.54) -.13 (.32) -.57 (.34) -.39 (.34) -0.224
Psychological Engagement
Party Membership .11 (.12) .13 (.22) .50*** (.15) .51*** (.18) .54*** (.18) .66*** (.17)
Political Interest .11* (.06) .15 (.12) .21** (.09) .06 (.11) .18* (.10) .21** (.10)
Political Knowledge .11 (.12) -.30 (.23) .09 (.16) -.17 (.21) -.27 (.20) -.08 (.18)
Internal Political Efficacy .20** (.09) .22 (.17) .35*** (.12) .32** (.15) .63*** (.14) .61*** (.13)
External Political Efficacy .02 (.07) .14 (.17) .06 (.12) -.06 (.15) -.29** (.14) -.14 (.13)
Government Attitude .03 (.08) .01 (.14) .14 (.11) .16 (.13) .06 (.13) .14 (.11)
Faith in People .13 (.09)
-.20 (.17) .25** (.12) -.03 (.15) -.03 (.15) .04 (.14)
_cut1/constant -3.93*** (.68) -0.2782 2.6 (1.01) 3.8 (1.4) 3.4 (1.3) -3.1*** (1.1)
_cut2 / / 3.1 (1.01) 4.1 (1.4) 3.8 (1.3) /
_cut3 / / 4.0 (1.02) 5.2 (1.4) 5.0 (1.3) /
Number of observations 885 403 372 373 372 370
Log Likelihood/Adj R-squared -561.37438 -159.6056 -454.02431 -257.87376 -278.71675 0.2179
Prob > chi 2 / Prob > F ~0 0.02 ~0 0.0037 ~0 ~0
† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01 
Voting
Appendix C-1: Original Analysis of Electoral Participation (2002)
Dependent Variables
Candidate Recruitment
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses. 
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Expressed opinions 
directly to the leader
Complained through 
bureaucratic hierarchy
Complained through 
the trade union
Asked other leader in 
the same unit to 
intervene
Sought help from those 
who could persuade the 
leader
Wrote to Government 
Offices
Workplace -.007 (.04) -.03 (.06) -.07 (.07) .10** (.06) -.07 (.05) -.09 (.08)
Father's Education .005 (.01) .02* (.01) .001 (.02) .02* (.01) -.004 (.01) .004 (.02)
Socioeconomic Resources
Position .003 (.05) -.007 (.06) -0.0096 .06 (.06) .03 (.06) -.13 (.09)
Income×10(-4)
-.01 (.03) -.10** (.05) .01 (.05) -.09 (.05) -.02 (.04) .04 (.05)
Education
-.03 (.04) .006 (.05) -.007 (.07) -.01 (.05) -.01 (.06) .16** (.07)
Self-regarded Economic Status
-.13** (.06) -.05 (.08) -.09 (.10) -.09 (.08) .20** (.08) -.01 (.10)
Self-regarded Social Status
-.01 (.06) .09 (.08) .001 (.09) .08 (.08) .04 (.08) -.06 (.10)
Male .22** (.09) .16 (.12) -.07 (.15) -.19 (.12) .05 (.12) .12 (.16)
Age .04* (.02) .06* (.03) .01 (.04) .08** (.03) .07** (.03) .03 (.04)
Age-squared×10(-4)
-0.0008 -.05 (.03) -.007 (.03) -0.0024 -.08** (.03) -.005 (.04)
Marital Status .05 (.20) -.18 (.27) .31 (.39) -.30 (.28) -.52** (.24) .17 (.48)
Ethnic Background .16 (.22) .26 (.31) -.14 (.32) .71** (.36) .03 (.27) -.34 (.34)
Psychological Engagement
Party Membership .09 (.10) .21* (.13) .24 (.16) .12 (.13) -.11 (.14) -.07 (.18)
Political Interest .19*** (.06) .12 (.08) .24** (.10) .32*** (.08) .22*** (.08) .25** (.11)
Political Knowledge .13 (.11) .26 (.17) .18 (.19) .13 (.16) .18 (.15) .15 (.23)
Internal Political Efficacy .13* (.08) .13 (.11) .27** (.13) .17* (.10) .04 (.11) .02 (.15)
External Political Efficacy .09 (.09) .24** (.10) .14 (.13) .23** (.10) .14 (.10) .10 (.14)
Government Attitude
-.09 (.07) -.08 (.10) .02 (.12) .16 (.10) .18* (.10) -.10 (.14)
Faith in People
-.04 (.09) .08 (.12) .03 (.14) .08 (.11) -.04 (.11) -.03 (.16)
_cut1/ constant 2.0 (.62) 4.3 (.90) 3.2 (1.0) 6.0 (.94) 4.2 (.89) 3.5 (1.2)
_cut2 2.4 (.62) 4.6 (.90) 3.5 (1.0) 6.5 (.94) 4.7 (.89) 3.8 (1.2)
_cut3 3.3 (.63) 5.3 (.90) 4.3 (1.1) 7.4 (.96) 5.4 (.90) 4.3 (1.2)
Number of observations 891 891 889 890 891 891
Log Likelihood/Adj R-squared
-943.54042 -429.1985 -266.42575 -423.88558 -430.18024 -218.22448
Prob > Chi 2 / Prob > F
~0 0.0004 0.1228 ~0 0.004 0.0065
Appendix C-2. Original Analysis of Non-Electoral Political Participation (2002)
Dependent Variables
† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01 
Complaining Official Contacting
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses. 
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Appendix C-3. Original Analysis of Electoral Participation (1993)
Independent Variables
Vote in 
Congressional 
Elections
Voting in Work 
Unit Elections 
Attended Campaign 
Meetings in C. V.
Attended Campaign 
Meetings in W. V.
Nominating 
Candidate in C.V.
Recommending 
Candidate in C.V.
Nominating 
Candidates in 
W.V. 
Recommending 
Candidate in W.V.
Workplace .16* (.10) .23 (.15) .05 (.07) -.11 (.09) .05 (.11) .04 (.10) .21** (.10) .15 (.10)
Political Organization .31* (.16) .49** (.25) .11 (.13) .27*  (.14) -.22 (.21) .36 (.24) .09 (.16) .33* (.17)
Father's Party Membership -.24 (.18) -.37 (.23) .19 (.13) .15 (.14) -.01 (.21) -.40 (.25) -.08 (.16) -.37**(.17)
Father's Education -0.004 -.06 (.07) .08** (.04) -.10** (.04) -.15** (.06) -.08 (.06) -0.0045 -0.005
Socioeconomic Resources
Position -.12 (.10)
 -.04 (.14) .12 (.07) .12 (.08) .07 (.11) .24** (.11) .10 (.09) .15 (.10)
Income×10(-4) -1.33 (.92)
 .89 (2.2) -1.4 (0.84) .22 (.92) .19 (1.1) .40 (1.1) .9 (1.0) .10 (1.2)
Education -.08 (.08) .05 (.14) -0.02 (0.06) .05 (.07) -.05 (.09) -.07 (.10) -.03 (.08) .04 (.08)
Self-regarded Economic Status -0.0209 .09 (.15) .22** (.08) .17* (.09) .19 (.12) .12 (.12) .28*** (.10) .18* (.10)
Self-regarded Social Status .10 (.11) .05 (.16) .08 (.08) .01 (.08) .18 (.12) .14 (.12) .05 (.10) .09 (.10)
Male -.09 (.16) .04 (.24) -.12 (.12) -.1 (.13) .006 (.19) .25 (.21) -.005 (.15) .18 (.15)
Age .09** (.04) .03 (.10) .03 (.03)  .04 (.04) -.11** (.05) -.07 (.05) -.05 (.15) -0.0032
Age-squared×10(-4) -43.7472 1.56 (13.8) -1.99 (3.62) -3.6 (4.3) 11.8** (5.22) 7.83 (5.2) 6.67 (5.13) 10.4** (5.1)
Marital Status -.05 (.23) .33 (.31) .17 (.17) -.19 (.19) .25 (.28) .15 (.28) .03 (.21) .01 (.22)
Ethnic Background .49 (.35)
 -.33 (.55) -.36 (.30) -0.1595 -.56 (.43) -.50 (.46) -.24 (.32) -.27 (.33)
Psychological Engagement
Party Membership -.036 (.23) .24 (.39) .25* (.15) .27* (.16) .81*** (.21) .48** (.21) .64*** (.18) .55*** (.18)
Political Interest .17** (.07) -.09 (.10) .02 (.05) .07 (.06) .03 (.09) -.03 (.10) -.08 (.06) -.09 (.07)
Political Knowledge -.13 (.17) .07 (.24) -.03 (.13) .04 (.14) .32 (.20) .27 (.20) -.05 (.16) .07 (.16)
Internal Political Efficacy .11 (.17) .10 (.20) .17 (.12) .25** (.11) .40** (.17) 54*** (.18) .28** (.12) .27** (.13)
External Political Efficacy .28* (.15)
 -.28 (.21) .17 (.11) .01 (.11)  -.004 (.16) .15 (.17) .27** (.13) .20 (.14)
Government Attitude -0.08 (0.17) .19 (.23) .35*** (.13) .40*** (.14) .10 (.19) .39* (.21) -.15 (.15) .07 (.16)
Faith in People -.05 (.15)
 .16 (.23) .13 (.11) .07 (.12) -.05 (.17) .07 (.18) -.10 (.14) .04 (.14)
_cut1/ constant -1.97 (1.30) -1.22 (2.25) 3.4 (.97) 2.7 (1.1) .71 (1.4) 3.96 (1.4) 1.8 (1.2) 1.7 (1.2)
_cut2 / / 3.8 (.97) 3.2 (1.1) 1.0 (1.4) 4.3 (1.4) 2.2 (1.2) 2.1 (1.2)
_cut3 / / 4.9 (.98) 4.3 (1.1) 2.3 (1.4) 5.5 (1.5) 3.5 (1.2) 3.5 (1.2)
Number of observations 486 368 447 380 472 472 380 360
Log Likelihood/Adj R-squared -178.33 -89.695264 -509.9 -461.389 -198.506 -190.452 -334.088 -299.62403
Prob > chi 2 / Prob > F 0.0001 0.0034 ~0 ~0 0.0001 ~0 ~0 ~0
Candidate Recruitment
† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses. 
Dependent Variables
Voting Campaigning
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Appendix C-4: Original Analysis of Non-Electoral Participation (1993)
Independent Variables
Complained through 
thebureaucratic 
hierarchy
Complained through 
the trade union
Expressed opinions 
directly to the leader
Asked other leader 
in the same unit to 
intervene
Sought help from 
those who could 
persuade the leader
Wrote letter to 
government offices
Seeking help from 
official's friends
Sent gifts or 
invited leader to 
dinner 
Workplace .12 (.08) -.06 (.10) .05** (.07) .03 (.08) .03 (.08) .01 (.12) -.06 (.11) -.12 (.12)
Political Organization .35** (.16) .17 (.19) .02 (.13) .002 (.15) -0.042 -.35†  (.22) -.02 (.20) .06 (.23)
Father's Party Membership -.001 (.16) .17 (.19) .18 (.12) -.08 (.15) -.001 (.15) -.44 (.26) .28 (.20) -.16 (.22)
Father's Education .02 (.05) .03 (.05) -.04 (.04) -.007 (.04) -.04 (.05) .07* (.06) .01 (.06) -.02 (.07)
Socioeconomic Resources
Position
-.05 (.09) .04 (.11) -.04 (.07) -.03 (.08) -.01 (.09) .1 (.13) -.11 (.12) -.03 (.12)
Income×10(-4)
-.41 (.92) 1.6 (1.3) -.74 (.73) -.92 (.89) .31 (.87) -1.4 (1.3) -1.40 (1.38) -.64 (1.3)
Education
-.07 (.08) .04 (.09) .05 (.06) .03 (.07) .09 (.07) .09 (.11) .13* (.10) .23** (.13)
Status .08 (.09) .15 (.10) .10 (.07) .20 (.09) .10 (.09) -.10 (.13) .29** (.13) .23* (.13)
Self-regarded Social Status .12 (.09) -.09 (.10) -.03 (.07) -.14 (.08) .06 (.09) .30** (.14) .05 (.13) -.11 (.13)
Male .20 (.15) .31* (.18) .01 (.11) .25 (.13) .13 (.14) .04 (.21) .004 (.18) .06 (.20)
Age .05 (.04) .11** (.05) .04 (.03) .02 (.04) .03 (.04) .09* (.05) .03 (.05) .16* (.08)
Age-squared×10(-4)
-2.7 (4.3) -51.41 -1.71 (3.53) -2.0 (4.2) -2.7 (4.22) -7.2 (5.6) -2.8 (5.8) -21.3** (10.6)
Marital Status
-.28 (.20) -.5** (.21) -.19 (.16) .16 (.19) -.23 (.18) -.36 (.25) -.53** (.23) .24 (.30)
Ethnic Background 
-.27 (.32) .16 (.44) .01 (.27) .21 (.34) -.27 (.31) -.86** (.36) -.06 (.42) -0.2584
Psychological Engagement
Party Membership .28 (.17) .30 (.20) .07 (.14) .15 (.16) .10 (.18) -.2 (.26) -.07 (.25) -.14 (.25)
Political Interest
-.08 (.06) -.11 (.07) -.008 (.05) .04 (.06) .03 (.06) .08 (.09) .08 (.08) .08(.09)
Political Knowledge
-.11 (.16) .20* (.15) -.1 (.12) -.1 (.14) -.36 (.15) .11 (.22) -.33 (.20) -.32 (.21)
Internal Political Efficacy .02 (.13) .12 (.15) .12 (.10) .06 (.12) .12 (.12) .33** (.16) -.15 (16) -.20 (.19)
External Political Efficacy .24* (.13) .20 (.15) .07 (.10) .20 (.12) .16 (.12) -.2 (.18) .08 (.16) .04 (.18)
Government Attitude
-.52** (.16) -03 (.17) -.25** (.12) -.47 (.14) -.14 (.14) -.04 (.21) -.22 (.18) -0.0756
Faith in People
.03 (.14) -.15 (.16) -.04 (.11) .03 (.13) .03 (.13) -.16 (.20) .24 (.17) .10 (.19)
_cut1/ constant 1.6 (1.5) 4.3 (1.4) .80 (.89) .84 (1.1) 1.4 (1.1) 3.2 (1.6) 1.9 (1.4) 2.9 (2.0)
_cut2 2.0 (1.2) 4.7 (1.4) 1.4 (.90) 1.3 (1.1) 1.9 (1.1) 3.6 (1.6) 2.5 (1.4) 3.4 (2.0)
_cut3 3.1 (1.2) 5.5 (1.4) 2.5 (.90) 2.5 (1.1) 3.0 (1.1) 4.5 (1.6) 3.6 (1.5)
Number of observations 457 457 457 457 457 457 457 457
Log Likelihood/Adj R-squared -325.6445 -222.4474 -585.22329 -384.94343 -360.88854 -149.80884 -168.73726 -140.46297
Prob > chi 2 / Prob > F 0.0002 0.0981 0.0247 0.0738 0.  4893 0.0133 0.1433 0.061
† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses. 
Dependent Variables
Complaining Official Contacting
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Appendix C-5: Probability of 2002 Writing to Government Offices by Education  
 
Quantity of Interest 
Illiterate 
(s.e.) 
Primary  
School 
(s.e.) 
Middle 
School 
(s.e.) 
High 
School 
(s.e.) 
Evening 
College 
(s.e.) 
College 
(s.e.) 
Graduate 
School 
(s.e.) 
Pr (wrote to government offices=0) 
0.98  
(.01) 
0.98 
(.009) 
0.97 
(.008) 
0.96 
(.008) 
0.94 
(.013) 
0.92 
(.025) 
0.89 
(.043) 
Pr (wrote to government offices=1) 
0.01 
(.004) 
0.01 
(.004) 
0.01 
(.004) 
0.02 
(.005) 
0.03 
(.007) 
0.03 
(.010) 
0.04 
(.015) 
Pr (wrote to government offices=2) 
0.01 
(.003) 
0.01 
(.004) 
0.01 
(.004) 
0.02 
(.005)  
0.02 
(.007) 
0.03 
(.013) 
0.04 
(.020) 
Pr (wrote to government offices=3) 
0.00 
(.002) 
0.00 
(.002) 
0.00 
(.002) 
0.01 
(.003) 
0.01 
(.004)  
0.02 
(.008) 
0.03 
(.015) 
 
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Illiterate Middle
School
Evening
College
Graduate
School
Education Level
Figure C-1: First Difference of the Influence of Education on 
Writing to Government Offices
Pr(wrote to government
offices=3)
Pr(wrote to government
offices=2)
Pr(wrote to government
offices=1)
Pr(wrote to government
offices=0)
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix D. Voting by Individual Work Unit Type  
  
  
  
  
Independent  Variables Voting (1993) Voting (2002) 
Government Organizations .29 (.25) .09 (.19) 
State institutions .42** (.20) .16 (.16) 
State Enterprises .42** (.18) -.02 (.11) 
Collective Enterprises .40* (.20) .13 (.15) 
Political Organization .40*** (.10) / 
Father's Party Membership -.08 (.10) / 
Father's Education -.04 (.03) .0001 (.007) 
Socioeconomic Resources     
Position in the Workplace -.002 (.05) .02 (.05) 
Income×10(-4) -0.11* (.06) .02 (.02) 
Education -.03 (.04) .03 (.03) 
Self-regarded Economic Status -.0005 (.06) -.005 (.05) 
Self-regarded Social Status -.01 (.06) .06 (.05) 
Male -.06 (.09) -.02 (.07) 
Age .04** (.02) .06*** (.02) 
Age-squared×10(-4) -4.56** (1.8) -.06*** (.02) 
Marital Status .25** (.11) .09 (.16) 
Ethnic Background (Han) .22 (.22) -.14 (.16) 
Psychological Engagement     
Party Membership .03 (.12) .22** (.09) 
Political Interest .06 (.04) .06 (.05) 
Political Knowledge -.01 (.10) .08 (.08) 
Internal Political Efficacy .06 (.11) .13** (.06) 
External Political Efficacy -.02 (.09) .09 (.06) 
Government Attitude .05 (.10) .01 (.07) 
Faith in People .08 (.08) .05 (.08) 
constant -1.99*** (.68) -2.5*** (.40) 
Number of observations 1070 1754 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors appear in parentheses.  
† P<.15 * P<.10 ** P<.05 ***P<.01   
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